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V. Business Law 
 
In This Section: 
 
New Case:  Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States; Maine Community Health Options v. 
United States; and Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Co. v. United States. 
“U.S. SUPREME COURT TO HEAR MODA HEALTH’S $24 MILLION ACA APPEAL” 
Elizabeth Hayes 
“SUPREME COURT TO CONSIDER CASES ACCUSING US OF SHORTING HEALTH INSURERS 
$12B IN PROMISED PAYMENTS” 
Debra Cassens Weiss  
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR INSURERS’ SUIT ON OBAMACARE” 
Adam Liptak 
“INSURER WINS FIRST CSR PAYMENT DECISION; UPDATES ON BHP AND RISK CORRIDORS 
LITIGATION” 
Katie Keith 
“MODA TAKES A HIT IN COURT OF APPEALS DECISION” 
Tom Holt  
“INSURERS PREPARE TO APPEAL RISK CORRIDOR CASE TO THE SUPREME COURT” 
Evan Sweeney  
 
New Case: Allen v. Cooper  
“HIGH COURT TO TACKLE PIRATE SHIP COPYRIGHT FIGHT” 
Bill Donahue  
“SCOTUS TO DECIDE WHETHER STATES CAN BE SUED FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
IN CASE INVOLVING BACKBEARD’S SHIP” 
Krista L. Cox 
“SUPREME COURT TO RULE WHETHER CONGRESS APPROPRIATELY ABROGATED STATE 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR COPYRIGHT CLAIMS IN ALLEN V. COOPER” 
Steve Brachmann 
“YO HO NO: LACK OF EXPRESS LANGUAGE SCUTTLES CLAIM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
WAIVER” 
Rebecca Harker Duttry 
“THE STATE CAN PLUNDER YOUR COPYRIGHT: ALLEN V. COOPER” 
Brain Esler  
 
New Case: Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.  
“SUPREME COURT WILL HEAR CASE OVER COPYRIGHTS TO LEGAL TEXTS” 
Bill Donahue  
 “THE LAW©?: NO ONE OWNS THE LAW, AND NO ONE SHOULD BE ABLE TO COPYRIGHT IT” 
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The New York Times Editorial Board  
 “ACCUSED OF ‘TERRORISM’ FOR PUTTING LEGAL MATERIALS ONLINE” 
Adam Liptak 




New Case: Aurelius Investment, LLC v. Puerto Rico  
“PUERTO RICO BOARD APPOINTMENT DISPUTE GETS SUPREME COURT REVIEW” 
Greg Stohr, Michelle Kaske, and Steven Church  
 “UPDATE 1- U.S. SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE LEGALITY OF PUERTO RICO FINANCIAL 
BOARD APPOINTMENTS” 
Lawrence Hurley  
 “PUERTO RICO’S BANKRUPTCY PLAN IS ALMOST DONE, AND IT COULD START A FIGHT” 
Mary Williams Walsh 
“PUERTO RICO FACES HEDGE FUND LAWSUITS AS U.S. REPRIEVE ENDS” 
Michelle Kaske  
“FIRST CIRCUIT DECLARES APPOINTMENT OF FOMB MEMBERS VIOLATES APPOINTMENTS 
CLAUSE” 


























Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States 
 
Ruling Below: Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 
Overview: Congress refused to authorize $12 billion for the expected funding of the Affordable 
Care Act stabilization program aimed to encourage sales by health insurance companies. 
Department of Justice contend that the Affordable Care Act insurers are not entitled to $12 
billion because Congress specifically barred funding for that purpose. 
 
Issue: Whether Congress can evade its unambiguous statutory promise to pay health insurers for 
losses already incurred simply by enacting appropriations riders restricting the sources of funds 
available to satisfy the government’s obligation. 
 
Note: Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States is consolidated with Maine Community Health 
Options v. United States; and Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Co. v. United States.  
 




UNITED STATES, Defendant- Appellant 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit 
 
Decided on June 14, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
PROST, Chief Judge:  
A health insurer contends that the 
government failed to satisfy the full amount 
of its payment obligation under a program 
designed to alleviate the risk of offering 
coverage to an expanded pool of individuals. 
The Court of Federal Claims entered 
judgment for the insurer on both statutory and 
contract grounds. The government appeals. 




This case concerns a three-year “risk 
corridors” program described in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq.) (“ACA”), and 
implemented by regulations promulgated by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”). The case also concerns the 
bills that appropriated funds to HHS and the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”) within HHS for the fiscal years 
during which the program in question 
operated. We begin with the ACA.  
 
I. The ACA 
 
Among other reforms, the ACA established 
“health benefit exchanges”—virtual 
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marketplaces in each state wherein 
individuals and small groups could purchase 
health coverage. The new exchanges offered 
centralized opportunities for insurers to 
compete for new customers. The ACA 
required that all plans offered in the 
exchanges satisfy certain criteria, including 
providing certain “essential” benefits.  
 
Because insurers lacked reliable data to 
estimate the cost of providing care for the 
expanded pool of individuals seeking 
coverage via the new exchanges, insurers 
faced significant risk if they elected to offer 
plans in these exchanges. The ACA 
established three programs designed to 
mitigate that risk and discourage insurers 
from setting higher premiums to offset that 
risk: reinsurance, risk adjustment, and risk 
corridors. This case concerns the risk 
corridors program. 
 
Section 1342 of the ACA directed the 
Secretary of HHS to establish a risk corridors 
program for calendar years 2014–2016. The 
full text of Section 1342 is reproduced below:  
 
(a) In general  
The Secretary shall establish and 
administer a program of risk corridors 
for calendar years 2014, 2015, and 
2016 under which a qualified health 
plan offered in the individual or small 
group market shall participate in a 
payment adjustment system based on 
the ratio of the allowable costs of the 
plan to the plan’s aggregate 
premiums. Such program shall be 
based on the program for regional 
participating provider organizations 
under part D of title XVIII of the 
Social Security Act. 
 
(b) Payment methodology  
(1) Payments out  
The Secretary shall provide 
under the program established 
under subsection (a) that if—  
(A) a participating plan’s 
allowable costs for any plan 
year are more than 103 
percent but not more than 108 
percent of the target amount, 
the Secretary shall pay to the 
plan an amount equal to 50 
percent of the target amount in 
excess of 103 percent of the 
target amount; and  
 
(B) a participating plan’s 
allowable costs for any plan 
year are more than 108 
percent of the target amount, 
the Secretary shall pay to the 
plan an amount equal to the 
sum of 2.5 percent of the 
target amount plus 80 percent 
of allowable costs in excess of 
108 percent of the target 
amount.  
(2) Payments in  
The Secretary shall provide 
under the program established 
under subsection (a) that if—  
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(A) a participating plan’s 
allowable costs for any plan 
year are less than 97 percent 
but not less than 92 percent of 
the target amount, the plan 
shall pay to the Secretary an 
amount equal to 50 percent of 
the excess of 97 percent of the 
target amount over the 
allowable costs; and  
 
(B) a participating plan’s 
allowable costs for any plan 
year are less than 92 percent 
of the target amount, the plan 
shall pay to the Secretary an 
amount equal to the sum of 
2.5 percent of the target 
amount plus 80 percent of the 
excess of 92 percent of the 
target amount over the 
allowable costs.  
 
(c) Definitions  
 
In this section:  
 
(1) Allowable costs  
 
(A) In general  
 
The amount of allowable 
costs of a plan for any year is 
an amount equal to the total 
costs (other than 
administrative costs) of the 
plan in providing benefits 
covered by the plan.  
 
(B) Reduction for risk 
adjustment and reinsurance 
payments  
 
Allowable costs shall [be] 
reduced by any risk 
adjustment and reinsurance 
payments received under 
section[s] 18061 and 18063 of 
this title. 
 
(2) Target amount  
 
The target amount of a plan 
for any year is an amount 
equal to the total premiums 
(including any premium 
subsidies under any 
governmental program), 
reduced by the administrative 
costs of the plan.  
 
Briefly, section 1342 directed the Secretary 
of HHS to establish a program whereby 
participating plans whose costs of providing 
coverage exceeded the premiums received 
(as determined by a statutory formula) would 
be paid a share of their excess costs by the 
Secretary— “payments out.” Conversely, 
participating plans whose premiums 
exceeded their costs (according to the same 
formula) would pay a share of their profits to 
the Secretary—“payments in.” The risk 
corridors program “permit[ted] issuers to 
lower [premiums] by not adding a risk 
premium to account for perceived 




On March 20, 2010, just three days before 
Congress passed the ACA, the Congressional 
Budget Office (“CBO”) published an 
estimate of the ACA’s cost. The CBO Cost 
Estimate made no mention of the risk 
corridors program, though it scored the 
reinsurance and risk adjustment programs. 
Overall, CBO predicted the ACA would 
reduce the federal deficit by $143 billion over 
the 2010–2019 period it evaluated.  
 
Preambulatory language in the ACA referred 
to CBO’s overall scoring, noting that the 
“Act will reduce the Federal deficit between 
2010 and 2019.”  
 
II. Implementing Regulations  
 
In March 2012, HHS promulgated 
regulations establishing the risk corridors 
program as directed by section 1342. Those 
regulations defined terms such as “allowable 
costs,” “administrative costs,” “premiums 
earned,” and “target amount,” all of which 
would ultimately factor into the calculations 
of payments in and payments out required by 
the statutory formula.  
 
The regulations also provided that insurers 
offering qualified health plans in the 
exchanges “will receive payment from HHS 
in the following amounts, under the 
following circumstances” and it recited the 
same formula set forth in the statute for 
payments out. The regulations similarly 
provided that insurers “must remit charges to 
HHS” according to the statutory formula for 
payments in.  
 
In March 2013, after an informal rulemaking 
proceeding, HHS published parameters for 
payments under various ACA programs for 
the first year of the exchanges, 2014, 
including the risk corridors program. The 
parameters revised certain definitions and 
added others, incorporating a certain level of 
profits as part of the allowable administrative 
costs. The parameters also provided that an 
issuer of a plan in an exchange must submit 
all information required for calculating risk 
corridors payments by July 31 of the year 
following the benefit year. HHS also 
indicated that “the risk corridors program is 
not required to be budget neutral,” so HHS 
would make full payments “as required under 
Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act.”  
This constituted the final word from HHS on 
the risk corridors program before the 
exchanges opened and the program began.  
 
III. Transitional Policy  
 
The ACA established several reforms for 
insurance plans—such as requiring a 
minimum level of coverage— scheduled to 
take effect on January 1, 2014. Non-
compliant plans in effect prior to the passage 
of the ACA in 2010, however, received a 
statutory exemption from certain 
requirements. This meant that insurers 
expected the pool of participants in the 
exchanges to include both previously 
uninsured individuals as well as individuals 
whose previous coverage terminated because 
their respective plans did not comply with the 
ACA and did not qualify for the 
grandfathering exemption.  
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Individuals and small businesses enrolled in 
noncompliant plans not qualifying for the 
exemption received notice that their plans 
would be terminated. Many expressed 
concern that new coverage would be “more 
expensive than their current coverage, and 
thus they may be dissuaded from 
immediately transitioning to such coverage.”  
In November 2013, after appellee Moda 
Health Plan, Inc. and other insurers had 
already set premiums for the exchanges for 
2014, HHS announced a one-year transitional 
policy that allowed insurers to continue to 
offer plans that did not comply with certain 
of the ACA’s reforms even for non-
grandfathered plans. HHS directed state 
agencies to adopt the same policies.  
 
This dampened ACA enrollment in states 
implementing the policy, especially by 
healthier individuals who elected to maintain 
their lower level of coverage, leaving insurers 
participating in the exchanges to bear greater 
risk than they accounted for in setting 
premiums. 
 
HHS acknowledged that “this transitional 
policy was not anticipated by health 
insurance issuers when setting rates for 
2014” but noted “the risk corridor program 
should help ameliorate unanticipated changes 
in premium revenue.”  HHS later extended 
the transitional period to last the duration of 
the risk corridor program.  
 
After further informal rulemaking (begun 
soon after announcing the transitional 
policy), HHS informed insurers that it would 
adjust the operation of the risk corridors 
program for the 2014 benefit year to “offset 
losses that might occur under the transitional 
policy as a result of increased claims costs not 
accounted for when setting 2014 premiums.”  
This included adjustments to HHS’s formula 
for calculating the “allowable costs” and 
“target amount” involved in the statutory 
formula.   
 
HHS projected that these new changes 
(together with changes to the reinsurance 
program) would “result in net payments that 
are budget neutral in 2014” and that it 
“intend[ed] to implement this program in a 
budget neutral manner” with adjustments 
over time with that goal in mind. 
 
In April 2014, CMS, the division of HHS 
responsible for administering the risk 
corridors program, released guidance 
regarding “Risk Corridors and Budget 
Neutrality.” It explained a new budget 
neutrality policy as follows:  
 
We anticipate that risk corridors 
collections will be sufficient to pay 
for all risk corridors payments. 
However, if risk corridors collections 
are insufficient to make risk corridors 
payments for a year, all risk corridors 
payments for that year will be 
reduced pro rata to the extent of any 
shortfall. Risk corridors collections 
received for the next year will first be 
used to pay off the payment 
reductions issuers experienced in the 
previous year in a proportional 
manner, up to the point where issuers 
are reimbursed in full for the previous 
year, and will then be used to fund 
current year payments. If, after the 
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obligations for the previous year have 
been met, the total amount of 
collections available in the current 
year is insufficient to make payments 
in that year, the current year payments 
will be reduced pro rata to the extent 
of any shortfall. If any risk corridors 
funds remain after prior and current 
year payment obligations have been 
met, they will be held to offset 
potential insufficiencies in risk 
corridors collections in the next year.  
 
As to any shortfall in the final year of 
payment, CMS stated it anticipated payments 
in would be sufficient, but that future 
guidance or rulemaking would address any 
persistent shortfalls.  
 
IV. Appropriations  
 
In February 2014, after HHS had proposed its 
adjustments to account for the transitional 
policy (but before HHS had finalized the 
adjustments), Congress asked the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
to determine what sources of funds could be 
used to make any payments in execution of 
the risk corridors program. GAO responded 
that it had identified two potential sources of 
funding in the appropriations for “Program 
Management” for CMS in FY 2014. That 
appropriation included a lump sum in excess 
of three billion dollars for carrying out certain 
responsibilities, including “other 
responsibilities” of CMS as well as “such 
sums as may be collected from authorized 
user fees.”  
 
GAO concluded that the “other 
responsibilities” language in the CMS 
Program Management appropriation for FY 
2014 could encompass payments to health 
plans under the risk corridors program, and 
so the lump-sum appropriation “would have 
been available for making payments pursuant 
to section 1342(b)(1).” Further, GAO 
concluded that the payments in from the risk 
corridors program constituted “user fees,” 
and so “any amounts collected in FY 2014 
pursuant to section 1342(b)(2) would have 
been available . . . for making the payments 
pursuant to section 1342(b)(2),” though HHS 
had not planned to make any such collections 
or payments until FY 2015.  
 
GAO clarified that appropriations acts “are 
considered nonpermanent legislation,” so the 
language it analyzed regarding the lump-sum 
appropriation and user fees “would need to be 
included in the CMS PM appropriation for 
FY 2015” in order to be available to make 
any risk corridors payments in FY 2015.  
 
In December 2014, Congress passed its 
appropriations to HHS for FY 2015 (during 
which the first benefit year covered by the 
risk corridors program would conclude). That 
legislation reenacted the user fee language 
that GAO had analyzed and provided a lump 
sum for CMS’s Program Management 
account; however, the lump-sum 
appropriation included a rider providing:  
 
None of the funds made available by 
this Act from the Federal Hospital 
Insurance Trust Fund or the Federal 
Supplemental Medical Insurance 
Trust Fund, or transferred from other 
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accounts funded by this Act to the 
‘Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services—Program Management’ 
account, may be used for payments 
under Section 1342(b)(1) of Public 
Law 111–148 (relating to risk 
corridors).  
 
Representative Harold Rogers, then-
Chairman of the House Committee on 
Appropriations, explained his view of the 
appropriations rider upon its inclusion in the 
appropriations bill for FY 2015:  
 
In 2014, HHS issued a regulation 
stating that the risk corridor program 
will be budget neutral, meaning that 
the federal government will never pay 
out more than it collects from issuers 
over the three year period risk 
corridors are in effect. The agreement 
includes new bill language to prevent 
CMS Program Management 
appropriation account from being 
used to support risk corridors 
payments.  
 
Congress enacted identical riders in FY 2016 
and FY 2017.  
 
V. Subsequent Agency Action 
 
In September 2015, CMS announced that the 
total amount of payments in fell short of the 
total amount requested in payments out. 
Specifically, it expected payments in of 
approximately $362 million but noted 
requests for payments out totaling $2.87 
billion. Accordingly, CMS planned to issue 
prorated payments at a rate of 12.6 percent, 
with any shortfall to be made up by the 
payments in received following the 2015 
benefit year.  
 
A follow-up letter noted that HHS would 
“explore other sources of funding for risk 
corridors payments, subject to the availability 
of appropriations” in the event of a shortfall 
following the final year of the program.  
 
A report from CMS shows that the total 
amount of payments in collected for the 
2014–2016 benefit years fell short of the total 
amount of payments out calculated according 
to the agency’s formula by more than $12 
billion.  
 
VI. Procedural History  
 
Moda commenced this action in the Court of 
Federal Claims under the Tucker Act in July 
2016. It seeks the balance between the 
prorated payments it received and the full 
amount of payments out according to section 
1342. The Court of Federal Claims denied the 
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim and 
granted Moda’s cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment as to liability.  
 
Both sides stipulated that the government 
owed Moda $209,830,445.79 in accordance 
with the ruling on liability. The trial court 
entered judgment for Moda accordingly. 
Dozens of other insurers filed actions 
alleging similar claims, with mixed results 
from the Court of Federal Claims. The Court 
of Federal Claims had jurisdiction under the 
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).2 We 
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Moda advances claims based on two theories. 
First, Moda contends that section 1342 itself 
obligates the government to pay insurers the 
full amount indicated by the statutory 
formula for payments out, notwithstanding 
the amount of payments in collected. Second, 
Moda contends that HHS made a contractual 
agreement to pay the full amount required by 
the statute in exchange for Moda’s 
performance (by offering a compliant plan in 
an exchange), and the government breached 
that agreement by failing to pay the full 
amount according to the statutory formula for 
payments out.  
 
We review the Court of Federal Claims’ legal 
conclusion that the government was liable on 
both theories de novo.  
 
I. Statutory Claim  
 
Moda argues that section 1342 obligated the 
government to pay the full amount indicated 
by the statutory formula for payments out, 
not a pro rata sum of the payments in. The 
government responds that section 1342 itself 
contemplated operating the risk corridors 
program in a budget neutral manner (so the 
total amount of payments out due to insurers 
cannot exceed the amount of payments in). In 
the alternative, the government contends that 
appropriations riders on the fiscal years in 
which payments from the risk corridors 
program came due limited the government’s 
obligation to the amount of payments in. 
Although we agree with Moda that section 
1342 obligated the government to pay the full 
amount of risk corridors payments according 
to the formula it set forth, we hold that the 
riders on the relevant appropriations effected 
a suspension of that obligation for each of the 
relevant years.  
 
We begin with the statute.  
A. Statutory Interpretation  
The government asserts that Congress 
designed section 1342 to be budget neutral, 
funded solely through payments in and that 
the statute carries no obligation to make 
payments at the full amount indicated by the 
statutory formula if payments in fell short.  
 
Section 1342 is unambiguously mandatory. It 
provides that “[t]he Secretary shall establish 
and administer” a risk corridors program 
pursuant to which “[t]he Secretary shall 
provide” under the program that “the 
Secretary shall pay” an amount according to 
a statutory formula.  Nothing in section 1342 
indicates that the payment methodology is 
somehow limited by payments in. It simply 
sets forth a formula for calculating payment 
amounts based on a percentage of a “target 
amount” of allowable costs.  
 
The government reasons that we must 
nevertheless interpret section 1342 to be 
budget neutral, because Congress relied on 
the CBO Cost Estimate that the ACA would 
decrease the federal deficit between 2010 and 
2019, without evaluating the budgetary effect 
of the risk corridors program. Thus, 
according to the government, the ACA’s 
passage rested on an understanding that the 
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risk corridors program would be budget 
neutral.  
 
Nothing in the CBO Cost Estimate indicates 
that it viewed the risk corridors program as 
budget neutral. Indeed, even if CBO had 
accurately predicted the $12.3 billion 
shortfall that now exists, CBO’s overall 
estimate that the ACA would reduce the 
federal deficit would have remained true, 
since CBO had estimated a reduction of more 
than $100 billion.  
 
The government’s amicus suggests it is 
“inconceivable” that CBO would have 
declined to analyze the budgetary impact of 
the risk corridors program, given its 
obligation to prepare “an estimate of the costs 
which would be incurred in carrying out such 
bill.” Not so. It is entirely plausible that CBO 
expected payments in would roughly equal 
payments out over the three year program, 
especially since CBO could not have 
predicted the costly impact of HHS’s 
transitional policy, which had not been 
contemplated at that time. Without more, 
CBO’s omission of the risk corridors 
program from its report can be viewed as 
nothing more than a bare failure to speak. 
Moreover, even if CBO interpreted the 
statute to require budget neutrality, that 
interpretation warrants no deference, 
especially in light of HHS’s subsequent 
interpretation to the contrary. CBO’s silence 
simply cannot displace the plain meaning of 
the text of section 1342.  
 
The government also argues that section 
1342 created no obligation to make payments 
out in excess of payments in because it 
provided no budgetary authority to the 
Secretary of HHS and identified no source of 
funds for any payment obligations beyond 
payments in. But it has long been the law that 
the government may incur a debt independent 
of an appropriation to satisfy that debt, at 
least in certain circumstances.  
 
In United States v. Langston, Congress 
appropriated only five thousand dollars for 
the salary of a foreign minister, though a 
statute provided that the official’s salary 
would be seven thousand five hundred 
dollars. The Supreme Court held that the 
statute fixing the official’s salary could not be 
“abrogated or suspended by the subsequent 
enactments which merely appropriated a less 
amount” for the services rendered, absent 
“words that expressly, or by clear 
implication, modified or repealed the 
previous law.” That is, the government’s 
statutory obligation to pay persisted 
independent of the appropriation of funds to 
satisfy that obligation.  
 
Our predecessor court noted long ago that 
“[a]n appropriation per se merely imposes 
limitations upon the Government’s own 
agents; it is a definite amount of money 
intrusted to them for distribution; but its 
insufficiency does not pay the Government’s 
debts, nor cancel its obligations, nor defeat 
the rights of other parties.”  
 
It is also of no moment that, as the 
government notes, HHS could not have made 
payments out to insurers in an amount 
totaling more than the amount of payments in 
without running afoul of the Anti-Deficiency 
Act. That Act provides that “[a]n officer or 
 407 
employee of the United States Government . 
. . may not . . . make or authorize an 
expenditure . . . exceeding an amount 
available in an appropriation . . . for the 
expenditure.” But the Supreme Court has 
rejected the notion that the Anti-Deficiency 
Act’s requirements somehow defeat the 
obligations of the government. The Anti-
Deficiency Act simply constrains 
government officials.  
 
For the same reason, it is immaterial that 
Congress provided that the risk corridors 
program established by section 1342 would 
be “based on the program” establishing risk 
corridors in Medicare Part D yet declined to 
provide “budget authority in advance of 
appropriations acts,” as in the corresponding 
Medicare statute. Budget authority is not 
necessary to create an obligation of the 
government; it is a means by which an officer 
is afforded that authority.  
 
Here, the obligation is created by the statute 
itself, not by the agency. The government 
cites no authority for its contention that a 
statutory obligation cannot exist absent 
budget authority. Such a rule would be 
inconsistent with Langston, where the 
obligation existed independent of any budget 
authority and independent of a sufficient 
appropriation to meet the obligation.  
 
We conclude that the plain language of 
section 1342 created an obligation of the 
government to pay participants in the health 
benefit exchanges the full amount indicated 
by the statutory formula for payments out 
under the risk corridors program. We next 
consider whether, notwithstanding that 
statutory requirement, Congress has 
suspended or repealed that obligation.  
B. The Effect of the Appropriations 
Riders  
The government next argues the riders in the 
appropriations bills for FY 2015 and FY 2016 
repealed or suspended its obligation to make 
payments out in an aggregate amount 
exceeding payments in. We agree.  
 
Repeals by implication are generally 
disfavored, but “when Congress desires to 
suspend or repeal a statute in force, ‘[t]here 
can be no doubt that . . . it could accomplish 
its purpose by an amendment to an 
appropriation bill, or otherwise.’” Whether 
an appropriations bill impliedly suspends or 
repeals substantive law “depends on the 
intention of [C]ongress as expressed in the 
statutes.” The central issue on Moda’s 
statutory claim, therefore, is whether the 
appropriations riders adequately expressed 
Congress’s intent to suspend payments on the 
risk corridors program beyond the sum of 
payments in. We conclude the answer is yes.  
 
Moda contends, however, this issue is also 
controlled by Langston. There, as discussed 
above, the Supreme Court held that a bare 
failure to appropriate funds to meet a 
statutory obligation could not vitiate that 
obligation because it carried no implication 
of Congress’s intent to amend or suspend the 
substantive law at issue.  
 
Just three years before Langston, however, 
the Supreme Court held that a statute that had 
set the salaries of certain interpreters at a 
fixed sum “in full of all emoluments 
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whatsoever” had been impliedly amended, 
where Congress appropriated funds less than 
the fixed sum set by statute, with a separate 
sum set aside for additional compensation at 
the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior. 
The Court held:  
 
This course of legislation . . . 
distinctly reveal[ed] a change in the 
policy of [C]ongress on the subject, 
namely that instead of establishing a 
salary for interpreters at a fixed 
amount, and cutting off all other 
emoluments and allowances, 
[C]ongress intended to reduce the 
salaries and place a fund at the 
disposal of the [S]ecretary of the 
[I]nterior, from which, at his 
discretion, additional emoluments 
and allowances might be given to the 
interpreters.  
 
Thus, “for the time covered by those” 
appropriations bills, the intent of Congress 
was “plain on the face of the statute.”  
 
Langston expressly distinguished Mitchell 
because the appropriations bills in Mitchell 
implied “that [C]ongress intended to repeal 
the act” setting a fixed salary, with 
“additional pay” to be provided at the 
Secretary’s discretion. By contrast, Congress 
had “merely appropriated a less amount” for 
Langston’s salary.  
 
The question before us, then, is whether the 
riders on the CMS Program Management 
appropriations supplied the clear implication 
of Congress’s intent to impose a new 
payment methodology for the time covered 
by the appropriations bills in question, as in 
Mitchell, or if Congress merely appropriated 
a less amount for the risk corridors program, 
as in Langston.  
 
The Supreme Court has noted Langston 
“expresses the limit in that direction.” The 
jurisprudence in the century and a half since 
Langston has cemented that decision’s place 
as an extreme example of a mere failure to 
appropriate. Our case falls clearly within the 
core of subsequent decisions wherein 
appropriations bills carried sufficient 
implication of repeal, amendment, or 
suspension of substantive law to effect that 
purpose, as in Mitchell.  
 
In United States v. Vulte, the Supreme Court 
considered a series of enactments concerning 
bonuses for Marine Corps officers serving 
abroad. A 1902 act established a ten percent 
bonus for all such officers and appropriated 
funds accordingly. In 1906 and 1907, 
appropriations for the payment of that bonus 
carried a rider specifying that the funds could 
be used to pay officers serving “beyond the 
limits of the states comprising the Union of 
the territories of the United States contiguous 
thereto (except P[ue]rto Rico and Hawaii).” 
The appropriations for 1908 contained no 
such rider and stated the increase of pay for 
officers serving abroad “shall be as now 
provided by law.”  
 
An officer serving in Puerto Rico in 1908 
sought compensation accounting for the ten 
percent bonus enacted in 1902. The Supreme 
Court rejected the government’s position that 
the exception in the appropriations bills of 
1906 and 1907 impliedly repealed the 1902 
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act, noting that the appropriations riders 
lacked any “words of prospective extension” 
indicating a permanent change in the law. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the appropriation riders did 
indicate Congress’s intent to “temporarily 
suspend as to P[ue]rto Rico and Hawaii” the 
ten percent bonus in 1906 and 1907.  
 
In Dickerson, the Supreme Court considered 
the effect of various appropriations riders on 
a reenlistment bonus authorized by Congress 
in 1922. After several years in force, an 
appropriations rider expressly suspended the 
bonus for the fiscal years ending in 1934–
1937 . The text of the rider changed in the 
appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending 
in 1938. That bill omitted the express 
suspension, noting only that “no part of any 
appropriation contained in this or any other 
Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1938, 
shall be available for the payment” of, inter 
alia, the reenlistment bonus.  
 
The appropriations bill for the fiscal year 
ending in 1939 repeated that language. Floor 
debates showed that Congress intended the 
new language to carry the same restriction 
expressed in the earlier appropriations bills.. 
The Supreme Court held that the 
appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending 
in 1939 evinced Congress’s intent to suspend 
the reenlistment bonus in light of persuasive 
evidence to that effect.  
 
Finally, in Will, the Supreme Court 
considered the effect of appropriations riders 
on a set of statutes establishing annual pay 
raises for certain officials, including federal 
judges. Over a span of four years, Congress 
passed appropriations acts with riders 
limiting the use of funds to pay the increases 
for federal judges, among others. The first 
such rider provided that “no part of the funds 
appropriated in this Act or any other Act shall 
be used to pay the salary of an individual in a 
position or office referred to in” the act 
providing for the pay raises for federal 
judges.  
 
The dispute in Will concerned whether the 
effect of the appropriations riders ran afoul of 
the Compensation Clause of the Constitution. 
Before reaching that issue, however, the 
Supreme Court first rejected the judges’ 
contention that the appropriations bills did 
“no more than halt funding for the salary 
increases.” Acknowledging the general rule 
disfavoring repeals by implication and its 
“especial force” when the alleged repeal 
occurred in an appropriations bill, the Court 
held that in each of the four appropriations 
acts in question, “Congress intended to repeal 
or postpone previously authorized increases.” 
This was true although the riders in years 1, 
3, and 4 were “phrased in terms of limiting 
funds.”. The Court’s conclusion was 
bolstered by floor debates occurring in year 3 
of the appropriations riders as well as 
language expressly suspending the pay raises 
in year 2, but it concluded the rider in year 1 
indicated that same clear intent:  
 
These passages indicate[d] clearly 
that Congress intended to rescind 
these rates entirely, not simply to 
consign them to the fiscal limbo of an 
account due but not payable. The 
clear intent of Congress in each year 
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was to stop for that year the 
application of the Adjustment Act.  
 
Congress clearly indicated its intent here. It 
asked GAO what funding would be available 
to make risk corridors payments, and it cut 
off the sole source of funding identified 
beyond payments in. It did so in each of the 
three years of the program’s existence. And 
the explanatory statement regarding the 
amendment containing the first rider of 
House Appropriations Chairman Rogers 
confirms that the appropriations language 
was added with the understanding that HHS’s 
intent to operate the risk corridors program as 
a budget neutral program meant the 
government “will never pay out more than it 
collects from issuers over the three year 
period risk corridors are in effect.” Plainly, 
Congress used language similar to the 
appropriations riders in Vulte, Dickerson, and 
Will (and quite clearer than the language in 
Mitchell) to temporarily cap the payments 
required by the statute at the amount of 
payments in for each of the applicable 
years— just as those decisions altered 
statutory payment methodologies. 
 
What else could Congress have intended? It 
clearly did not intend to consign risk 
corridors payments “to the fiscal limbo of an 
account due but not payable.”  
 
Moda contends that notwithstanding the 
similarities between our case and the 
foregoing authority, Congress simply 
intended to limit the use of a single source of 
funding while leaving others available. Moda 
points out that the appropriations riders in 
Dickerson and Will foreclosed the use of 
funding provided by that appropriations act 
“or any other act,” while the riders here omit 
that global restriction. But the Supreme Court 
never considered the impact of that language 
in Dickerson or Will, and it found effective 
suspensions-by-appropriations in Mitchell 
and Vulte even absent that language.  
 
Moda suggests that restricting access to funds 
from “any other act” was necessary to 
foreclose HHS from using funds that 
remained available. It points to the CMS 
Program Management appropriation for FY 
2014 (before the risk corridors program 
began and before any appropriations riders 
had been enacted) as well as the Judgment 
Fund, a standing appropriation for the 
purpose of paying certain judgments against 
the government. We address each in turn.  
 
In response to a request of Congress, GAO 
concluded that the FY 2014 CMS Program 
Management fund “would have been 
available for risk-corridors payments.” 
According to Moda, this means HHS could 
have used funds from the FY 2014 
appropriation to make risk corridors 
payments for the 2015 benefit year (which 
concluded in FY 2015). Not so. GAO’s 
opinion only addressed what funds from FY 
2014 would have been available for risk 
corridors payments had any such payments 
been among the “other responsibilities” of 
CMS for that fiscal year. That appropriation 
expired in FY 2014. GAO specifically noted 
that “for funds to be available for this purpose 
in FY 2015, the CMS PM appropriation for 
FY 2015 must include language similar to the 
language included in the CMS PM 
appropriation for FY 2015.” Of course, 
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Congress enacted the rider for FY 2015 
instead.  
 
GAO’s opinion was correct. Under section 
1342, HHS could not have collected or owed 
payments out or payments in during FY 2014 
because the statute required calculations 
based on allowable costs for a plan year and 
the program was to run for calendar years 
2014, 2015, and 2016. Thus, HHS could not 
have been responsible for payments out until, 
at the earliest, the end of calendar year 2014, 
which occurred during FY 2015.  
 
Likewise, the CMS Program Management 
appropriations in the continuing resolutions 
enacted at the end of calendar year 2014 
(during FY 2015) expired in December 2014, 
when Congress enacted the FY 2015 
appropriations act (and the first rider in 
question)—still before HHS could have even 
calculated the payments in and payments out 
under the risk corridors program.  
 
Moda’s reliance on the Judgment Fund is also 
misplaced. The Judgment Fund is a general 
appropriation of “[n]ecessary amounts” in 
order “to pay final judgments” and other 
amounts owed via litigation against the 
government, subject to several conditions. 
The Judgment Fund “does not create an all 
purpose fund for judicial disbursement.” 
Rather, access to the Judgment Fund 
presupposes liability. Moda’s contention that 
the government’s liability persists because it 
could pay what it owed under the statutory 
scheme from the Judgment Fund reverses the 
inquiry. The question is what Congress 
intended, not what funds might be used if 
Congress did not intend to suspend payments 
in exceeding payments out.  
 
As discussed above, Congress’s intent to 
temporarily cap payments out at the amount 
of payments in was clear from the 
appropriations riders and their legislative 
history. It did not need to use Moda’s 
proposed magic words, “or any other act,” to 
foreclose resort to the Judgment Fund. We 
simply cannot infer, as Moda’s position 
would require, that upon enacting the 
appropriations riders, Congress intended to 
preserve insurers’ statutory entitlement to full 
risk corridors payments but to require 
insurers to pursue litigation to collect what 
they were entitled to. That theory cannot 
displace the plain implication of the language 
and legislative history of the appropriations 
riders.  
 
Moda points out that Congress’s intent 
regarding the appropriations riders must be 
understood with the context of other 
legislative efforts surrounding the ACA and 
the risk corridors program in particular. For 
example, Moda points to Congress’s failed 
attempt to enact legislation requiring budget 
neutrality for the risk corridors program. But 
we need not and do not conclude that 
Congress achieved through appropriations 
riders what it failed to do with permanent 
legislation. Rather, we only hold that 
Congress enacted temporary measures 
capping risk corridor payments out at the 
amount of payments in, and it did so for each 
year the program was in effect. (We need not 
address, for example, what would have 
occurred if Congress had failed to include the 
rider in one of the acts appropriating funds for 
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the fiscal years in which payments came due 
or if it had affirmatively appropriated funds 
through some other source.)  
 
It is also irrelevant that the President signed 
the bills containing the appropriations riders, 
even as he threatened to veto any bill rolling 
back the ACA, as Moda points out. Again, we 
do not hold that the appropriations riders 
effected any permanent amendment. 
Moreover, Moda has offered no evidence that 
President Obama expressed any specific 
views of the implications of these 
appropriations riders before or after signing, 
much less evidence that could overcome the 
clear implication of the text of the riders and 
the surrounding legislative history.  
 
Moda also contends that two decisions from 
our predecessor court, New York Airways, 
and Gibney v. United States, demonstrate that 
the appropriations riders here do not carry 
such strong implications. In New York 
Airways, our predecessor court held that 
Congress’s failure to appropriate sufficient 
funds to pay for services at a rate set by a 
government agency did not defeat the 
obligation to pay the full amount. Floor 
debates indicated that “Congress was well-
aware that the Government would be legally 
obligated to pay . . . even if the appropriations 
were deficient.” The court noted that 
Congress viewed the obligation “as a 
contractual obligation enforceable in the 
courts which could be avoided only by 
changing the substantive law under which the 
Board set the rates, rather than by curtailing 
appropriations,” and the agency made its 
similar view of the obligation clear to 
Congress.  
Here, the risk corridors program is an 
incentive program, not a quid pro quo 
exchange for services rendered like that in 
New York Airways. Moreover, it is much 
clearer here that Congress understood the 
appropriations riders to suspend substantive 
law, inasmuch as the appropriations riders 
directly responded to GAO’s identification of 
only two sources of funding for the program.  
 
In Gibney, a statute provided that certain 
employees of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service would be paid 
overtime at a particular rate. Two subsequent 
statutes extended a more stringent overtime 
rate to other federal employees, while 
expressly leaving the prior rate for INS in 
place. A rider in an appropriations bill 
provided that “none of the funds appropriated 
for the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service shall be used to pay compensation for 
overtime services other than as provided in” 
the latter two acts. INS agents who received 
overtime payments at the more stringent rate 
fixed in the latter acts sought payment at the 
earlier rate.  
 
That rider, according to the Gibney court, 
constituted “a mere limitation on the 
expenditure of a particular fund and had no 
other effect,” so it could not limit the 
overtime rate available to an INS agent. But 
the court’s holding ultimately rested on a 
different point—that limiting overtime 
payments “as provided in” the new acts had 
no effect on the rate for INS agents, since the 
new acts expressly preserved their special 
overtime rate. The appropriations rider did 
“not even purport to affect the right of 
immigration inspectors to overtime pay as 
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provided in the” earlier act. The 
interpretation of the appropriations riders in 
Gibney cannot be viewed in isolation of its 
alternative holding, and there is no safety 
valve built into the ACA to preserve the 
government’s obligation notwithstanding 
Congress’s suspension of it. Accordingly, 
Gibney is inapposite.  
 
After oral argument in this case had occurred, 
Moda filed a citation of supplemental 
authority as permitted by Rule 28(j) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
indicating that HHS had released a proposed 
budget for FY 2019, including a proposal 
indicating an $11.5 billion outlay for risk 
corridors payments in FY 2018 (reflective of 
the effect of sequestration on the total $12.3 
billion outstanding) and noting a “legislative 
proposal to fully fund the Risk Corridors 
Program.”  
 
According to Moda, this refutes the 
government’s positions on its statutory 
claims. In particular, Moda states, “if the 
appropriation riders had substantively 
amended the ACA, the government would 
have no basis now to be proposing to 
appropriate funds to fulfill the entirety of its 
[risk corridor] obligations.”  
 
Moda again misunderstands the inquiry. The 
question is what intent was communicated by 
Congress’s enactments in the appropriations 
bills for FY 2015–2017. It is irrelevant that a 
subsequent Administration proposed a 
budget that set aside funds to make purported 
outstanding risk corridors payments. Of 
course, Congress could conceivably reinstate 
an obligation to make full payments, even 
now after the program has concluded. But the 
proposed budget does not place that question 
before us.  
 
The intent of Congress remains clear. After 
GAO identified only two sources of funding 
for the risk corridors program—payments in 
and the CMS Program Management fund—
Congress cut off access to the only fund 
drawn from taxpayers. A statement 
discussing that enactment acknowledged 
“that the federal government will never pay 
out more than it collects from issuers over the 
three year period risk corridors are in effect.” 
Congress could have meant nothing else but 
to cap the amount of payments out at the 
amount of payments in for each of the three 
years it enacted appropriations riders to that 
effect.  
 
Moda contends that this result is inconsistent 
with the purpose of the risk corridors 
program. Perhaps. But it also seems that 
Congress expected the program to have 
minimal, if any, budget impact (even though 
we hold the text of section 1342 allowed for 
unbounded budget impact). Congress could 
not have predicted the shifting sands of the 
transitional policy implemented by HHS, 
which Moda blames for the higher costs it 
and other insurers bore through their 
participation in the exchanges. In response to 
that turn of events, Congress made the policy 
choice to cap payments out, and it remade 
that decision for each year of the program. 
We do not sit in judgment of that decision. 
We simply hold that the appropriations riders 
carried the clear implication of Congress’s 
intent to prevent the use of taxpayer funds to 
support the risk corridors program.  
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Thus, Moda’s statutory claim cannot stand.  
 
II. Contract Claim  
 
Moda also asserts an independent claim for 
breach of an implied-in-fact contract that 
purportedly promised payments of the full 
amount indicated by the statutory formula in 
exchange for participation in the exchanges.  
 
The requirements for establishing a contract 
with the government are the same for express 
and implied contracts. They are (1) 
“mutuality of intent to contract,” (2) 
“consideration,” (3) “lack of ambiguity in 
offer and acceptance,” and (4) “actual 
authority” of the government representative 
whose conduct is relied upon to bind the 
government.  
 
Absent clear indication to the contrary, 
legislation and regulation cannot establish the 
government’s intent to bind itself in a 
contract. We apply a “presumption that ‘a law 
is not intended to create private contractual or 
vested rights but merely declares a policy to 
be pursued until the legislature shall ordain 
otherwise.’” This is because the legislature’s 
function is to make laws establishing policy, 
not contracts, and policies “are inherently 
subject to revision and repeal.”  
 
Moda does not contend that the government 
manifested intent via the text of section 1342 
alone. Indeed, the statute contains no 
promissory language from which we could 
find such intent. Instead, Moda alleges a 
contract arising “from the combination of 
[the statutory] text, HHS’s implementing 
regulations, HHS’s preamble statements 
before the ACA became operational, and the 
conduct of the parties, including relating to 
the transitional policy.”  
 
The centerpiece of Moda’s contract theory 
(and the foundation for the trial court’s 
decision in this case) is Radium Mines, Inc. v. 
United States. There, the Atomic Energy 
Commission issued regulations titled “Ten 
Year Guaranteed Minimum Price,” in order 
“[t]o stimulate domestic production of 
uranium.” The regulations established 
guaranteed minimum prices for uranium 
delivered to the commission, with specific 
conditions required for entitlement to the 
minimum price.  
 
The court observed that the title of the 
regulation indicated that the government 
would “guarantee” the prices recited and that 
the regulation’s “purpose was to induce 
persons to find and mine uranium,” when, 
due to restrictions on private transactions in 
uranium, “no one could have prudently 
engaged in its production unless he was 
assured of a Government market.” The court 
rejected the government’s position that the 
regulations constituted a mere invitation to 
make an offer, holding instead that the 
regulation itself constituted “an offer, which 
ripened into a contract when it was accepted 
by the plaintiff’s putting itself into a position 
to supply the ore or the refined uranium 
described in it.”  
 
Moda contends that here, the statute, its 
implementing regulations, and HHS’s 
conduct all evinced the government’s intent 
to induce insurers to offer plans in the 
exchanges without an additional premium 
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accounting for the risk of the dearth of data 
about the expanded market, in reliance on the 
presence of a fairly comprehensive safety net. 
But the overall scheme of the risk corridors 
program lacks the trappings of a contractual 
arrangement that drove the result in Radium 
Mines. There, the government made a 
“guarantee,” it invited uranium dealers to 
make an “offer,” and it promised to “offer a 
form of contract” setting forth “terms” of 
acceptance. Not so here.  
 
The risk corridors program is an incentive 
program designed to encourage the provision 
of affordable health care to third parties 
without a risk premium to account for the 
unreliability of data relating to participation 
of the exchanges—not the traditional quid 
pro quo contemplated in Radium Mines. 
Indeed, an insurer that included that risk 
premium, but nevertheless suffered losses for 
a benefit year as calculated by the statutory 
and regulatory formulas would still be 
entitled to seek risk corridors payments.  
 
Additionally, the parties in Radium Mines, 
one of which was the government, never 
disputed that the government intended to 
form some contractual relationship at some 
time throughout the exchange. The only 
question there was whether the regulations 
themselves constituted an offer, or merely an 
invitation to make offers. Radium Mines is 
only precedent for what it decided.  
 
Here, no statement by the government 
evinced an intention to form a contract. The 
statute, its regulations, and HHS’s conduct all 
simply worked towards crafting an incentive 
program. These facts cannot overcome the 
“well-established presumption” that 
Congress and HHS never intended to form a 
contract by enacting the legislation and 
regulation at issue here.  
 
Accordingly, Moda cannot state a contract 
claim. 
  
* * *  
 
Because we conclude that the government 
does not owe Moda anything in excess of its 
pro rata share of payments in, we need not 
address whether payments were due annually 
or only at the end of the three-year period 




Although section 1342 obligated the 
government to pay participants in the 
exchanges the full amount indicated by the 
formula for risk corridor payments, we hold 
that Congress suspended the government’s 
obligation in each year of the program 
through clear intent manifested in 
appropriations riders. We also hold that the 
circumstances of this legislation and 
subsequent regulation did not create a 
contract promising the full amount of risk 
corridors payments. Accordingly, we hold 
that Moda has failed to state a viable claim 
for additional payments under the risk 
corridors program under either a statutory or 





The parties shall bear their own costs.  
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NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The United States and members of the health 
insurance industry, in connection with the 
program referred to as “Obamacare,” agreed 
to a three-year plan that would mitigate the 
risk of providing low-cost insurance to 
previously uninsured and underinsured 
persons of unknown health risk. This risk-
abatement plan is included in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (ACA). As 
described by the Court of Federal Claims,1 
the “risk corridors” provision accommodates 
the unpredictable risk of the extended 
healthcare programs. By this provision, the 
government will “‘share in profits or losses 
resulting from inaccurate rate setting from 
2014 to 2016.’” The risk corridors program 
was enacted as Section 1342 of the 
Affordable Care Act, and is codified in 
Section 18062 of Title 42. Subsection (a) is 
as follows:  
 
The Secretary shall establish and 
administer a program of risk corridors 
for calendar years 2014, 2015, and 
2016 under which a qualified health 
plan offered in the individual or small 
group market shall participate in a 
payment adjustment system based on 
the ratio of the allowable costs of the 
plan to the plan’s aggregate 
premiums. Such program shall be 
based on the program for regional 
participating provider organizations 
under part D of [the Medicare Act].  
 
The statute contains a detailed formula for 
this risk corridors sharing of profits and 
losses. Healthcare insurers throughout the 
nation, including Moda Health Plan, accepted 
and fulfilled the new healthcare procedures, 
in collaboration with administration of the 
ACA by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) in the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS).  
 
Many health insurers soon experienced 
losses, attributed at least in part to a 
governmental action called the “transitional 
policy.” Reassurance was presented, and 
Moda (and others) continued to perform their 
obligations. Although the government 
continued to collect “payments in” from 
insurers who more accurately predicted risk, 
the government has declined to pay its 
required risk corridors amounts, by 
restricting the funds available for the 
“payments out.”  
 
The Court of Federal Claims held the 
government to its statutory and contractual 
obligations to Moda. My colleagues do not. I 
respectfully dissent.  
 
The Court of Federal Claims interpreted 
the statute in accordance with its terms  
 
The ACA provides the risk corridors formula, 
establishing that the insurer will make 
“payments in” to the government for the 
insurer’s excess profits as calculated by the 
formula, and “payments out” from the 
government for the insurer’s excess losses. 
The formula was enacted into statute:  
 
The Secretary shall provide under the 
program established under subsection 
(a) that if—  
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(A) a participating plan’s allowable 
costs for any plan year are more than 
103 percent but not more than 108 
percent of the target amount, the 
Secretary shall pay to the plan an 
amount equal to 50 percent of the 
target amount in excess of 103 
percent of the target amount; and  
 
(B) a participating plan’s allowable 
costs for any plan year are more than 
108 percent of the target amount, the 
Secretary shall pay to the plan an 
amount equal to the sum of 2.5 
percent of the target amount plus 80 
percent of allowable costs in excess 
of 108 percent of the target amount.  
 
In March 2012, HHS issued regulations for 
the risk corridors program, stating that 
Qualified Health Plans (QHPs) “will receive 
payment” or “must remit charges” depending 
on their gains or losses. In March 2013, HHS 
stated:  
 
The risk corridors program is not 
statutorily required to be budget 
neutral. Regardless of the balance of 
payments and receipts, HHS will 
remit payments as required under 
section 1342 of the Affordable Care 
Act.  
 
Moda cites this reassurance, as Moda 
continued to offer and implement healthcare 
policies in accordance with the Affordable 
Care Act.  
 
The “transitional policy” resulted in a change 
in the risk profile of participants in the 
Affordable Care Act. Moda states that “many 
individuals who had previously passed 
medical underwriting, and were considerably 
healthier than the uninsured population, 
maintained their existing insurance and did 
not enroll in QHPs,”, thereby reducing the 
amount of premiums collected from healthier 
persons. HHS stated, in announcing the 
transitional policy, that “the risk corridor 
program should help ameliorate 
unanticipated changes in premium revenue.”  
 
The transitional policy was initially 
announced as applying only until October 1, 
2014. However, it was renewed throughout 
the period here at issue.  
 
The risk corridors obligations were not 
cancelled by the appropriations riders  
 
In April 2014, HHS-CMS issued an 
“informal bulletin” stating, “We anticipate 
that risk corridors collections will be 
sufficient to pay for all risk corridors 
payments. However, if risk corridors 
collections are insufficient to make risk 
corridors payments for a year, all risk 
corridors payments for that year will be 
reduced pro rata to the extent of any 
shortfall.” HHS also stated “that the 
Affordable Care Act requires the Secretary to 
make full payments to issuers,” and that it 
was “recording those amounts that remain 
unpaid . . . [as an] obligation of the United 
States Government for which full payment is 
required.”  
 
The issue on this appeal is focused on the 
interpretation and application of the “rider” 
that was attached to the omnibus annual 
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appropriations bills. This rider prohibits HHS 
from using its funds, including its bulk 
appropriation, to make risk corridors 
payments. My colleagues hold that this rider 
avoided or indefinitely postponed the 
government’s risk corridors obligations. The 
Court of Federal Claims, receiving this 
argument from the United States, correctly 
discarded it.  
 
Meanwhile, the risk corridors statute was not 
repealed or the payment regulations 
withdrawn, despite attempts in Congress. 
Moda continued to perform its obligations in 
accordance with its agreement with the 
CMS’s administration of the Affordable Care 
Act.  
 
A statute cannot be repealed or amended 
by inference  
 
To change a statute, explicit legislative 
statement and action are required. Nor can 
governmental obligations be eliminated by 
simply restricting the funds that might be 
used to meet the obligation. The 
appropriation riders that prohibited the use of 
general HHS funds to pay the government’s 
risk corridors obligations did not erase the 
obligations. The Court of Federal Claims 
correctly so held.  
 
The mounting problems with the Affordable 
Care Act did not go unnoticed. In September 
2014, the General Accountability Office 
(GAO) responded to an inquiry from Senator 
Jeff Sessions and Representative Fred Upton, 
and stated that “the CMS PM [Centers for 
Medicare Services-Program Management] 
appropriation for FY 2014 would have been 
available for making the payments pursuant 
to section 1342(b)(1).” The GAO also stated 
that “payments under the risk corridors 
program are properly characterized as user 
fees” and could be used to make payments 
out. This review also cited the available 
recourse to the general CMS assessment. 
However, in December 2014, the 
appropriations bill for that fiscal year 
contained a rider that prohibited HHS from 
using various funds, including the CMS PM 
funds, for risk corridors payments. The rider 
stated:  
 
None of the funds made available by 
this Act from the Federal Hospital 
Insurance Trust Fund or the Federal 
Supplemental Medical Insurance 
Trust Fund, or transferred from other 
accounts funded by this Act to the 
“Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services-Program Management” 
account, may be used for payments 
under section 1342(b)(1) of [the 
ACA] (relating to risk corridors). 
 
Similar riders were included in the omnibus 
appropriations bills for the ensuing years. As 
the Court of Federal Claims recited, by 
September 2016, after collecting all 
payments in for the 2015 year, it was clear 
that all payments in would be needed to cover 
2014 losses, and that no payments out would 
be made for the 2015 plan year. Moda states: 
“The Government owed Moda $89,426,430 
for 2014 and $133,951,163 for 2015, but only 
paid $14,254,303 for 2014 and nothing for 
2015, leaving a $209,123,290 shortfall.”  
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The panel majority ratifies an “indefinite 
suspension” of payment, stating that this was 
properly achieved by cutting off the funds for 
payment. The majority correctly states that 
“the government’s statutory obligation to pay 
persisted independent of the appropriation of 
funds to satisfy that obligation.” However, 
the majority then subverts its ruling, and 
holds that the government properly 
“indefinitely suspended” compliance with 
the statute. 
 
In United States v. Will, the Court explained 
that “when Congress desires to suspend or 
repeal a statute in force, ‘[t]here can be no 
doubt that . . . it could accomplish its purpose 
by an amendment to an appropriation bill, or 
otherwise.’” However, this intent to suspend 
or repeal the statute must be expressed: “The 
whole question depends on the intention of 
Congress as expressed in the statutes.”  
 
“The cardinal rule is that repeals by 
implication are not favored.” “The doctrine 
disfavoring repeals by implication ‘applies 
with full vigor when . . . the subsequent 
legislation is an appropriations measure,’” as 
here. As the Court of Federal Claims 
observed:  
 
Repealing an obligation of the United 
States is a serious matter, and burying 
a repeal in a standard appropriations 
bill would provide clever legislators 
with an end-run around the 
substantive debates that a repeal 
might precipitate.  
 
The classic case of United States v. Langston, 
speaks clearly, that the intent to repeal or 
modify legislation must be clearly stated, in 
“words that expressly or by clear implication 
modified or repealed the previous law.” The 
Court explained that a statute should not be 
deemed abrogated or suspended unless a 
subsequent enactment contains words that 
“expressly, or by clear implication, modified 
or repealed the previous law.”  
 
My colleagues dispose of Langston as an 
“extreme example,” stating that subsequent 
decisions are more useful since Langston is a 
“century and a half” old. Indeed it is, and has 
stood the test of a century and a half of logic, 
citation, and compliance. Nonetheless 
discarding Langston, the panel majority finds 
intent to change the government’s obligations 
under the risk corridors statute. The majority 
concludes that “Congress clearly indicated its 
intent” to change the government’s 
obligations, reciting two factors: 
 
First, the majority concludes that the 
appropriations riders were a response to the 
GAO’s guidance that there were two 
available sources of funding for the risk 
corridors program, and that Congress 
intended to remove the GAO-suggested 
source of funds from the HHS-CMS program 
management funds. My colleagues find that, 
by removing access to the HHS-CMS funds, 
Congress stated its clear intent to amend the 
statute and abrogate the payment obligation 
if the payments in were insufficient. 
However, they point to no statement in the 
legislative history suggesting that the rider 
was enacted in response to the GAO’s report.  
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Next, my colleagues look to the remarks of 
Chairman Harold Rogers to discern intent. 
He stated:  
 
In 2014, HHS issued a regulation 
stating that the risk corridor program 
will be budget neutral, meaning that 
the federal government will never pay 
out more than it collects from issuers 
over the three year period risk 
corridors are in effect. The agreement 
includes new bill language to prevent 
CMS Program Management 
appropriation account from being 
used to support risk corridors 
payments.  
 
Chairman Rogers is referring to the April 
2014 “guidance,” where HHS stated that they 
“anticipate that risk corridors collections will 
be sufficient to pay for all risk corridors 
payments.” In that guidance, HHS was 
stating its understanding that “risk corridors 
collections [might be] insufficient to make 
risk corridors payments for a year.”  
 
In 2014, a bill to require budget neutrality in 
the operation of the risk corridors program 
was introduced. The proposed legislation 
sought to amend Section 1342(d) of the ACA 
to ensure budget neutrality of payments in 
and payments out. The bill stated:  
 
In implementing this section, the 
Secretary shall ensure that payments 
out and payments in under paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of subsection (b) are 
provided for in amounts that the 
Secretary determines are necessary to 
reduce to zero the cost . . . to the 
Federal Government of carrying out 
the program under this section.  
 
The proposal, introduced by Senator Marco 
Rubio on April 7, 2014, was an effort to 
change the risk corridors program. The 
change was proposed, but not enacted, 
providing an indication of legislative intent. 
 
We have been directed to no statement of 
abrogation or amendment of the statute, no 
disclaimer by the government of its statutory 
and contractual commitments. However, the 
government has not complied with these 
commitments—leading to this litigation.  
 
The standard is high for intent to cancel or 
amend a statute. The standard is not met by 
the words of the riders. “[T]he intention of 
the legislature to repeal must be clear and 
manifest.” “In the absence of some 
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, 
the only permissible justification for a repeal 
by implication is when the earlier and later 
statutes are irreconcilable.” Here, where there 
is no irreconcilable statute, repeal by 
implication is devoid of any support.  
 
The panel majority does not suggest that 
intent to repeal can be found in the rider itself. 
Nor can intent be inferred from any evidence 
in the record. It is clear that Congress knew 
what intent would have looked like, because 
members of Congress tried, and failed, to 
achieve budget neutrality in the risk corridors 
program.  
 
Instead, my colleagues hold that the statutory 
obligation was not repealed, but only 
“temporarily suspended.” The unenacted text 
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of the proposed “Bailout Act,” reproduced 
supra, would have accomplished the result of 
budget neutrality that the majority finds was 
achieved by the riders. Congress’ decision to 
forego this proposed repeal is highly 
probative of legislative intent.  
 
Precedent does not deal favorably with repeal 
by implication—the other ground on which 
my colleagues rely. The panel majority relies 
heavily on United States v. Vulte. However, 
Vulte supports, rather than negates, the 
holding of the Court of Federal Claims. The 
facts are relevant: Lt. Vulte’s pay as a 
lieutenant in the Marine Corps for service in 
Porto Rico was initially based on the Army’s 
pay scale, and in 1902 Congress implemented 
a ten percent bonus for officers of his pay 
grade. In the appropriations acts for foreign 
service, for 1906 and 1907, Congress 
excluded officers serving in Porto Rico from 
receiving the bonus. In the act for 1908, the 
appropriations act continued the 10% bonus 
but did not mention an exclusion for service 
in Porto Rico. Lieutenant Vulte sought the 
bonus for 1908. The government argued that 
the 1906 and 1907 acts effectively repealed 
the 1902 bonus. The Court disagreed, and 
held that although the bonus was restricted 
for 1906 and 1907, the 1902 act was not 
repealed, and he was entitled to the 1908 
bonus.  
 
The panel majority concludes that Vulte 
established a rule of “effective suspensions-
by-appropriations.”. That is not a valid 
conclusion. The Court held that, by altering 
the bonus for 1906 and 1907, Congress 
cannot have intended to effectuate a 
permanent repeal of the 1902 statute. And 
Vulte did not retroactively strip the officers of 
pay for duties they had performed while 
subject to the higher pay. On the question of 
whether an annual appropriations rider can 
permanently abrogate a statute, the Vulte 
Court stated:  
 
‘Nor ought such an intention on the 
part of the legislature to be presumed, 
unless it is expressed in the most clear 
and positive terms, and where the 
language admits of no other 
reasonable interpretation.’ This 
follows naturally from the nature of 
appropriation bills, and the 
presumption hence arising is fortified 
by the rules of the Senate and House 
of Representatives.  
 
The panel majority’s contrary position is not 
supported.  
 
The panel majority also relies on United 
States v. Mitchell, to support the majority’s 
ruling of “temporary suspension.” Again, the 
case does not support the position taken by 
my colleagues. In Mitchell an appropriations 
act initially set the salaries of interpreters at 
$400 or $500. A subsequent appropriation, 
five years later, set “the appropriation for the 
annual pay of interpreters [at] $300 each, and 
a large sum was set apart for their additional 
compensation, to be distributed by the 
secretary of the interior at his discretion.” The 
Court stated, “[t]he whole question depends 
on the intention of congress as expressed in 
the statutes,”, and observed that the statute 
clearly stated the number of interpreters to be 
hired, the salary for those interpreters, and the 
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appropriation of an additional discretionary 
fund to cover additional compensation.  
 
The relevance of Mitchell is obscure, for the 
Court found the clear intent to change 
interpreters’ pay for the subsequent years. 
There is no relation to the case at bar, where 
the majority holds that an appropriations 
rider can change the statutory obligation to 
compensate for past performance under an 
ongoing statute. However, Mitchell does 
reinforce the rule that repeal or suspension of 
a statute must be manifested by clearly stated 
intent to repeal or suspend. Also, like Vulte, 
the act that in Mitchell was “suspended” by a 
subsequent appropriation was itself an 
appropriation, not legislation incurring a 
statutory obligation. The appropriation rider 
in Mitchell simply modified an existing 
appropriation. In Moda’s situation, however, 
the panel majority holds that the 
appropriation rider can suspend the 
authorizing legislation. No such intent can be 
found in the statute, as Mitchell requires and 
as the statute in that case provided.  
 
The panel majority’s theory is not supported 
by Mitchell and Vulte, for the statutes in both 
cases contain the clearly stated intent to 
modify existing appropriations. Moda’s 
situation is more like that in Langston, where 
the Court stated:  
 
it is not probable that congress . . . 
should, at a subsequent date, make a 
permanent reduction of his salary, 
without indicating its purpose to do 
so, either by express words of repeal, 
or by such provisions as would 
compel the courts to say that harmony 
between the old and the new statute 
was impossible.  
 
Similarly, it is not probable that Congress 
would abrogate its obligations under the risk 
corridors program, undermining a foundation 
of the Affordable Care Act, without stating 
its intention to do so. The appropriations 
riders did not state that the government would 
not and need not meet its statutory 
commitment.  
 
Precedent supports the decision of the 
Court of Federal Claims 
 
In New York Airways, Inc. v. United States, 
the Court of Claims held that the “mere 
failure of Congress to appropriate funds, 
without further words modifying or 
repealing, expressly or by clear implication, 
the substantive law, does not in and of itself 
defeat a Government obligation created by 
statute.”. The Civil Aeronautics Board had 
provided subsidies to helicopter carriers 
according to a statute whose appropriation 
provision stated:  
 
For payments to air carriers of so 
much of the compensation fixed and 
determined by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board under section 406 of the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 
U.S.C. § 1376), as is payable by the 
Board, including not to exceed 
$3,358,000 for subsidy for helicopter 
operations during the current fiscal 
year, $82,500,000, to remain 
available until expended. 
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However, the appropriation cap was not 
sufficient to cover the statutory obligation. 
The Court of Claims held that the insufficient 
appropriation did not abrogate the 
government’s obligations to make payments. 
The court stated that “the failure of Congress 
or an agency to appropriate or make available 
sufficient funds does not repudiate the 
obligation; it merely bars the accounting 
agents of the Government from disbursing 
funds and forces the carrier to a recovery in 
the Court of Claims.”  
 
Precedent also illustrates the circumstances 
in which intent to repeal or suspend may 
validly be found. In Dickerson, Congress had 
in 1922 enacted a reenlistment bonus for 
members of the armed forces who reenlisted 
within three months. For each year between 
1934 and 1937 an appropriations rider stated 
that the reenlistment bonus “is hereby 
suspended.” For fiscal year 1938, the 
appropriations rider did not contain the same 
language, but stated that:  
 
no part of any appropriation 
contained in this or any other Act for 
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, 
shall be available for the payment’ of 
any enlistment allowance for 
‘reenlistments made during the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1939 . . . .’   
 
The rider in Dickerson cut off funding from 
all sources, stating “no part of any 
appropriation contained in this or any other 
Act . . . shall be available.” The Court held 
that the new language continued to suspend 
the bonus statute, for the words, and the 
accompanying Congressional Record, 
display the clear intent to discontinue the 
bonus payment. The Record stated: “We have 
not paid [the enlistment bonus] for 5 years, 
and the latter part of this amendment now 
before the House is a Senate amendment 
which discontinues for another year the 
payment of the reenlistment allowances.” 
The Record and the statutory language left no 
doubt of congressional intent to continue the 
suspension of reenlistment bonuses. The 
panel majority recognizes that the Court in 
Dickerson found “persuasive evidence” of 
“Congress’s intent to suspend the 
reenlistment bonus.”  
 
In United States v. Will, the Court considered 
statutes setting the salary of government 
officials including federal judges. In four 
consecutive years, appropriations statutes 
had held that these officials would not be 
entitled to the cost-of-living adjustments 
otherwise paid to government employees. 
The annual blocking statutes were in various 
terms. In one year, the statute stated that the 
cost-of-living increase “shall not take effect” 
for these officials. For two additional years, 
the appropriations statutes barred the use of 
funds appropriated “by this Act or any other 
Act,” as in Dickerson. The fourth year’s 
appropriation contained similar language, 
stating that “funds available for payments . . 
. shall not be used.”  In each year, the 
language stated the clear intent that federal 
funds not be used for these cost-of-living 
adjustments.  
 
The panel majority finds support in Will, and 
states that “the Supreme Court never 
considered the impact of that language in 
Dickerson or Will.” However, in Dickerson 
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the Court twice repeated the “any other Act” 
language, in concluding that the language 
supported the intentional suspension. And in 
Will, the Court explicitly stated that the 
statutory language was “intended by 
Congress to block the increases the 
Adjustment Act otherwise would generate.”  
 
The Court found legislative intent clear in 
these cases. In contrast, the appropriations 
rider for risk corridors payments does not 
purport to change the government’s statutory 
obligation, even as it withholds a source of 
funds for the statutory payment. My 
colleagues’ ratification of some sort of 
permanent postponement denies the 
legislative commitment of the government 
and the contractual understanding between 
the insurer and HHSCMS.  
 
The riders cannot have retroactive effect 
after inducing participation  
 
The creation of the risk corridors program as 
an inducement to the insurance industry to 
participate in the Affordable Care Act, and 
their responses and performance, negate any 
after-the-fact implication of repudiation of 
the government’s obligations.  
 
The government argued before the Court of 
Federal Claims that its obligations to insurers 
did not come due until the conclusion of the 
three year risk corridors program, and that 
“HHS has until the end of 2017 to pay Moda 
the full amount of its owed risk corridors 
payments, and Moda’s claims are not yet ripe 
because payment is not yet due.” We have 
received no advice of payments made at the 
end of 2017 or thereafter.  
The appropriations rider cannot have 
retroactive effect on obligations already 
incurred and performance already achieved. 
Retroactive effect is not available to “impair 
rights a party possessed when he acted, 
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or 
impose new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed. If the statute 
would operate retroactively, our traditional 
presumption teaches that it does not govern 
absent clear congressional intent favoring 
such a result.” Such clear intent is here 
absent.  
 
Removal of Moda’s right to risk corridors 
payments would “impair rights a party 
possessed when [it] acted,” a “disfavored” 
application of statutes, for “a statute shall not 
be given retroactive effect unless such 
construction is required by explicit language 
or by necessary implication.” Such premises 
are absent here.  
 
Moda has recourse in the Judgment Fund  
 
The Government does not argue that the 
Judgment Fund would not apply if judgment 
is entered against the United States, in 
accordance with Section 1491:  
 
The United States Court of Federal 
Claims shall have jurisdiction to 
render judgment upon any claim 
against the United States founded 
either upon the Constitution, or any 
Act of Congress or any regulation of 
an executive department, or upon any 
express or implied contract with the 
United States, or for liquidated or 
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unliquidated damages in cases not 
sounding in tort.  
The Judgment Fund is established “to pay 
final judgments, awards, compromise 
settlements, and interest and costs specified 
in the judgments or otherwise authorized by 
law when . . . payment is not otherwise 
provided for . . . .”  
 
The contract claim is also supported  
 
The Court of Federal Claims also found that 
the risk corridors statute is binding 
contractually, for the insurers and the 
Medicare administrator entered into mutual 
commitments with respect to the conditions 
of performance of the Affordable Care Act. 
The Court of Federal Claims correctly 
concluded that an implied-in-fact contract 
existed between Moda and the government. I 
do not share my colleagues’ conclusion that 




The government’s ability to benefit from 
participation of private enterprise depends on 
the government’s reputation as a fair partner. 
By holding that the government can avoid its 
obligations after they have been incurred, by 
declining to appropriate funds to pay the bill 
and by dismissing the availability of judicial 
recourse, this court undermines the reliability 
of dealings with the government.  
 
I respectfully dissent from the panel 
majority’s holding that the government need 
not meet its statutory and contractual 























 “U.S. Supreme Court to hear Moda Health’s $24 Million ACA Appeal” 
 
 




June 24, 2019 
 
Moda Health, which lost its $249 million 
appeal against the federal government a year 
ago, will get another day in court — the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
The court agreed to to hear three cases filed 
by health insurers who claim they are owed 
more than $12 billion under the Affordable 
Care Act’s risk corridors program. 
Lawsuits from Moda, Maine Community 
Health Options and Land of Lincoln Mutual 
Health will be consolidated in the appeal. 
“We are encouraged that the Supreme Court 
has agreed to hear our case,” Moda President 
and CEO Robert Gootee said in a statement. 
“We remain confident that the court will 
ultimately hold the government to its promise 
to pay those companies, including Moda, 
who answered the government’s call to 
provide access to affordable health care for 
the neediest of Americans.” 
The risk corridors program was created to 
encourage insurers to offer plans on the new 
health insurance marketplaces. The 
government would pay insurers that lost 
money during the first three years of the 
ACA’s implementation, using funds from 
profitable insurers. 
Moda suffered losses on its plan in 2014 and 
2015 but saw little compensation from the 
program and nearly went into receivership, 
though it has since regained its financial 
footing. It is owed $249 million altogether. 
Risk corridor funds came up $12 billion short 
of what was owed nationwide. Meanwhile, 
Republicans in Congress blasted the program 
as a bailout to the insurance industry and 
declined appropriate other funds to cover the 
gap. The government paid 12.6 percent of 
risk corridor claims for 2014 and nothing for 
2015. 
The U.S. Justice Department argued that 
since Congress required the program to be 
budget-neutral, it only owed to the extent that 
profitable insurers paid money in. 
Moda and other insurers have argued the 
government pulled a bait and switch. The 
federal government, Moda has said, should 
not be allowed to walk away from its 
obligation to partially reimburse the company 
for financial losses incurred when it provided 
coverage to more than 100,000 Oregonians 
under the ACA. 
Earlier this year, Delta Dental of California 
purchased a 49.5 percent stake in Moda for 
$152 million.  
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“Supreme Court to Consider Cases Accusing US of Shorting Health Insurers $12B 





Debra Cassens Weiss 
 
June 24, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
decide whether Congress must fulfill a 
statutory promise to pay insurers who lost 
money by participating in the Affordable 
Care Act’s insurance marketplaces.  
The court accepted and consolidated three 
cases brought by insurers who say they 
upheld their end of the bargain, and Congress 
must honor the statutory commitment to 
offset their losses.  
The insurers say Congress promised to pay 
the money for three years to encourage 
insurers to participate in insurance 
marketplaces but later used appropriations 
riders to deny funds to pay the insurers. “The 
net effect was a bait-and-switch of staggering 
dimensions in which the government has paid 
insurers $12 billion less than what was 
promised,” says a cert petition (filed by two 
insurers, Moda Health Plan and Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of North Carolina.  
The two other cert petitions also used the 
bait-and-switch language.  
The Affordable Care Act had authorized the 
payments as part of a “risk corridors” 
program intended to limit insurers’ gains and 
losses when they participated in the insurance 
marketplaces, report the Wall Street Journal 
the New York Times, Politico and the 
Washington Post (  
Under the program, insurers whose 
premiums exceeded expenses in the first 
three years of the program would have to pay 
some of the profit to the federal government. 
Insurers whose claims exceeded premiums 
charged would get partial payment for their 
losses.  
The cases are Maine Community Health 
Options v. United States, Moda Health Plan 
v. United States and Land of Lincoln Mutual 









“Supreme Court to Hear Insurers’ Suit on Obamacare” 
 
 




June 24, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to 
decide whether the federal government was 
entitled to break a promise to shield insurance 
companies from some of the risks they took 
in participating in the exchanges established 
by President Barack Obama’s health care 
law, the Affordable Care Act.  
In their brief seeking Supreme Court review, 
two insurance companies said they had been 
the victims of “a bait-and-switch of 
staggering dimensions in which the 
government has paid insurers $12 billion less 
than what was promised.”  
The health care law established so-called risk 
corridors meant to help insurance companies 
cope with the risks they took when they 
decided to participate in the law’s 
marketplaces without knowing who would 
sign up for coverage. Under the program, the 
federal government would limit insurance 
companies’ gains and losses on insurance 
sold in the marketplaces from 2014 through 
2016.  
If premiums exceeded a company’s medical 
expenses, the insurer would be required to 
pay some of its profit to the government. But 
if premiums fell short of medical expenses, 
the insurer would be entitled to payments 
from the government.  
The law’s drafters hoped that payments into 
the program would offset payments out. As it 
turned out, losses substantially outpaced 
gains. Under the terms of the law, the 
government was required to make up much 
of the difference.  
But Congress later enacted a series of 
appropriation riders that seemed to bar the 
promised payments. The insurance 
companies sued, but a divided three-judge 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit ruled against them.  
Chief Judge Sharon Prost, writing for the 
majority, acknowledged that the health care 
law “obligated the government to pay the full 
amount of risk corridors payments.” But she 
added that “the riders on the relevant 
appropriations effected a suspension of that 
obligation for each of the relevant years.” 
In dissent, Judge Pauline Newman said the 
majority had undermined basic principles of 
fairness.  
“The government’s ability to benefit from 
participation of private enterprise depends on 
the government’s reputation as a fair 
partner,” she wrote. “By holding that the 
government can avoid its obligations after 
they have been incurred, by declining to 
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appropriate funds to pay the bill and by 
dismissing the availability of judicial 
recourse, this court undermines the reliability 
of dealings with the government.”  
In urging the Supreme Court to hear the case, 
two insurance companies said the appeals 
court’s decision threatened to encourage the 
government to walk away from other 
inconvenient promises.  
“By giving judicial approval to the 
government’s egregious disregard for its 
unambiguous statutory and contractual 
commitments,” the brief said, “the decision 
provides a road map for the government to 
promise boldly, renege obscurely, and avoid 
both financial and political accountability for 
depriving private parties of billions in 
reliance interests.”  
The court agreed to hear three cases on the 
issue: Maine Community Health Options v. 
United States, No. 18-1023; Moda Health 
Plan Inc. v. United States, No. 18-1028; and 
Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Co. 
v. United States, No. 18-1038. The three 
cases will be consolidated for a single hour of 
arguments and heard in the court’s next term, 

































September 6, 2018  
 
While all eyes were on this week’s oral 
arguments in Texas v. United States, there is 
no shortage of litigation over the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) to keep tabs on. This post 
discusses what appears to be the first ruling 
on whether insurers are entitled to unpaid 
cost-sharing reduction (CSR) payments, 
following a decision by the Trump 
administration to end the payments in 
October 2017. The post also discusses the 
latest on litigation over unpaid risk corridor 
payments and a new payment methodology 
for the Basic Health Program (BHP) in 
Minnesota and New York. 
First Court To Decide CSR Payment Case 
Rules For Insurer. 
On September 4, 2018, Judge Elaine D. 
Kaplan of the Court of Federal Claims issued 
what is believed to be the first ruling on 
whether insurers are entitled to unpaid cost-
sharing reduction (CSR) payments. The 
decision to end those payments was partially 
the result of litigation brought by the House 
of Representatives in 2014 that was settled 
earlier this year. In that lawsuit (House v. 
Azar), a district court judge held that the 
payment of CSRs without an explicit 
appropriation from Congress violated the 
appropriations clause of the Constitution. 
Here, Judge Kaplan concluded that insurers 
are, in fact, entitled to unpaid CSRs even in 
the absence of an explicit appropriation. This 
lawsuit was brought by the Montana Health 
CO-OP but a number of insurers have filed 
lawsuits against the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) for failing to 
reimburse marketplace insurers for 2017 and, 
in some cases, beyond. This includes at least 
one class action lawsuit. Similar to 
arguments made below in risk corridors 
litigation, insurers argued that the 
government’s failure to make CSR payments 
violates Section 1402 of the ACA and an 
implied-in-fact contract between HHS and 
insurers. 
Judge Kaplan concluded that Section 1402 
does indeed obligate the federal government 
to make CSR payments and that Congress’s 
failure to explicitly appropriate funds for the 
payments did not relieve the government of 
that obligation. As she put it, “the statutory 
language clearly and unambiguously imposes 
an obligation on the Secretary of HHS to 
make payments to health insurers that have 
implemented cost-sharing reductions on their 
covered plans as required by the ACA.” 
The judge reached this conclusion in part by 
citing Moda Health Plan, a risk corridors 
case that was recently decided by a three-
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judge panel of the Federal Circuit (which is 
discussed in more detail below). In Moda, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that a similar 
statute obligated the government to make risk 
corridors payments to insurers. 
Judge Kaplan also rejected the idea that silver 
loading impacts the analysis of whether 
Section 1402 requires the federal government 
to make CSR payments. She concluded that 
there is no evidence that the ACA itself or 
Congress intended the CSR obligation in 
Section 1402 to be offset by increased 
premium tax credits due to silver loading. 
Judge Kaplan granted Montana Health CO-
OP’s request for summary judgment and 
denied the Department of Justice’s 
(DOJ’s) request to dismiss the case. She 
ruled only on the statutory claim (that the 
government violated Section 1402 of the 
ACA by failing to make CSR payments) and 
did not reach the question of whether the 
government breached an implied-in-fact 
contract with marketplace insurers. The 
government will presumably appeal the 
decision. 
In the meantime, other litigation over unpaid 
CSRs continues. Some cases had been stayed 
temporarily but are now proceeding, with 
additional filings expected soon. This 
includes lawsuits filed by Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Vermont, Maine Community 
Health Options, LA Care Health 
Plan,and Sanford Health Plan, and a class 
action lawsuit led by Common Ground 
Healthcare Cooperative (where a response 
from DOJ is expected in mid-September). 
Risk Corridors: Insurers Await Federal 
Circuit Decision 
In mid-June, a three-judge panel of the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
issued opinions in Moda Health Plan v. 
United States and Land of Lincoln Mutual 
Health Insurance Co. v. United States. By a 
2-1 majority in both cases, the panel 
concluded that the government does not have 
to pay health insurers that offered qualified 
health plans the full amount owed to them in 
risk corridors payments. The panel’s decision 
overturned a lower court decision (in the 
Court of Federal Claims) in favor of Moda 
Health Plan. 
The majority concluded that HHS was 
obligated under Section 1342 of the ACA to 
make risk corridor payments pursuant to a 
statutory formula. This obligation, however, 
was later limited by Congress through 
appropriations riders. The appropriations 
riders rendered the risk corridors program 
“budget neutral,” meaning the federal 
government could only pay out the amount of 
money that it took in, leaving billions in 
outstanding risk corridor claims. 
In late July, Moda Health Plan and Land of 
Lincoln filed petitions to have their cases 
reheard en banc by a full panel of all judges 
on the Federal Circuit. En banc review 
is discretionary; it is rare and is typically 
reserved to maintain precedent or for legal 
questions of “exceptional importance.” Both 
briefs argue that the Federal Circuit opinion 
conflicts with existing Supreme Court 
precedent and that the full panel should step 
in to decide the question of whether an 
appropriations rider can amend the 
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government’s financial obligations under a 
federal statute. 
At the same time, Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of North Carolina and Maine Community 
Health Options—the next two insurers whose 
risk corridors cases were pending before the 
Federal Circuit—asked the court to rule in 
favor of the federal government in their cases. 
The court granted these requests, 
and both insurers filed their own petitions 
for en banc review. 
On August 31, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) asked the Federal Circuit not to grant 
the four insurers’ request for en banc review. 
DOJ argues that the three-judge Federal 
Circuit panel correctly applied Supreme 
Court precedent and there is no need for the 
full panel of judges to review the case. (DOJ 
also again takes issue with the court’s 
conclusion that Section 1342 of the ACA 
obligates the government to make risk 
corridors payments in the first place, even in 
the absence of an explicit appropriation. This 
conclusion has implications for CSR 
litigation discussed above). 
A number of other stakeholders filed amicus 
briefs throughout August, all urging the 
Federal Circuit to rehear the case(s) en banc. 
Briefs were filed by America’s Health 
Insurance Plans, the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Association, the Association for Community 
Affiliated Plans and the Alliance of 
Community Health Plans, the National 
Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, state attorneys general 
representing 17 states and the District of 
Columbia, economists and professors, 
and other insurers. 
From here, the Federal Circuit will choose 
whether to hear the case en banc or not. If 
not, the insurers could appeal to the Supreme 
Court. If the Supreme Court declines to hear 
the case, the Federal Circuit’s ruling would 
stand, meaning insurers would not recover 
more than $12 billion in outstanding risk 
corridors payments. 
HHS Takes Another Step To Resolve Basic 
Health Program Litigation In Minnesota And 
New York 
On August 24, HHS posted a new final 
administrative order regarding a revised 
payment methodology for the BHP for 2018. 
The BHP allows states to offer a more 
affordable alternative to marketplace 
coverage to certain uninsured individuals 
with incomes between 133 and 200 percent 
of the federal poverty level. 
The final administrative order takes yet 
another step towards resolving 
a lawsuit brought by Minnesota and New 
York—the only states that have opted to 
establish a BHP—for over $1 billion in 
annual funding after HHS stopped making 
CSR payments. New York and Minnesota 
sued after HHS informed them that their BHP 
payments would no longer include the “CSR 
component” beginning in 2018. They argued 
that this reversal in HHS’s position was both 
substantively and procedurally unlawful and 
asked that HHS be required to adopt a new 
methodology through the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process. 
The states and federal government have 
worked diligently to settle the case, 
requesting multiple extensions from the 
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court to negotiate. These negotiations 
resulted in a stipulation in May that required 
HHS to 1) make supplemental BHP 
payments of about $151.9 million to New 
York and about $17.3 million to Minnesota; 
and 2) revise its 2018 BHP payment 
methodology while providing states with the 
opportunity to comment on the proposed 
methodology. 
Pursuant to the stipulation, HHS issued a 
draft administrative order and provided states 
with the opportunity to provide comments. 
These comments (which are included in the 
final order) were submitted in early August. 
HHS considered these comments and 
finalized its administrative order without 
substantive changes. Although 
the stipulation specified that the 
administrative order should be published in 
the Federal Register, HHS does not appear to 
have done so and quietly posted the order on 
its website. 
Both New York and Minnesota urged HHS 
to approve an alternative rate for the premium 
tax credit (PTC) component of the BHP 
payment that reflects silver loading. This 
would reflect what BHP enrollees would 
have been paid in PTC subsidies if there had 
been silver loading to account for the loss of 
CSR subsidies. This would have resulted in 
higher PTCs and, thus, a higher PTC 
component of BHP payments (to make up for 
the lost CSR component). 
To address this, the final order adds a 
“premium adjustment factor” to calculate the 
PTC portion of the BHP payment rate for 
2018. The premium adjustment factor for 
2018 is 18.8 percent and will result in 
additional BHP funding of about $422 
million to New York and about $46 million 
to Minnesota. Put another way, this means 
that HHS will assume that premiums in 
Minnesota and New York would have been 
18.8 percent higher in 2018 due to 
nonpayment of CSRs if those states had not 
offered the BHP. 
HHS arrived at an adjustment of 18.8 percent 
after surveying a subset of states and 
qualified health plan insurers to understand 
how these insurers adapted to CSR 
nonpayment. Of the 1,233 qualified health 
plans offered in 2018, about 26 percent (318 
plans in a total of 26 states) responded. After 
excluding 13 plans from New York from the 
sample, the nationwide median adjustment 
was 20 percent. HHS used this to settle on an 
18.8 percent premium adjustment factor for 
Minnesota and New York. 
HHS justified its decision to adopt a premium 
adjustment factor and examine the effects of 
silver loading in other states by pointing to a 
part of Section 1331 of the ACA. Section 
1331 directs HHS to “take into consideration 
the experience of other states with respect to 
participation in an Exchange and such 
[PTCs] and [CSRs] provided to residents of 
the other states.” 
Despite the new methodology for 2018, HHS 
makes clear that it has not yet committed to a 




 “Moda takes a hit in Court of Appeals Decision” 
 
 




June 19, 2018 
 
Moda Health’s chances of recovering $214 
million in ACA exchange market risk 
adjustment funds dropped precipitously last 
week. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit reversed a lower court 
decision and held that the federal government 
did not have to make risk corridor payments 
in an adverse decision in Moda Health Plan, 
Inc. v. the United States. Despite daunting 
legal arguments and political opposition, 
Moda is determined to appeal. With such 
high-dollar stakes, neither the feds nor Moda 
seems likely to surrender.  
Moda is battling a Trump Administration that 
refuses to defend the ACA and a conservative 
Congressional GOP that could retain a House 
or Senate majority. Finally, the Supreme 
Court in its landmark ACA decision tossed 
core policy questions back to the political 
branches, which gives us little reason to 
believe it would jeopardize political capital 
on questions over risk corridor technicalities.  
The core legal issues involve the 2014-16 
ACA “risk corridors” that were supposed to 
smooth financial risk among carriers who 
either profited or lost in the exchange market. 
Winners were to pay, and losers were to 
receive payouts determined by a pro-rated, 
market-share formula. However, in practice, 
the winnings were paltry and le434 very little 
money available for pay outs. Congress, 
concerned that the Obama administration 
would use general HHS appropriations to 
fund risk adjustment payments, found a 
populist issue in “insurer bailouts” and 
passed riders to forbid the use of general 
funds in FY2015 and FY2016 appropriations.  
Here are the arguments:  
Moda argues that the plain language of the 
ACA requires HHS to disburse full payments 
by statutory formula. The government does 
not dispute that it would owe additional 
payments had the pay-ins been su434icient, 
but argues that in the absence of such funds, 
it owes nothing additional.  
Moda argues that the cumulative e434ect of 
ACA risk corridor provisions, HHS 
administrative rules, and the agency’s written 
sub-regulatory guidance constitute a 
“contract” with carriers who entered the 
ACA exchange market to make risk 
adjustment payments. The government 
contends they do not constitute a contract.  
Moda contends that the restrictive 
appropriations riders only precluded payment 
from HHS funds but did not limit the use of 
the federal government’s legal judgment 
funds. The government disagrees.  
Though Federal Circuit Appeals Court’s 
decision sometimes wandered into the misty 
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woods of “legislative intent,” it focused its 
reasoning on the text of the ACA and the 
appropriations riders signed into law by 
President Obama without formal objection.  
Moda prevailed on only one of its three 
arguments: The court held that the ACA 
plainly requires full risk corridor payouts by 
formula. However, citing other instances in 
which actual programmatic agreements were 
in play, the court ruled there was no risk 
corridor “contract,” but merely an 
“incentive” to sell health insurance on 
exchanges. Citing a century of precedent, the 
court also ruled that the appropriations riders 
suspended the risk corridor payment program 
– and that it was within Congress’ power to 
do so.  
Moda intends to appeal; it could do so by 
requesting rehearing en banc (a full panel of 
the court), or petitioning to the Supreme 
Court. A en banc hearing not only is the next 
best venue but also could be the last. The 
legal issues presented are not high 
constitutional principles, but they could meet 
the lesser appellate threshold that “the 
proceeding involves a question of 
exceptional importance.” There is no split of 
appellate circuits on the issues at hand, and 
the Supreme Court accepts few split- less 
cases. One similar case out of Nevada could 
make its way to the famously active Ninth 
Circuit and produce a Supreme Court-
inviting split. Similar remaining active cases 
all reside in the U.S. Court of Claims, which 
is now bound by this Moda precedent.  
In the meantime, Moda appears to have 
inched back from its precarious financial 
position through careful strategy and suburb 
execution. According to public filings with 
the Oregon Division of Financial Regulation, 
Moda’s blended fully insured medical loss 
ratio dropped to 90% for 2017, down from a 
heartbeat-skipping 100% in 2015. The filings 
do not take into account other, likely 
profitable, lines of business about which 
Moda is not required to report specific 
results.  
Moda quite reasonably will continue to fight 
for its full payments from HHS. Its best hope 
may be that the case drags on into 2019, past 
the Congressional mid-terms and perhaps 
long enough to yield a political, rather than a 























November 6, 2018 
 
A federal appeals court has denied a bid from 
several insurers to rehear a lawsuit seeking to 
recoup risk corridor payments, setting the 
stage for a potential battle at the Supreme 
Court. 
Over the summer, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the 
Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) was not required to make risk corridor 
payments to insurers.  
That overturned a 2017 decision by the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims that said HHS failed 
to fulfill its promise to make the payments 
designed to protect insurers from extreme 
gains or losses on the Affordable Care Act 
exchanges. 
Moda Health Plans, Land of Lincoln, Maine 
Community Health Options and Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of North Carolina petitioned the 
federal circuit court to rehear the case in front 
of the entire panel of judges. 
On Tuesday, 9 of the 11 
judges rejected (PDF) that request. Moda 
Health Plans, one of the insurers leading the 
litigation against HHS, plans to appeal the 
decision to the Supreme Court. 
“Obviously we are disappointed by today’s 
decision,” Robert Gootee, President & CEO, 
Moda, Inc. said in a statement to 
FierceHealthcare. “We continue to believe, 
as the trial court did, that the government’s 
obligation to us is clearly stated in the law. 
We will seek review by the Supreme Court.” 
Stephen McBrady, an attorney with Crowell 
& Moring who represents Maine Community 
Health Options, said the insurer also intends 
to appeal. 
“Maine Community Health Options is a non-
profit health plan that went into the 
exchanges and performed exactly as the 
Affordable Care Act required, providing 
healthcare coverage to thousands of 
previously uninsured and underinsured 
Maine citizens,” he said in an emailed 
statement. “The health plan filed its risk 
corridors law suit in order to enforce the 
government’s obligation to perform as the 
government was required under the 
ACA.  Today’s ruling is disappointing, but 
Maine Community Health Options intends to 
appeal to the Supreme Court.” 
Following the Federal Circuit Court’s June 
decision, University of Michigan law 
professor Nicholas Bagley wrote in the 
Incidental Economist that the case is “not an 
implausible candidate for review… but the 
Court might be gun-shy about wading into 
another case about the ACA.” 
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Notably, two judges on the federal circuit—
Pauline Newman and Evan Wallach—
dissented, calling the case a “question of the 
integrity of government” with a financial 
impact on insurers across the country. 
“Our system of public-private partnership 
depends on trust in the government as a fair 
partner,” Newman wrote. “And when 
conflicting interests arise, assurance of fair 
dealing is a judicial responsibility.” 
As of last year, the government’s unpaid risk 
corridor tab had swelled to $12.3 billion. 
That brought dozens of lawsuits from 
insurers like Moda, Humana and Molina 
Healthcare, which claimed they were owed 






































Allen v. Cooper 
 
Ruling Below: Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 
Overview: A videographer alleged that North Carolina violated his copyright by publishing his 
video footage and still photograph of the wreckage. Circuit Court concluded that Congress did not 
validly abrogate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity with the enactment of the Copyright 
Remedy Clarification Act.  
 
Issue: Whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights 
are infringed by states.  




Roy A. COOPER, III, Defendants-Cross-Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 
 
Decided on July 10, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:  
 
Frederick Allen, a videographer, and 
Nautilus Productions, LLC, Allen’s video 
production company, commenced this action, 
which, at its core, alleges that North Carolina, 
its agencies, and its officials (collectively, 
"North Carolina") violated Allen’s 
copyrights by publishing video footage and a 
still photograph that Allen took of the 18th–
century wreck of a pirate ship that sank off 
the North Carolina coast. Allen and Nautilus 
obtained the rights to create the footage and 
photograph through a permit issued by North 
Carolina to the ship’s salvors, and Allen 
subsequently registered his work with the 
U.S. Copyright Office. Allen and Nautilus 
also seek to declare unconstitutional a 2015 
state law— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121–
25(b) (providing that photographs and video 
recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of 
North Carolina are public records)—which 
Allen and Nautilus claim was enacted in bad 
faith to provide the State with a defense to 
their federal copyright infringement action. 
 
North Carolina filed a motion to dismiss 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, 
qualified immunity, and legislative 
immunity. North Carolina’s claim of 
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sovereign immunity prompted Allen and 
Nautilus to argue (1) that in a 2013 
Settlement Agreement, North Carolina 
waived sovereign immunity; (2) that in any 
event the federal Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act of 1990 had abrogated the 
State’s sovereign immunity; and (3) that as to 
their claims for injunctive relief, Ex parte 
Young provided an exception to sovereign 
immunity for ongoing violations of federal 
law. 
The district court rejected North Carolina’s 
claims of immunity, and North Carolina filed 
this interlocutory appeal. Allen and Nautilus 
filed a cross-appeal. For the reasons that 
follow, we reverse and remand with 
instructions to dismiss with prejudice the 
claims against the state officials in their 
individual capacities and to dismiss without 




In 1717, the pirate Edward Teach, better 
known as Blackbeard, captured a French 
merchant vessel and renamed her Queen 
Anne’s Revenge . Teach armed 
the Revenge with 40 cannons and made her 
his flagship. But the following year, 
the Revenge ran aground about a mile off the 
coast of Beaufort, North Carolina, and Teach 
abandoned her. Under state law, the ship and 
its artifacts later became the property of 
North Carolina and subject to its "exclusive 
dominion and control."  
 
More than two-and-a-half centuries later, on 
November 21, 1996, Intersal, Inc., a private 
research and salvage firm operating under a 
permit issued by North Carolina, discovered 
the wreck of the Revenge , and on September 
1, 1998, Intersal, along with Maritime 
Research Institute, Inc., an affiliated entity, 
entered into a 15–year salvage agreement 
with the North Carolina Department of 
Natural and Cultural Resources ("the 
Department"). Under the agreement, Intersal 
and Maritime Research acknowledged North 
Carolina’s ownership of the shipwreck and 
the ship’s artifacts, and North Carolina 
acknowledged Intersal’s and Maritime 
Research’s salvage rights, agreeing that 
Intersal and Maritime Research could retain 
a designated portion of the financial proceeds 
arising from the sale of media relating to 
the Revenge and replicas of its artifacts. 
 
As relevant to this case, the agreement 
provided that: 
 
Except as provided in paragraph 20 
and this paragraph, Intersal shall have 
the exclusive right to make and 
market all commercial narrative 
(written, film, CD Rom, and/or video) 
accounts of project related activities 
undertaken by the Parties. 
 
The agreement, however, made an exception 
for the creation of a "non commercial 
educational video and/or film documentary" 
and provided that the parties would cooperate 
in making such an educational documentary. 
And Paragraph 20 provided: 
 
The Department shall have the right 
to authorize access to, and publish 
accounts and other research 
documents relating to, the artifacts, 
site area, and project operations for 
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non commercial educational or 
historical purposes. Nothing in this 
document shall infringe to any extent 
the public’s right to access public 
records in accordance with Chapters 
121 and 132 of the General Statutes 
of North Carolina. 
 
The agreement also provided: 
 
[Maritime Research], Intersal and the 
Department agree to make available 
for duplication by each other, or, 
when appropriate, to provide the 
Department with, relevant field maps, 
notes, drawings, photographic 
records and other such technical, 
scientific and historical 
documentation created or collected 
by [Maritime Research], Intersal or 
the Department pursuant to the study 
of the site and the recovery of 
materials therefrom. These materials 
shall become public records curated 
by the Department. 
 
Following execution of this salvage 
agreement, Intersal retained Nautilus, Allen’s 
production company, to document the 
salvage of the Revenge, and under that 
arrangement, Allen accumulated, as he 
alleged in the complain, “a substantial 
archive of video and still images showing the 
underwater shipwreck and the efforts of 
teams of divers and archaeologists to recover 
various artifacts from [it].”  
Allen registered 13 copyrights in these 
materials with the U.S. Copyright Office, 
each copyright covering a year’s worth of 
footage.  
 
In 2013, Allen and Nautilus took the position 
that the Department’s publication of Allen’s 
work on the Internet without his consent 
infringed Allen’s copyrights, and this 
prompted a dispute leading ultimately to a 
settlement agreement dated October 15, 
2013, to which the Department, Intersal, 
Nautilus, and Allen were parties. In that 
agreement, none of the parties admitted to 
any wrongdoing but agreed to the 
clarification of preexisting arrangements so 
that the salvage operation could continue. 
 
The 2013 Settlement Agreement divided 
Allen and Nautilus’s video and photographic 
documentation, treating some of the footage 
as "commercial documentaries" and some as 
"non-commercial media," for purposes of 
clarifying the parties’ respective rights. With 
respect to "commercial documentaries," the 
2013 Settlement Agreement provided: 
 
Intersal, through Nautilus, has 
documented approximately fifteen 
(15) years of underwater and other 
activities related to the QAR [Queen 
Anne’s Revenge] project. For 
purposes of this Commercial 
Documentaries section, Intersal 
represents to [the Department] that 
Nautilus Productions shall remain 
Intersal’s designee. Intersal shall have 
the exclusive right to produce a 
documentary film about the 
[Revenge] project for licensing and 
sale. Intersal may partner with [the 
Department] if it chooses to do so.... 
If [the Department] and Intersal do 
not partner to make a documentary, 
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the Intersal documentary script shall 
be reviewed by [the Department] for 
historical accuracy prior to final 
release by Intersal or its agents. 
Intersal agrees to allow [the 
Department] to use its completed 
documentary, free of charge, in its 
museums and exhibits for educational 
purposes. 
 
With respect to "non-commercial media," the 
Agreement provided in relevant part: 
 
All non-commercial digital media, 
regardless of producing entity, shall 
bear a time code stamp, and 
watermark (or bug) of Nautilus and/or 
[the Department], as well as a link to 
[the Department], Intersal, and 
Nautilus websites, to be clearly and 
visibly displayed at the bottom of any 
web page on which the digital media 
is being displayed. 
 
[The Department] agrees to display 
non-commercial digital media only 
on [the Department’s] website.  
 
As to Nautilus’s archival footage, the 
Agreement provided that archival footage 
and photographs that did not "bear a time 
code stamp and a Nautilus Productions 
watermark (or bug)" would be returned to 
Nautilus. But it also provided that the 
Department could "retain, for research 
purposes, archival footage, still photographs, 
and other media that contain a time code 
stamp and watermark [or bug], and as to such 
media [the Department] [would] provide 
Nautilus with a current, accurate list." 
Finally, the 2013 Settlement Agreement 
addressed the video footage and still 
photographs as public records, providing: 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall 
prevent [the Department] from 
making records available to the public 
pursuant to North Carolina General 
Statutes Chapters 121and 132, or any 
other applicable State or federal law 
or rule related to the inspection of 
public records. 
 
During the recovery phase of the 
[Revenge ] project, [the Department] 
and Intersal agree to make available 
to each other records created or 
collected in relation to the [Revenge ] 
project. The entity requesting copies 
bears the cost of reproduction. Within 
one (1) year after the completion of 
the recovery phase, Intersal shall 
allow [the Department] to accession 
duplicate or original records that were 
created or collected by Intersal during 
the project and that are related to the 
site, or the recovery or conservation 
of the [Revenge ] materials. Such 
records shall include relevant field 
maps, notes, drawings, photographic 
records, and other technical, scientific 
and historical documentation created 
or collected by [the Department] or 
Intersal pursuant to the study of the 
site and the recovery of materials 
therefrom. These materials shall 
become public records curated by [the 
Department]. All digital media 
provided by Intersal under the terms 
 442 
of this paragraph shall include a time 
code stamp and watermarks (or bugs). 
 
Following execution of the 2013 Settlement 
Agreement, as Allen and Nautilus alleged in 
their complaint, the Department "resumed 
infringing [Allen’s] copyrights" by 
"publish[ing] ... and/or display[ing]" various 
"works" on the Internet. The complaint 
identified six "infringing works" along with 
their Internet addresses. Five of those works 
were videos about the Revenge shipwreck 
that were posted on the Department’s 
YouTube channel, and the remaining 
"infringing work" was a newsletter about 
North Carolina’s maritime museums, which 
contained an article about the Revenge with 
one of Allen’s still photographs. 
Accordingly, Allen and Nautilus sent North 
Carolina a "Takedown Notice," and North 
Carolina maintained that it complied before 
the hearing on its motion to dismiss filed in 
the district court. It provided the district court 
with documentary evidence confirming that 
fact, and at oral argument on this appeal, 
counsel for Allen and Nautilus also 
confirmed that the six alleged infringements 
had ceased. 
 
Allen and Nautilus commenced this action in 
December 2015, naming as defendants the 
State of North Carolina, the Department, the 
Governor, and six officials in the 
Department, among others. Except for the 
Governor, who was sued only in his official 
capacity, each of the individual defendants 
was sued in both his or her official and 
individual capacities. The complaint, as 
amended, contained five counts. In Count I, 
Allen and Nautilus alleged that in 2015, the 
defendants enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121–
25(b) (making shipwreck videos and 
photographs in North Carolina’s custody 
public records) in bad faith to "create a 
defense" to the copyright infringement claim 
asserted in Count II. They sought a 
declaratory judgment that § 121–25(b) was 
unenforceable because it was preempted by 
federal copyright law and was otherwise 
unconstitutional under the Takings Clause 
and Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 
In Count II, Allen and Nautilus claimed 
copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 
501(a) – (b). In Count III, they alleged that 
the defendants "acted under color of state law 
to enact § 121–25(b) and to threaten 
plaintiffs ... with enforcement thereof," in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, in 
Counts IV and V, they alleged state law 
claims for unfair trade practices and civil 
conspiracy. For relief, Allen and Nautilus 
sought, in addition to the declaratory 
judgment sought in Count I, an order 
enjoining copyright infringement and 
enforcement of § 121–25(b), as well as 
compensatory, statutory, treble, and punitive 
damages. North Carolina filed a motion to 
dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), maintaining 
that the institutional defendants and 
individual defendants in their official 
capacities were shielded from suit in federal 
court by sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment and that the officials 
sued in their individual capacities were 
entitled to qualified and legislative immunity. 
Allen and Nautilus responded to the claim of 
sovereign immunity, arguing (1) that North 
Carolina waived sovereign immunity in the 
2013 Settlement Agreement; (2) that North 
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Carolina’s sovereign immunity was also 
abrogated by the federal Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 511; 
(3) and that, in any event, injunctive relief 
was available under Ex parte Young , 209 
U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). 
They also argued that the individual officials 
could not invoke qualified immunity because 
reasonable officials under the circumstances 
alleged would have known that they were 
violating Allen’s rights under federal 
copyright law, and that they could not invoke 
legislative immunity because none of the 
officials had performed any legislative 
functions. 
 
Following a hearing, the district court, by 
order dated March 23, 2017, denied North 
Carolina’s motion to dismiss as to Counts I 
and II, concluding that its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity for those counts was 
validly abrogated by the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act; that the state officials sued 
in their individual capacities were not entitled 
to qualified immunity; and that a 
determination of those officials’ legislative 
immunity would be "premature" at that time. 
It granted the motion as to the remaining 
counts on the basis of sovereign immunity. 
 
From the district court’s interlocutory order, 
North Carolina filed this appeal, challenging 
the district court’s denial of immunity in all 
forms. Allen and Nautilus cross-appealed, 
challenging several of the district court’s 





Invoking the Eleventh Amendment, North 
Carolina and its officials acting in their 
official capacities claim that they are immune 
from suit in federal court and they contend 
that the immunity applies regardless of the 
form of relief sought by the plaintiffs. 
 
Allen and Nautilus disagree, arguing that 
North Carolina waived sovereign immunity 
when it signed the 2013 Settlement 
Agreement; that the State’s sovereign 
immunity was abrogated by the federal 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act; and 
that, in any event, Ex parte Young provides 
them with an exception for the injunctive 
relief they request as to ongoing violations of 





The 2013 Settlement Agreement, on which 
Allen and Nautilus rely to argue that North 
Carolina waived its sovereign immunity, 
provides in relevant part: 
 
In the event [North Carolina], 
Intersal, or [Allen and] Nautilus 
breaches this Agreement, [North 
Carolina], Intersal, or [Allen and] 
Nautilus may avail themselves of all 
remedies provided by law or equity.  
 
Allen and Nautilus maintain that by agreeing 
to the availability of all remedies, North 
Carolina agreed that the remedies being 
sought in this action may be obtained from it, 
thereby effecting a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from suit in federal court. 
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We cannot, however, read this provision as a 
waiver of North Carolina’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. First, Eleventh 
Amendment immunity protects the States, 
their agencies, and officials from suit in 
federal court . Yet, the subject provision in 
the 2013 Settlement Agreement makes no 
reference to federal court, state court or, for 
that matter, any court. Moreover, the 
provision states only that each party may 
pursue available remedies as provided by law 
or equity. Consequently, legal or equitable 
limitations on those remedies must also 
apply. And one of those limitations is that a 
State, its agencies, and its officials acting in 
their official capacities cannot be sued in 
federal court without their consent. We 
readily conclude that the provision falls far 
short of the clear statement that is required to 
effect a waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. As the Supreme Court has made 
clear, a State must expressly consent to 
suit in federal court to waive its immunity 




Allen and Nautilus also contend that 
Congress validly abrogated North Carolina’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity with the 
enactment of the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act. That Act provides: 
 
Any State, any instrumentality of a 
State, and any officer or employee of 
a State or instrumentality of a State 
acting in his or her official capacity, 
shall not be immune, under the 
Eleventh Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States or 
under any other doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, from suit in Federal court 
by any person ... for a violation of any 
of the exclusive rights of a copyright 
owner provided by [federal copyright 
law].  
 
It is well established that any abrogation of a 
State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity 
requires both a clear statement of 
congressional intent—which, to be sure, § 
511 provides—and a valid exercise of 
congressional power. Thus, the question 
presented here reduces to whether Congress 
validly exercised its constitutional power 
when enacting the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act. 
 
Allen and Nautilus contend first that 
Congress validly enacted the Copyright 
Remedy Clarification Act because it properly 
invoked Article I’s Patent and Copyright 
Clause, which authorizes Congress to 
"secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries." But, as 
North Carolina correctly notes, that ground 
for enactment of an abrogation is foreclosed 
by Seminole Tribe and its progeny, which 
make clear that Congress cannot rely on its 
Article I powers to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  
  
Allen and Nautilus argue, however, that those 
cases were impliedly overruled by the 
Supreme Court’s more recent decision 
in Central Virginia Community College v. 
Katz ,  which relied on Article I’s Bankruptcy 
Clause to hold that a proceeding initiated by 
a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential 
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transfers by a debtor to a state agency was not 
barred by sovereign immunity. 
The Katz holding, however, was made in a 
completely distinguishable context that was 
unique to the Bankruptcy Clause, and the 
Court limited its holding to that Clause. 
Indeed, the Court made clear that its holding 
in Katz was not intended to 
overrule Seminole Tribe and its progeny, 
stating that it was not disturbing the broader 
jurisprudence regarding Congress’s power to 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In 
short, even after Katz , it remains clear that 
Congress cannot rely on the enumerated 
power in Article I over copyright to compel a 
State to litigate copyright cases in a federal 
court. 
 
Allen and Nautilus contend that, in any event, 
Congress validly enacted the Copyright 
Remedy Clarification Act under the authority 
granted to it in § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which affords Congress the 
"power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation," the Amendment’s substantive 
guarantees. As they maintain, it is settled that 
Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity 
"through a valid exercise of its §5 power,  
because the Eleventh Amendment and the 
principle of state sovereignty that it embodies 
"are necessarily limited by the enforcement 
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,"  North Carolina argues, 
however, that Congress did not validly 
exercise its § 5 power in enacting the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act because 
(1) it did not, as required, purport to rely on 
its § 5 authority, and (2) it did not, as also 
required, tailor the Act to an identified, 
widespread pattern of conduct made 
unconstitutional by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
In construing the scope of § 5 power, the 
Supreme Court has been careful to strike a 
considered balance between upholding the 
dignity of States as sovereign entities, on the 
one hand, and safeguarding individual rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, on 
the other. It has accordingly explained that 
Congress has plenary authority to abrogate 
sovereign immunity for claims arising from 
state conduct that amounts to an actual 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive guarantees. The Court has also 
interpreted § 5 as permitting Congress to 
abrogate sovereign immunity for "a 
somewhat broader swath of [state] conduct, 
including that which is not itself forbidden by 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment."  Yet again, 
however, in light of the competing equities at 
stake, it has circumscribed Congress’s 
authority to do so in two respects. Congress 
must both (1) make clear that it is relying on 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
source of its authority and (2) ensure that any 
abrogation of immunity is "congruen[t] and 
proportional[ ]" to the Fourteenth 
Amendment injury to be prevented or 
remedied.  
 
In this case, we conclude that in enacting the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 
Congress satisfied neither requirement. 
First, it is readily apparent that in enacting the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 
Congress relied on the Copyright Clause in 
Article I of the Constitution, rather than § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
invocation of Article I authority was 
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expressly and repeatedly stated in the Act’s 
legislative history. Neither the text of the 
statute nor its legislative history indicates any 
invocation of authority conferred by § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. And without 
such an invocation, the Act cannot effect a 
valid abrogation under § 5. 
 
This was made clear in Florida Prepaid, 
where the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the Patent Remedy Act, 
which abrogated the States’ immunity from 
suit in federal court for patent infringement. 
After noting that the legislative history 
indicated that Congress relied on the 
Commerce Clause, the Patent Clause, and § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
stated that the Commerce and Patent Clauses 
could not sustain the Act in light of Seminole 
Tribe. Florida Prepaid. Similarly, the Court 
rejected the plaintiff’s alternative argument 
that the Act could be justified under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause: 
 
There is no suggestion in the 
language of the statute itself, or in the 
House or Senate Reports of the bill 
which became the statute, that 
Congress had in mind the Just 
Compensation Clause.... Since 
Congress was so explicit about 
invoking its authority under Article I 
and its authority to prevent a State 
from depriving a person of property 
without due process of law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we think this 
omission precludes consideration of 
the Just Compensation Clause as a 
basis for the Patent Remedy Act.  
 
Here, the legislative history of the Copyright 
Remedy Clarification Act shows that 
Congress relied on its Article I power over 
copyrights and not on § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, similarly "preclud[ing] 
consideration" of § 5 as a proper basis for the 
Act’s abrogation of States’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. 
 
Allen argues that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in EEOC v. Wyoming,  and Kimel 
v. Florida Board of Regents, undermine any 
need to invoke expressly the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In EEOC , the Court noted that 
when exercising § 5 power, there is no need 
to "recite the words ‘section 5’ or ‘Fourteenth 
Amendment.’" But that quotation does not 
help Allen and Nautilus because the Court 
also explained that, regardless of whether the 
terms " § 5" or "Fourteenth Amendment" are 
used, it must "be able to discern some 
legislative purpose or factual predicate that 
supports the exercise of [ § 5 ] power."  More 
importantly, EEOC was not a case about the 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, and the EEOC Court never 
addressed whether the legislation before it—
the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act—was a valid exercise of Congress’s 
power under § 5. 
 
Similarly, Kimel provides Allen and Nautilus 
with little support. The Kimel Court 
concluded that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act’s abrogation of sovereign 
immunity was invalid because it was not a 
congruent and proportional response to 
unconstitutional age discrimination by the 
States. They argue that, because the Court 
reached that conclusion despite the absence 
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of any congressional invocation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by Congress, no 
such invocation should be required here. The 
Kimel Court, however, did not even mention 
the omission on which Allen and Nautilus 
rely. And more to the point, no case 
since Florida Prepaid has disavowed the 
Supreme Court’s instruction that an 
abrogation of sovereign immunity cannot be 
sustained by a source of constitutional 
authority that Congress never invoked. 
 
Not only did Congress not invoke its 
authority under § 5, it also did not, as 
required, limit the scope of the Copyright 
Remedy Clarification Act to enforcement of 
rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Rather, in abrogating sovereign 
immunity, Congress used language that 
sweeps so broadly that the Act cannot be 
deemed a congruent and proportional 
response to the Fourteenth Amendment 
injury with which it was confronted. 
 
Our conclusion is required by Florida 
Prepaid, where the circumstances were 
analogous to those before us. The Supreme 
Court there concluded that the Patent 
Remedy Act did not appropriately enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment because there 
was no "congruence and proportionality 
between the [Fourteenth Amendment] injury 
to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end." While the Court 
acknowledged that patents are a "species of 
property" and that patent infringement by 
States could therefore implicate the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against 
deprivations of property without due process, 
it explained that a due process violation 
would not result merely from a State’s 
infringement of a patent. Rather, the 
infringement would both have to go 
unremedied and have to be done intentionally 
or at least recklessly.   
 
Citing at length to the legislative record of the 
Patent Remedy Act, the Florida Prepaid 
Court then determined that Congress was not 
faced with sufficient evidence of 
unconstitutional patent infringement to 
justify abrogation. It observed that there were 
fewer than 10 patent infringement suits 
against States in the century preceding the 
enactment of the Patent Remedy Act; that 
most state infringement was apparently 
accidental; and that while state remedies for 
governmental infringement were disuniform 
and rather tenuous, the evidence before 
Congress did not prove such remedies to be 
constitutionally inadequate. In the Court’s 
view, this evidence "suggest[ed] that the 
Patent Remedy Act does not respond to a 
history of ‘widespread and persisting 
deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the 
sort Congress has faced in enacting proper 
prophylactic § 5 legislation." 
 
The Court then compared that evidence to the 
Patent Remedy Act’s sweeping abrogation 
provisions, which made the States liable for 
patent infringement to the same extent as 
private parties, and concluded that the 
provisions were " ‘so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventive object that 
[they] [could not] be understood as 
responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.’"  In particular, 
the Court observed that Congress had done 
"nothing to limit the coverage of the [Patent 
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Remedy] Act to cases involving arguable 
constitutional violations," such as where a 
State authorized infringement as a matter of 
official policy or otherwise intentionally 
infringed patents without providing any 
remedy. Nor had Congress included 
durational limits or abrogated immunity only 
for States presenting the greatest incidence of 
infringement. The absence of such tailoring, 
juxtaposed with the limited evidence of 
unconstitutional patent infringement, 
"ma[de] it clear" that the Patent Remedy Act 
did not appropriately enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
 
In this case, a similar legislative record and 
an equally broad enactment likewise leads to 
the conclusion that the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act’s abrogation of sovereign 
immunity cannot be sustained under § 5. 
While we may presume that a copyright, like 
a patent, is a "species of property" that could 
be deprived without due process in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, not every 
infringement violates the Constitution, as 
the Florida Prepaid Court explained. To be 
sure, the legislative record of the Copyright 
Remedy Clarification Act did include some 
evidence of copyright infringement by States 
that presumably violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The 
record of such infringement, however, was 
materially similar to that in Florida Prepaid . 
 
As Allen and Nautilus note, most of the 
evidence was compiled in a 1988 report 
prepared at Congress’s request by Ralph 
Oman, who was then the United States 
Register of Copyrights.  In preparing the 
report, the Copyright Office solicited public 
comments regarding the issue of state 
immunity from copyright claims and 
received several dozen responses from 
various industry groups, among others, 
expressing grave concerns about the prospect 
of such immunity. But, the Oman Report 
reveals that only five of the commenters 
"document[ed] actual problems ... in 
attempting to enforce their [copyright] claims 
against state government infringers."  And 
the commenters’ responses described at most 
seven incidents in which States invoked 
sovereign immunity to avoid liability for 
copyright infringement. Only two of those 
incidents recounted in the Register’s 
Report—where States invoked sovereign 
immunity and continued to display 
copyrighted films to prison inmates for free 
even after the copyright holders notified them 
of the infringement—were described with 
sufficient detail to show clearly the requisite 
willfulness of state officials to amount to a 
due process violation. Besides these incidents 
in the Oman Report, Congress learned of just 
a few other comparable incidents of 
unremedied State infringement from hearing 
testimony.  In total, even assuming that all of 
the incidents of unremedied 
infringement were intentional, the record 
before Congress contained at most a dozen 
incidents of copyright infringement by States 
that could be said to have violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
This evidence plainly falls short of 
establishing the "widespread and persisting 
deprivation of constitutional rights" that is 
required to warrant prophylactic legislation 
under § 5.  Indeed, the evidence here appears 
little different in quality or quantity than the 
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historical evidence underlying the Patent 
Remedy Act, which was found insufficient in 
Florida Prepaid . Critically, in each case, 
Congress did not identify an extant pattern of 
infringement giving rise to violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment across a significant 
number of States.  At most, the record of the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, like 
that of the Patent Remedy Act, indicated that 
there was a potential for greater 
constitutional violations in the future and that 
Congress simply "acted to head off this 
speculative harm." 
 
Acting against this backdrop of limited 
evidence, Congress enacted the Copyright 
Remedy Clarification Act to make States 
broadly, immediately, and indefinitely 
accountable for copyright infringement to the 
same extent as private parties, imposing 
sweeping liability for all violations of federal 
copyright law, whether the violation 
implicates the Fourteenth Amendment or 
not. Congress thus declined to narrow 
whatsoever the Act’s reach, instead 
abrogating immunity indiscriminately in a 
manner that was wholly incongruous with the 
sparse record of unconstitutional conduct 
before it. This failure to adopt any limitation 
along the lines discussed in Florida 
Prepaid cannot be reconciled with the 
requirement that legislation enacted under § 
5 be "tailor[ed] ... to remedying or preventing 
[unconstitutional] conduct."  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Copyright 
Remedy Clarification Act’s wholesale 
abrogation of sovereign immunity for claims 
of copyright infringement is grossly 
disproportionate to the relevant injury under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore the 
abrogation cannot be sustained as an 
enactment that "appropriate[ly]" "enforce[s]" 
that Amendment. 
 
In concluding otherwise, the district court 
sought to distinguish the record in Florida 
Prepaid by relying primarily on the "many 
examples of copyright infringements by 
States" in the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act’s legislative history. In so 
relying, however, the court failed to consider 
whether any of those examples involved 
intentional and unremedied infringement, 
as Florida Prepaid clearly instructs. Also, as 
an alternative basis for holding that the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act had 
validly abrogated North Carolina’s 
immunity, the district court relied on "the 
amount of suits filed against allegedly 
infringing states in recent years." That 
reliance, however, did not comport with the 
Supreme Court’s determination that 
Congress must identify a pattern of 
unconstitutional conduct before it abrogates 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
 
In concluding that the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act does not validly abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, we join the 
numerous other courts to have considered 
this issue since Florida Prepaid, all of which 




Finally, Allen and Nautilus contend that, at 
the very least, their claims against the state 
officials for injunctive and declaratory relief 
may proceed under the exception to Eleventh 
 450 
Amendment immunity recognized in Ex 
parte Young. The parties argued the issue 
before the district court, but the court, in light 
of its ruling on the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act, did not address it. Because 
we reverse the district court on abrogation, 
we address the Ex parte Young exception and 
conclude that the exception does not apply in 
this case. 
 
Under Ex parte Young , private citizens may 
sue state officials in their official capacities 
in federal court to obtain prospective relief 
from ongoing violations of federal law.  This 
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity 
"is designed to preserve the constitutional 
structure established by the Supremacy 
Clause" and rests on the notion, often referred 
to as "a fiction," that a state officer who acts 
unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official 
or representative character and [thus] 
subjected in his person to the consequences 
of his individual conduct.” To invoke the 
exception, the plaintiff must identify and seek 
prospective equitable relief from 
an ongoing violation of federal law.  
 
Allen and Nautilus maintain that they have 
alleged two ongoing violations from which 
they seek prospective relief: (1) North 
Carolina’s continuing infringement of 
Allen’s copyrights and (2) its continuing 
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute, 
namely, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121–25(b), which 
designates images of shipwrecks in the 
State’s custody as public records. 
 
As to the alleged ongoing copyright 
infringement, Allen and Nautilus identified 
in their complaint six specific "infringing 
works" that are "now publicly viewable" at 
six locations on the Internet, specifying the 
Internet address for each. North Carolina, 
however, maintains that shortly before the 
November 2016 hearing on its motion to 
dismiss, it removed those allegedly 
infringing materials from the Internet and 
provided exhibits to the district court to 
confirm that it had done so. While Allen and 
Nautilus acknowledged at oral argument that 
the six alleged violations had ceased, they 
argue that the complaint nonetheless alleged 
generally instances of ongoing Internet 
infringement beside those six violations, 
referring to a paragraph that alleged, in a 
conclusory fashion, that displays of 
copyrighted materials were continuing "at 
least at th[ose] locations." But such a general 
and threadbare catchall, suggesting the 
possibility of other infringing displays, does 
not plausibly allege the existence of an 
ongoing violation of federal law. In the same 
vein, Allen and Nautilus argue that because 
they alleged a history of infringements both 
before and after the 2013 Settlement 
Agreement, there is "no reasonable prospect 
that infringements will cease unless they are 
enjoined." This argument, however, which 
relies on the asserted possibility that North 
Carolina will resume infringing Allen’s 
copyrights, conflates the Ex parte 
Young exception with the doctrine of 
mootness. Even assuming that North 
Carolina has failed to provide reasonable 
assurances that it will avoid infringing 
Allen’s copyrights in the future, as would 
foreclose the voluntary-cessation exception 
to mootness, it remains Allen’s burden in the 
context of sovereign immunity to establish 
an ongoing violation of federal law to qualify 
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for relief under Ex parte Young. Because the 
only ongoing infringement that Allen and 
Nautilus plausibly alleged has concededly 
ended, they cannot employ the Ex parte 
Young exception to address their fear of 
future infringements. 
 
Allen and Nautilus also identify as an 
ongoing violation North Carolina’s purported 
continuing "enforcement" of § 121–25(b) to 
provide a defense against their claims of 
copyright infringement. This allegation, 
however, also cannot support application of 
the Ex parte Young exception because when 
a plaintiff sues "to enjoin the enforcement of 
an act alleged to be unconstitutional," the 
exception applies "only where a party 
defendant in [such] a suit ... has ‘some 
connection with the enforcement of the Act.’" 
As we explained in Hutto, the "requirement 
that there be a relationship between the state 
officials sought to be enjoined and the 
enforcement of the state statute prevents 
parties from circumventing a State’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity." We thus 
noted "that a governor cannot be enjoined by 
virtue of his general duty to enforce the 
laws," nor can an "attorney general ... be 
enjoined where he has no specific statutory 
authority to enforce the statute at issue." By 
contrast, however, we have held that a State’s 
circuit court clerk had the requisite 
connection to the enforcement of the State’s 
marriage laws to be enjoined from enforcing 
them because the clerk was charged with the 
particular responsibilities for granting and 
denying applications for marriage licenses.  
 
In this case, Allen and Nautilus sued the 
State, the Governor, the Department, and 
several Department officials, alleging at most 
that several of the officials supported 
enactment of § 121–25(b) and providing no 
further explanation regarding any connection 
between the officials and the challenged 
enactment. Indeed, Allen and Nautilus have 
not even shown that § 121–25(b) can be 
enforced against a private party. In any event, 
in view of the officials’ roles, it is apparent 
that none of them would or could have any 
role in enforcing the statute, as required.  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Ex parte 
Young does not provide Allen and Nautilus 
with an exception to the Eleventh 





The North Carolina officials who were sued 
in their individual capacity for monetary 
damages contend that the district court erred 
in denying them qualified immunity and 
legislative immunity from suit. In doing so, 
the district court explained that these 
defendants were not protected by qualified 
immunity because "the law of [copyright] 
infringement is clearly established." The 
court also denied them legislative immunity 
because it was "premature" to resolve that 
issue. As we explain, however, we also 
reverse on these issues. 
 
Qualified immunity "shields officials from 
civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does 
not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.’ The inquiry as to 
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whether the law is "clearly established" is a 
demanding one: 
 
A clearly established right is one that 
is sufficiently clear that every 
reasonable official would have 
understood that what he [or she] is 
doing violates that right. In other 
words, existing precedent must have 
placed the statutory or constitutional 
question beyond debate. 
 
* * * 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
told courts ... not to define clearly 
established law at a high level of 
generality. Thus, we consider 
whether a right is clearly established 
in light of the specific context of the 
case, not as a broad general 
proposition. 
 
In this case, Allen and Nautilus obtained their 
rights to take videos and photographs of the 
Revenge shipwreck from Intersal, who in turn 
obtained the rights from the Department. And 
any rights that Allen and Nautilus have to 
those videos and photographs are 
circumscribed by the provisions of the 2013 
Settlement Agreement with the Department. 
In that Agreement, Intersal asserted—and the 
Department, Allen, and Nautilus agreed—
that Intersal had documented "fifteen (15) 
years of underwater and other activities 
related to the [Queen Anne’s Revenge] 
project" and that it had the right to produce 
and retain an interest in a commercial 
documentary film about those activities. The 
Agreement provided that the Department 
could "use [the] completed documentary, free 
of charge, in museums and exhibits for 
educational purposes." And the Agreement 
provided, with respect to non-commercial 
digital media, that such media should bear "a 
time code stamp and watermark" of "Nautilus 
and/or [the Department]" and that the 
Department would display them only on the 
Department’s website. The Agreement also 
provided that the Department could retain the 
archival footage with a time stamp and 
watermark "for research purposes," although 
it would return to Nautilus any footage and 
photographs that did not bear a time code 
stamp and watermark. Moreover, it provided 
that "[d]uring the recovery phase of the 
[Revenge ] project, [the Department] and 
Intersal [would] make available to each other 
recordscreated or collected in relation to the 
[Revenge ] project," (emphasis added), 
defining "records" to include "field maps, 
notes, drawings, photographic records, and 
other technical, scientific and historical 
documentation created or collected by [the 
Department] or Intersal pursuant to the study 
of the site and the recovery of materials 
therefrom." These materials were designated 
"public  records" to be "curated by [the 
Department]." (Emphasis added). 
 
Notably, the 2013 Settlement Agreement 
stated that "[n]othing in [the] Agreement 
shall prevent [the Department] from making 
records available to the public pursuant to 
North Carolina General Statutes Chapters 
121 and 132, or any other applicable State or 
federal law or rule related to the inspection of 
public records." At that time—i.e. , in 2013, 
before § 121–25(b) was enacted— N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 132–1 provided that "all ... 
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photographs [and] films ... made or received 
pursuant to law ... in connection with the 
transaction of public business by any agency 
of North Carolina" are "public records," and 
that it is "the policy of [the] State that the 
people may obtain copies of ... public records 
... free or at minimal cost unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law." 
 
Based on these provisions of the 2013 
Settlement Agreement and the then 
applicable public records law, it is far from 
clear whether the Department was prohibited 
from displaying Allen’s copyrighted 
materials in the manner alleged in the 
complaint. This is especially so in view of the 
Department’s role in the salvage project to 
preserve for the public the site and artifacts 
and to document their salvage in furtherance 
of research and the education of the public. 
 
Of course, we need not resolve whether 
North Carolina’s display of the video footage 
and the still photograph violated the 
Copyright Act to resolve the issue of 
qualified immunity.  What we do conclude is 
that reasonable officials in the position of the 
North Carolina officials would not have 
understood beyond debate that their 
publication of the material violated Allen’s 
rights under the Copyright Act. The issue is 
indeed debatable. Accordingly, we conclude 
that Allen and Nautilus’s copyright claims 
against the North Carolina officials in their 
individual capacities are precluded by 
qualified immunity. 
 
We also conclude that legislative immunity 
shields the North Carolina officials in their 
individual capacities for their alleged 
involvement in the enactment of § 121–25(b). 
 
The district court did not expressly resolve 
whether the individual officers were entitled 
to legislative immunity, concluding instead 
that such a ruling would be "premature." But 
its deferral in ruling amounted to a denial of 
the immunity because the immunity protects 
officials "not only from the consequences of 
litigation’s results, but also from the burden 
of defending themselves" in court.  Thus, the 
very purpose of the immunity is thwarted 
when an official must expend "time and 
energy ... to defend against a lawsuit" arising 
from his legislative acts.  Accordingly, the 
North Carolina officials can appropriately 
appeal the district court’s deferral in ruling on 
legislative immunity. 
 
Legislative immunity entitles public officials 
to absolute immunity for their performance 
of legislative functions. And it attaches 
whenever state officials—including those 
outside the legislative branch—engage in any 
conduct within the "sphere of legitimate 
legislative activity."  Determining 
whether official conduct is shielded by 
legislative immunity "turns on the nature of 
the act," without regard to the "motive or 
intent" of the official performing it.  
 
In this case, the North Carolina officials were 
sued in their individual capacities for 
"conspir[ing] to convert [Allen’s] 
copyrighted works into public documents" 
through the enactment of § 121–25(b). But 
the only actual conduct alleged in furtherance 
of the conspiracy—that the officers "wrote, 
caused to be introduced, lobbied for passage 
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of, and obtained passage" of § 121–25(b) —
is quintessentially legislative in nature and 
falls squarely within the scope of legislative 
immunity. Allen and Nautilus’s only 
argument to the contrary is that the complaint 
alleges that the officers sought enactment of 
§ 121–25(b) with impure motives , seeking to 
benefit an affiliated nonprofit entity and to 
remove the threat of legal liability. As noted, 
however, motive is irrelevant to the issue.  
 
*   *   * 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse each of 
the district court’s rulings on immunity and 
remand with instructions that the district 
court dismiss without prejudice Allen and 
Nautilus’s claims against North Carolina, the 
Department, and the public officials acting in 
their official capacities and to dismiss with 
prejudice the remaining claims against the 
officials in their individual capacities. 
 




































































June 3, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
hear a case over whether a videographer can 
sue the state of North Carolina for using his 
copyrighted footage of a pirate shipwreck, 
giving the justices a chance to revive an 
obscure federal law that has repeatedly been 
ruled unconstitutional by lower courts.  
 
The justices granted certiorari to Frederick 
Allen, who wants the high court to overturn a 
ruling from last year last year that declared 
unconstitutional the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act, which allows copyright 
owners to sue states for infringement.  
 
The ruling, which said Congress didn’t have 
the authority to revoke the sovereign 
immunity granted to states under the 
Eleventh Amendment, was the latest by a 
federal appeals court to strike down the 1990 
amendment to the Copyright Act.  
 
Allen, who sued North Carolina for using his 
footage of a famed local shipwreck, said 
those rulings were “misreadings” of 
precedent and an overreach by one branch of 
government onto another.  
 
As is customary, the high court did not 
explain why it took the case. A spokeswoman 
for the North Carolina's Department of 
Justice said the agency "looks forward to 
continuing to defend the state in this case."  
 
Allen and his Nautilus Productions sued in 
2015 after North Carolina refused to stop 
using his footage of the Queen Anne’s 
Revenge — the flagship of the famed pirate 
Blackbeard that ran aground in North 
Carolina.  
 
Theoretically, the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act gave him the right to do so. 
The Eleventh Amendment gives states and 
state officials broad sovereign immunity 
from being sued in federal court, but the 
CRCA, passed in 1990, aimed to “abrogate” 
that immunity to allow infringement cases 
against states.  
 
The problem? The CRCA has been struck 
down repeatedly by courts that say Congress 
lacked the authority to pass a statute trumping 
the Eleventh Amendment the way the law 
aimed to. The U.S. Department of Justice no 
longer defends the statute in court.  
 
Last summer, the Fourth Circuit rejected 
Allen’s arguments that Congress could derive 
authority for CRCA in either the 
Constitution’s intellectual property clause or 
the 14th Amendment, which allows Congress 
to protect property rights from states' abuses.  
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In January, Allen asked the U.S. Supreme 
Court to overturn that decision. He said the 
high court, and not a series of lower courts, 
should be the final arbiter of the law’s 
constitutionality.  
 
“What should occasion this court’s review is 
the federal judiciary’s relatively unexamined 
disregard of a law enacted by Congress as a 
co-equal branch, and the distension of vital 
principles that should properly define and 
limit each branch’s respective powers,” Allen 
wrote.  
 
 “This court generally grants review where, 
as here, a federal court refuses to enforce a 
federal statute on constitutional grounds,” he 
added.  
 
In a statement on Monday, Allen said that he 
and his team were "obviously gratified."  
 
"The Constitution of the United States of 
America expressly empowers Congress to 
grant copyright holders ‘the exclusive right to 
their respective writings and discoveries'," 
Allen wrote. "We look forward to making our 
case to the Supreme Court as to why it was 
within Congress’s constitutional authority to 
hold states liable for their acts of copyright 
infringement.”  
 
Allen and Nautilus are represented by Derek 
L. Shaffer, Christopher Landau, Kathleen 
Lanigan, Todd Anten, Lisa M. Geary and 
Joanna E. Menillo of Quinn Emanuel 
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP; Susan Freya Olive 
and David Loar McKenzie of Olive & Olive 
PA; and G. Jona Poe Jr. of Poe Law Firm 
PLLC.  
 
North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper III and 
various other defendants named in the 
lawsuit are represented by attorneys from the 
state’s Department of Justice.  
 
The case is Allen v. Cooper, case number 18-
































“SCOTUS To Decide Whether States Can Be Sued For Copyright Infringement In 
Case Involving Backbeard’s Ship”  
 
 
Above The Law 
 
Krista L. Cox  
 
June 20, 2019 
 
Somehow, within a month, I find myself 
writing two different columns involving 
copyright… and pirates. Not copyright 
“piracy,” but actual pirates. As in, eye 
patches, parrots, and swashbuckler pirates. 
SCOTUS has agreed to hear a case — the 
facts of which involve a famous pirate ship 
— to determine whether a state can be sued 
for damages in a copyright case. Congress 
enacted the Copyright Remedy Clarification 
Act of 1990 (CRCA), which set out to 
abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity in copyright cases and 
allow individuals to sue states for 
infringement. While SCOTUS has not ruled 
on the constitutionality of CRCA, 
developments between 1997 and the present 
have led to the widespread belief that states 
are indeed immune from copyright 
infringement case. 
Before getting into the details of CRCA and 
the case SCOTUS will hear next term, let’s 
clear up a couple of things about what state 
sovereign immunity does — and does not — 
do in the intellectual property context. A state 
cannot be sued for damages in intellectual 
property cases. However, a state (and its 
officials acting in their official 
capacity) can be sued for injunctive relief or 
declaratory judgments. It’s not like a state 
can just get off scot-free for infringement; 
litigation is still expensive and they can be 
enjoined from further infringement. States 
are not completely immune from litigation. 
Additionally, contrary to what some critics of 
sovereign immunity claim, states generally 
don’t go around infringing intellectual 
property. While there may be good-faith, 
mistaken beliefs that a particular use is fair 
use, states and their subdivisions typically act 
in a responsible fashion with every intention 
of adhering to the law. It’s a little silly to 
suggest that a state will start 
screening Avengers: Endgame and rely on 
state sovereign immunity to avoid liability. 
In Allen v. Cooper, the justices will consider 
whether Congress validly exercised its power 
in abrogating state sovereign immunity in 
copyright cases through enactment of the 
CRCA. The case involves the discovery of 
the infamous pirate Blackbeard’s ship, Queen 
Anne’s Revenge, off the coast of North 
Carolina. Allen filmed the shipwreck then 
claimed that North Carolina violated 
copyright by displaying the footage on the 
internet without authorization. North 
Carolina, in response, asserted that CRCA 
was unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit 
agreed that CRCA was not a valid exercise of 
Congressional authority. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision to accept cert 
is a bit surprising since it seems to be well-
understood that CRCA was not a valid 
exercise of Congressional authority and that 
states retain sovereign immunity in copyright 
cases. There are no circuit splits. 
Additionally, while SCOTUS has not 
determined whether CRCA is constitutional, 
it decided two very similar cases involving 
trademarks and copyright in 1997. Both 
cases, resulting in two separate decisions, 
involved the same litigants: Florida Prepaid 
Post-Secondary Education Expense Board 
and the College Savings Bank. These cases 
considered the Trademark Remedy 
Clarification Act of 1992 and the Patent and 
Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act of 1992. In both cases, 
SCOTUS ruled in 5-4 decisions that states are 
immune from suits in federal courts for 
violations of patent and trademark law 
(Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and 
Stevens dissented in the pair of cases). In 
order for Congress to validly abrogate 
sovereign immunity, SCOTUS ruled, 
“Congress would need to identify conduct 
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive provisions, and must tailor its 
legislative scheme to remedying or 
preventing such conduct.” The Court looked 
at the legislative history of the statutes, which 
revealed relatively few instances of intention 
infringement of patents and trademark. 
Because the record did not demonstrate 
widespread deprivation of patents and 
trademark, Congressional action to abrogate 
sovereign immunity was not proportional and 
therefore invalid. 
Following the Florida Prepaid cases in the 
copyright context, the Fifth Circuit found 
in Chavez v. Arte Publico Press that state 
universities (here, the University of Houston) 
have sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment and CRCA represents an 
improper exercise of Congressional power. 
Here, the Fifth Circuit — relying heavily on 
the Florida Prepaid cases — found that for 
Congress to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
there must be “congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented/remedied and the means adopted 
to that end.” The Fifth Circuit determined 
that the legislative history did not identify 
any pattern of constitutional violations or 
infringements by states nor any pattern of 
unremedied copyright infringement by states. 
Indeed, the legislative history of 
infringement by states is even more scant for 
CRCA than it was in the trademark in patent 
contexts. Additionally, the court noted that 
the legislative history of CRCA included 
only two allusions to state remedies, 
demonstrating that there was a failure to 
include information to state remedies for 
unlawful takings of private property by state 
governments or other possible remedies — 
such as breach of contract — that Congress 
did not consider when enacting CRCA. 
Additionally, CRCA fails because for 
Congress to determine that under the due 
process clause deprivation is actionable, it 
must be an intentional act; negligent acts 
causing unintended injury are an insufficient 
nexus. The CRCA failed to confine its reach 
to intentional acts. 
While some may suggest that SCOTUS has 
taken the case to overturn the general 
understanding that states retain sovereign 
immunity in copyright cases, the Court’s 
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recent decision in Franchise Tax Board of 
California v. Hyatt could provide an 
indication that it strongly supports sovereign 
immunity. There, in a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS 
upheld state sovereign immunity in cases 
brought in other state courts. 
Ultimately, we will have to wait until next 


































“Supreme Court to Rule Whether Congress Appropriately Abrogated State 
Sovereign Immunity for Copyright Claims in Allen v. Cooper”  
 
 




June 18, 2019 
As we anxiously await a final decision from 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti, 
and decisions on pending petitions 
for certiorari in several other IP cases, the 
Court agreed to hear Allen v. Cooper on June 
3. The case asks whether Congress acted 
appropriately in relying upon its powers 
under Article I of the U.S. Constitution to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity against 
federal copyright claims by passing the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act 
(CRCA) or if, as the Fourth Circuit held, 
Congress improperly abrogated state 
sovereign immunity by passing that law. 
Queen Anne’s Revenge Salvage Project 
Leads to Copyright Claims 
The underlying case involves copyrighted 
video footage and one photograph created by 
videographer Frederick Allen and his 
production company Nautilus Productions 
during a project to salvage the Queen Anne’s 
Revenge, a ship commandeered in 1717 by 
the famous pirate Edward Teach, also known 
as “Blackbeard,” which was abandoned in 
1718 after it ran aground off the coast of 
Beaufort, North Carolina. After private 
research and salvage firm Intersal entered 
into an agreement to salvage the ship in 1998, 
Intersal retained Nautilus to document the 
salvage project. Allen subsequently obtained 
13 federally registered copyrights, each 
covering one year of footage from the salvage 
project. 
After the North Carolina Department of 
Natural and Cultural Resources, the state 
agency that signed the salvage agreement 
with Intersal, published Allen’s 
documentation of the salvage work on the 
Internet, Allen maintained that this infringed 
upon his copyrights in the work. In October 
2013, Allen, Nautilus, Intersal and North 
Carolina entered into a settlement agreement 
that clarified Allen’s respective rights to the 
video footage, some of which was 
determined to be “commercial 
documentaries” and other work that was 
“non-commercial media.” Allen contended 
that North Carolina continued its 
infringement after the settlement agreement 
by displaying videos on a YouTube channel 
and using a still photograph in a newsletter on 
maritime museums. 
Allen Petitions Supreme Court After 
Fourth Circuit Finds CRCA 
Unconstitutional 
In December 2015, Allen and Nautilus filed 
an infringement lawsuit in the Eastern 
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District of North Carolina against the state’s 
cultural resources department as well as the 
state’s governor and six department officials. 
North Carolina moved to dismiss the claims 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), asserting Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity as a defense to the 
claims made against the state and individual 
defendants. The district court denied North 
Carolina’s motions, finding that Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity was validly 
abrogated by Congress through the CRCA. 
North Carolina appealed from the district 
court’s denial of the state’s immunity defense 
and the case went to the Fourth Circuit. Last 
July, a Fourth Circuit panel reversed the 
district court’s denial of the sovereign 
immunity defense and remanded to the 
district court with instructions to dismiss all 
claims. On appeal, Allen and Nautilus had 
contended that the CRCA, which codified 
that states and state officials aren’t immune 
from copyright infringement suits in federal 
court, was properly invoked by Congress 
under the legislative body’s authority granted 
by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the Fourth Circuit found that it was 
“readily apparent” that Congress relied upon 
the Constitution’s Intellectual Property 
Clause in enacting this law and not its 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Citing to the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision 
in  College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Post-Secondary Education Expense Board, a 
case involving a similar law abrogating state 
sovereign immunity in patent infringement 
suits, the Fourth Circuit found that such an 
abrogation wasn’t valid absent Congress’ 
invocation of its Fourteenth Amendment 
authority. The Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act extends liability to states for 
all copyright violations, not just violations 
that implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, so 
the abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
under this law was “grossly disproportionate 
to the relevant injury under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” 
Allen and Nautilus filed their petition to the 
Supreme Court this January to challenge the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding that the CRCA 
didn’t validly abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. In the petition, Allen argued that 
the Fourth Circuit’s invalidation of federal 
statute warranted SCOTUS review. Allen 
also argued that the Supreme Court should 
weigh in on the constitutional authority held 
by Congress to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity from copyright suits. Citing 
to Florida Prepaid, the petition noted that 
Congress’ Article I power to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity wasn’t even argued to 
the Court in that case. Further, if the Supreme 
Court were to render the CRCA “a dead letter 
by default” by not reviewing the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision, the issue of copyright 
infringement by states would continue 
unabated. Allen’s petition cites to statistics 
identifying 154 infringement suits filed 
against states between 2000 and 2017, adding 
that actual instances of infringement “are 
vastly understated relative to actual 
incidence.” The CRCA provides adequate 
remedy for copyright holders given that 
injunctive relief doesn’t compensate creators 
for past infringement and is expensive to 
obtain. 
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Supreme Court Likely to Undo CRCA and 
Uphold State Sovereign Immunity 
The CRCA could be open to more challenge 
at the Supreme Court because it’s not limited 
to injunctive relief, according to Brian Esler, 
Partner at Miller Nash Graham & Dunn. 
“Giving a private citizen the right to sue a 
state for damages is less likely to be held to 
be a valid exercise of congressional power,” 
he said. “It’s not to say that Congress can’t, 
but there’s a higher level of scrutiny then as 
opposed to allowing only injunctive relief.” 
In a July 2017 blog post on this case, Esler 
noted it was interesting that the copyrighted 
material at issue was about the Queen Anne’s 
Revenge given that the first British copyright 
law, from which U.S. copyright law is in part 
derived, was the Statute of Anne. This was 
the first law providing for the regulation of 
copyrights through the government and the 
courts rather than private parties. Esler, who 
taught British IP law in the early 2000s at the 
University of Hertfordshire, said that the 
Statute of Anne was very much in the 
Framers’ minds when they wrote the 
Intellectual Property Clause into Article I of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
Esler said that the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Franchise Tax Board of 
California v. Hyatt, issued in May, provides 
a clue as to how the nation’s highest court 
will decide the state sovereign immunity 
issue in this case. In Franchise Tax Board, 
the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision 
(authored by Justice Clarence Thomas) 
holding that states retain their sovereign 
immunity from private suits brought to courts 
in other states. “The Supreme Court majority 
in that case said that the Eleventh 
Amendment was actually broader than what 
its text suggests,” Esler said. He believed 
that Franchise Tax Board could be a strong 
indicator that the Supreme Court might seek 
to extend state sovereign immunity 
in Allen consistent with the Court’s decision 
in Florida Prepaid. 
While SCOTUS upheld congressional 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
in Central Virginia Community College v. 
Katz (2006), and the bankruptcy provision in 
that case also derived from Article I of the 
Constitution, Esler noted that the Court held 
that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause 
was to maintain uniformity in U.S. 
bankruptcy law. “I don’t think you can say 
the same about the Intellectual Property 
Clause,” Esler said. “Although it certainly 
gave power to Congress to legislate in that 
area, it doesn’t demand uniformity.” 
Moreover, Justice Thomas authored the 
dissent in Central Virginia and now seems to 
have a majority for his expansive reading of 
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August 29, 2018 
The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit confirmed, consistent with rulings in 
other courts, that the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act does not validly abrogate 
11th Amendment immunity, and that 11th 
Amendment immunity may only be waived if 
a state expressly consents to suit in federal 
court.Allen v. Cooper, Case Nos. 17-1522, -
1602 (4th Cir. July 10, 2018) (Niemeyer, J). 
Allen, a videographer, along with Nautilus, 
his video production company, obtained the 
rights to create footage and photograph 
Blackbeard’s pirate ship off the coast of 
North Carolina through a permit issued by 
North Carolina to the salvors of the ship. The 
permit gave the salvors the exclusive right to 
make and market all commercial narrative 
accounts of project-related activities 
undertaken by the salvors, but specifically 
provided that the agreement did not infringe 
the public’s right to access public records, 
including field maps, notes, drawings, 
photographic records and other relevant 
materials created or collected pursuant to the 
study of the site and recovery of materials 
therefrom. After capturing substantial video 
footage and still images showing the 
underwater shipwreck and the efforts of 
teams of divers to recover artifacts from the 
wreck, Allen registered these works with the 
US Copyright Office.  
Subsequently, the North Carolina 
Department of Natural and Cultural 
Resources published some of Allen’s work 
on the internet without his consent, leading to 
a copyright infringement dispute that the 
parties settled pursuant to a settlement 
agreement. After entering into the settlement 
agreement, Allen and Nautilus alleged that 
the Department resumed publishing and/or 
displaying various videos about the 
shipwreck on the Department’s YouTube 
channel and published one of Allen’s still 
photographs in a newsletter, in violation of 
the parties’ agreement. 
Allen and Nautilus then brought suit alleging 
violation of Allen’s copyrights. North 
Carolina filed a motion to dismiss under 
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) asserting 
sovereign immunity under the 11th 
Amendment. In response, Allen and Nautilus 
made three main arguments: 
• North Carolina waived sovereign 
immunity in the settlement 
agreement. 
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• The federal Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act of 1990 
abrogated the State’s sovereign 
immunity. 
• Ex parte Young provided an 
exception to sovereign immunity 
for ongoing violations of federal 
law.  
After the district court rejected North 
Carolina’s claims of immunity, North 
Carolina filed an interlocutory appeal, and 
Allen and Nautilus filed a cross-appeal. 
The 11th Amendment immunity protects 
states, their agencies and their officials from 
suit in federal court. In order to waive 
immunity under the 11th Amendment, a state 
must expressly consent to suit in federal 
court. The Fourth Circuit found that the 
settlement agreement between the 
Department and Allen fell short of the clear 
statement required to effect a waiver of 11th 
Amendment immunity. The agreement 
provided in relevant part: 
In the event [North Carolina], Intersal 
[salvors], or [Allen and] Nautilus breaches 
this Agreement, [North Carolina], Intersal, or 
[Allen and] Nautilus may avail themselves of 
all remedies provided by law or equity. 
This statement makes no reference to federal 
court (or any court) and states only that each 
party may pursue available remedies as 
provided by law or equity. Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit found that legal or equitable 
limitations on those remedies—including 
11th Amendment immunity—must also 
apply under the agreement and, as a result, 
the agreement did not constitute a waiver of 
11th Amendment immunity. 
The Fourth Circuit further found that the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act does not 
abrogate a state’s 11th Amendment 
immunity. The Act provides in relevant part: 
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and 
any officer or employee of a State or 
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her 
official capacity, shall not be immune, under 
the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States or under any other 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in 
Federal court by any person . . . for a violation 
of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright 
owner provided by [federal copyright law]. 
The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that Congress 
cannot rely on its enumerated power in 
Article I’s Patent and Copyright Clause, 
which authorizes Congress to “secur[e] for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries,” to abrogate 11th 
Amendment immunity. The Court, relying 
on Florida Prepaid v. College Savings 
Bank (S.Ct. 1999), found that the language in 
the Act sweeps so broadly that it cannot be 
deemed a congruent and proportional 
response to the 14th Amendment injury with 
which it was confronted. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act cannot validly abrogate the 
11th Amendment. 
Lastly, the Fourth Circuit found that Ex parte 
Young, which allows private citizens to sue 
state officials in their official capacities in 
federal court to obtain prospective relief from 
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ongoing violations of federal law, does not 
apply in this case because North Carolina 
removed the allegedly infringing materials 
from the internet and there was no ongoing 
copyright infringement. The argument by 
Allen and Nautilus that there was 
the possibility of other infringing displays 
did not plausibly allege the existence of an 
ongoing violation of federal law, and thus Ex 
parte Young did not provide an exception to 
the 11th Amendment immunity claimed by 
North Carolina. 
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded 
the matter to the district court with 
instructions to dismiss, with prejudice, the 
claims against state officials in their 
individual capacities, and to dismiss, without 




























“The State Can Plunder Your Copyright: Allen v. Cooper” 
 
 




July 17, 2018 
In 1710, during the reign of Queen Anne, 
Great Britain’s Parliament enacted the statute 
that gave rise to copyright as we know it—
the Statute of Anne—which was the first 
statute to declare that the subject matter of 
copyright would be regulated by the 
government and the courts, rather than 
agreements between private parties. Seven 
years later, the English pirate Blackbeard 
captured a French merchant vessel, renamed 
her the Queen Anne’s Revenge, and soon 
after ran her aground off the coast of North 
Carolina. As demonstrated by the recent 
Fourth Circuit decision in Allen v. Cooper, 
Blackbeard’s choice of the ship’s name 
proved prophetic. 
 
In that case, the Fourth Circuit was tasked 
with deciding whether the company that 
recently discovered and salvaged the wreck 
of the Queen Anne’s Revenge off the coast of 
North Carolina could sue North Carolina and 
various of its state officials for copyright 
infringement when North Carolina posted 
some YouTube videos and pictures of the 
salvage operation that contained what were 
admittedly the plaintiff’s copyrighted videos 
and images. The plaintiffs even had two 
contracts with North Carolina in which North 
Carolina had agreed that the plaintiffs would 
have the “exclusive right” to produce and 
profit from videos about their salvage project 
(although North Carolina did require the 
plaintiffs to make their raw footage and 
photographs available to North Carolina, 
reserved the right to use them for educational 
purposes, and warned the plaintiffs that any 
materials provided would become public 
records). Had the plaintiffs been suing a 
private actor, the case for infringement (and 
damages or injunctive relief) would have 
been straightforward. But as was true in 
Queen Anne’s reign, and is still true now, the 
sovereign is immune from suit except in 
limited circumstances, which sovereign 
immunity (at least for states) is enshrined in 
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
But Article I of the Constitution also gives 
Congress the authority to “secur[e] for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries” (i.e., to grant copyrights). 
And pursuant to that Constitutional authority, 
Congress enacted the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act in 1990, which provides 
that States and state officers “shall not be 
immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States or under 
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from 
suit in Federal court by any person . . . for a 
violation of any of the exclusive rights of a 
copyright owner provided by [federal law].” 
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So plaintiffs should have had the wind at their 
backs in suing the State and its officers for 
copyright infringement. 
The Fourth Circuit scuttled that notion, and 
found that Congress itself was the outlaw in 
passing a statute purporting to abrogate the 
State’s sovereign immunity because 
“Congress cannot rely on the enumerated 
power in Article I over copyright to compel a 
State to litigate copyright cases in a federal 
court.” In doing so, the Fourth Circuit joined 
a growing list of federal courts that have held 
the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act to be 
unconstitutional. 
So to review: (1) copyright claims can only 
be brought in federal court, (2) states cannot 
be sued without their consent in federal court, 
so (3) plaintiff’s copyright claims are 
dismissed. As we have noted here 
before with respect to trade secrets, it can be 
dangerous for any rights holder to deal with 
the government as it would a private party. 


































Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc. 
 
Ruling Below: Code Revision Comm’n v. Public Resource. Org Inc, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 
2018) 
 
Overview: The Circuit Court held that the Official Code of Georgia Annotate (OCGA) were 
sufficiently law-like to be properly regarded as a sovereign work and therefore were not 
copyrightable.   
 
Issue: Whether the government edicts doctrine extends to—and thus renders uncopyrightable—
works that lack the force of law, such as the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. 
 
CODE REVISIONS COMMISSION, for the Benefit of and on behalf of General Assembly 




PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC., Defendant—Appellant  
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
 
Decided on October 19, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:  
 
Today, we are presented with the question of 
whether the annotations contained in the 
Official Code of Georgia Annotated 
(OCGA), authored by the Georgia General 
Assembly and made an inextricable part of 
the official codification of Georgia’s laws, 
may be copyrighted by the State of Georgia. 
Answering this question means confronting 
profound and difficult issues about the nature 
of law in our society and the rights of citizens 
to have unfettered access to the legal edicts 
that govern their lives. After a thorough 
review of the law, and an examination of the 
annotations, we conclude that no valid  
 
copyright interest can be asserted in any part 
of the OCGA.  
 
From the earliest day of the Republic, under 
federal copyright law, copyright interests 
have vested in the author of the work. 
Authorship, therefore, is central to many 
questions that arise under the Copyright Act, 
17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. This case is no 
exception. In most states the “official” code 
is comprised of statutory text alone, and all 
agree that a state’s codification cannot be 
 469 
copyrighted because the authorship is 
ultimately attributable to the People. 
Conversely, all agree that annotations created 
by a private party generally can be 
copyrighted because the annotations are an 
original work created by a private publisher. 
But the annotations in the OCGA are not 
exactly like either of these two types of 
works. Rather, they fall somewhere in 
between -- their legal effect and ultimate 
authorship more indeterminate. To resolve 
this question, then, we reason by analogy, 
and drill down on the core attributes that 
make the OCGA annotations what they are -
- namely an exercise of sovereign power.  
 
The general rule that legislative codifications 
are uncopyrightable derives from an 
understanding of the nature of law and the 
basic idea that the People, as the reservoir of 
all sovereignty, are the source of our law. For 
purposes of the Copyright Act, this means 
that the People are the constructive authors of 
those official legal promulgations of 
government that represent an exercise of 
sovereign authority. And because they are the 
authors, the People are the owners of these 
works, meaning that the works are 
intrinsically public domain material and, 
therefore, uncopyrightable.  
 
That the law itself, whether it takes the form 
of a legislative enactment or of a judicial 
opinion, is subject to the rule is clear and not 
contested. This is because these works 
represent the quintessential exercise of 
sovereign power. When a legislature enacts a 
law, or a court writes an opinion rendering an 
official interpretation of the law in a case or 
controversy, they are undisputedly speaking 
on behalf of the People, who are properly 
regarded as the author of the work. The task 
we face today is whether we should similarly 
treat Georgia’s entire official code, which 
expressly merges its statutes and their official 
annotations, as the sovereign expression of 
the People by their legislature, as public 
domain material.  
 
To navigate the ambiguities surrounding how 
to characterize this work, we resort to first 
principles. Because our ultimate inquiry is 
whether a work is authored by the People, 
meaning whether it represents an articulation 
of the sovereign will, our analysis is guided 
by a consideration of those characteristics 
that are the hallmarks of law. In particular, we 
rely on the identity of the public officials who 
created the work, the authoritativeness of the 
work, and the process by which the work was 
created. These are critical markers. Where all 
three point in the direction that a work was 
made in the exercise of sovereign power -- 
which is to say where the official who created 
the work is entrusted with delegated 
sovereign authority, where the work carries 
authoritative weight, and where the work was 
created through the procedural channels in 
which sovereign power ordinarily flows -- it 
follows that the work would be attributable to 
the constructive authorship of the People, and 
therefore uncopyrightable.  
 
The question is a close one -- and important 
considerations of public policy are at stake on 
either side -- but, at the end of the day, we 
conclude that the annotations in the OCGA 
are sufficiently law-like so as to be properly 
regarded as a sovereign work. Like the 
statutory text itself, the annotations are 
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created by the duly constituted legislative 
authority of the State of Georgia. Moreover, 
the annotations clearly have authoritative 
weight in explicating and establishing the 
meaning and effect of Georgia’s laws. 
Furthermore, the procedures by which the 
annotations were incorporated bear the 
hallmarks of legislative process, namely 
bicameralism and presentment. In short, the 
annotations are legislative works created by 
Georgia’s legislators in the exercise of their 
legislative authority.  
 
As a consequence, we conclude that the 
People are the ultimate authors of the 
annotations. As a work of the People the 
annotations are inherently public domain 
material and therefore uncopyrightable. 
Because we conclude that no copyright can 
be held in the annotations, we have no 
occasion to address the parties’ other 






The Official Code of Georgia Annotated 
(OCGA or the Code) is an annotated 
compilation of Georgia statutes that has been 
published annually since 1982. The statutory 
text contained in the OCGA has been 
“enacted and [has] the effect of statutes 
enacted by the General Assembly of 
Georgia.” As the Code itself explains, the 
statutory text in the OCGA is the official 
published version of Georgia’s laws, and 
when the Georgia General Assembly enacts a 
new law, the bill typically reads “An Act… 
To amend… the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated.” 
 
Appearing alongside the statutory text are 
various annotations, consisting of history 
lines, repeal lines, cross references, 
commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, 
excerpts from law review articles, summaries 
of opinions of the Attorney General of 
Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of 
the State Bar, and other research references. 
The Code itself makes clear that these 
annotations are a part of the official Code, 
stating that the statutory portions of the Code 
“shall be merged with annotations… and 
[are] published by authority of the state 
…and when so published [are to] be known 
and may be cited as the ‘Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated.’”  
 
Despite the fact that they are part of the 
official Code, Georgia law says that the 
annotations themselves do not have the force 
of law in the way that the statutory portions 
of the Code do. One provision of the Code 
explains that:  
 
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the 
descriptive headings or catchlines 
immediately preceding or within the text of 
the individual Code sections of this Code, 
except the Code section numbers included in 
the headings or catchlines immediately 
preceding the text of the Code sections, and 
title and chapter analyses do not constitute 
part of the law and shall in no manner limit or 
expand the construction of any Code section. 
All historical citations, title and chapter 
analyses, and notes set out in this Code are 
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given for the purpose of convenient reference 
and do not constitute part of the law.  
 
Laws passed during each session of the 
Georgia General Assembly that reenact the 
OCGA as the state’s official code similarly 
provide that the annotations “contained in the 
Official Code of Georgia Annotated are not 
enacted as statutes by the provisions of this 
Act.”  
 
The annotations were initially prepared by 
Mathew Bender & Co., Inc., an operating 
division of the LexisNexis Group, (Lexis), 
pursuant to an agreement it entered into with 
the State of Georgia. Under the terms of the 
agreement, Lexis is responsible for the 
ongoing publication and maintenance of the 
Code, and all editorial, publication, and 
distribution costs. In exchange, Lexis was 
given the exclusive right of publication by 
Georgia. But, notably, Georgia holds the 
copyright in the annotations in its own name. 
The publication agreement also specifies 
what types of annotations should appear 
alongside the statutory text, and provides 
detailed and specific directions as to how 
Lexis is to generate and arrange this content. 
The agreement also provides that the Code 
Revision Commission (the “Commission”) 
supervises the work of Lexis and has final 
editorial control over the contents of the 
OCGA. The Commission is a body 
established by the Georgia General Assembly 
in 1977 that was originally tasked with 
undertaking the recodification of all of 
Georgia’s laws, a project that had not been 
done since 1933. The Commission is 
comprised of Georgia officials, including the 
Lieutenant Governor, four members of the 
Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia 
House of Representatives, four additional 
members of the Georgia House of 
Representatives, and five members appointed 
by the president of the State Bar of Georgia. 
Following its successful recodification of 
Georgia law and the publication of the 
OCGA in 1982, the Commission is now 
responsible for updating the OCGA and 
supervising Lexis’s editing and publication 
of the OCGA.  
 
In addition to providing instructions to Lexis 
about how the annotations should be created, 
compiled, and arranged, the publication 
agreement establishes a number of other 
conditions governing the relationship 
between Lexis and the State of Georgia. First, 
the agreement requires that Lexis create a 
free, unannotated, online version of the Code 
for use by the general public. Second, the 
agreement limits the price that Lexis can 
charge for the OCGA. While other 
commercial annotations of the Georgia Code 
can cost as much as $2,570, the price of the 
OCGA is currently $404. Third, it grants 
Lexis the exclusive right to produce and sell 
print, CD-ROM, and online versions of the 
OCGA. Finally, it provides that the 
Commission shall receive royalties on the 
sale of CD-ROM and online versions of the 
OCGA, but shall not receive royalties from 
the sale of print volumes.  
 
The publication agreement also provides that 
“[a]ll the contents of the Code… shall be 
copyrighted in the name of the State of 
Georgia… [and] [t]he copyrights shall cover 
all copyrightable parts of the Code.” The 
Commission asserts a copyright in all 
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portions of the OCGA except for the statutory 
text, which it recognizes cannot be 
copyrighted. Despite the copyright and the 
exclusive publishing rights granted to Lexis, 
the State of Georgia makes the CD-ROM 
version of the OCGA available to the general 
public at over 60 state and county-operated 
facilities throughout Georgia, such as 
libraries and universities. In addition, state 
agencies are granted the right to print and 
distribute or sell to the public portions of the 





Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit 
organization with a mission of improving 
public access to government records and 
primary legal materials. Thus for example, 
PRO has been responsible for the free, online 
publication of all U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions and every post-1950 U.S. Court of 
Appeals opinion. PRO has also been 
responsible for the online publication of 
various state statutory codes.  
 
In 2013 PRO purchased all 186 volumes of 
the print version of the OCGA and its 
supplements, scanned them, and uploaded 
them to its website to be freely accessible to 
the public. It also placed digital copies of the 
OCGA onto USB drives and mailed them to 
various Georgia legislators. Additionally, 
PRO distributed copies of the OCGA to other 
organizations and on other websites in order 
to facilitate its further dissemination by other 
parties.  
 
On multiple occasions the Commission sent 
letters to PRO demanding that it cease and 
desist from publishing the OCGA on the 
grounds that publication infringes on the 
State of Georgia’s copyright in the work. 
PRO refused to comply, arguing that there 
was no valid copyright in the OCGA because 
the law cannot be copyrighted. The 
Commission, acting on behalf of the Georgia 
General Assembly and the State of Georgia, 
sued PRO on July 21, 2015 in the United 
District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia. The complaint sought injunctive 
relief against PRO’s “widespread and 
unauthorized copying and distribution of the 
copyrighted annotations in the Official Code 
of Georgia Annotated through the 
distribution of thumb drives containing 
copies of the O.C.G.A. and the posting of the 
O.C.G.A. on various websites.” On 
September 14, 2015, PRO filed its answer to 
the complaint, acknowledging its widespread 
publication of the OCGA, but denying that 
the State of Georgia holds an enforceable 
copyright in the Code. PRO also asserted the 
defense of fair use. Finally, PRO 
counterclaimed seeking a declaratory 
judgment that “the State of Georgia has no 
valid copyright in any portion of the 
O.C.G.A. because the O.C.G.A. is in the 
public domain.”  
 
Following briefing and argument, the district 
court granted the Commission’s motion for 
partial summary judgment and denied PRO’s 
motion. The court concluded that because the 
annotations in the OCGA lack the force of 
law, they are not public domain material. 
Also, it rejected PRO’s other challenges to 
the validity of Georgia’s copyright as well as 
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its fair use defense. Soon thereafter, the 
district court entered a permanent injunction 
against PRO enjoining it “from all 
unauthorized use, including through 
reproduction, display, distribution, or 
creation of derivative works, of the Official 
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.).” 
The injunction also ordered PRO to “remove 
all versions of the O.C.G.A. from its 
website,” and to cease any fundraising 
activities connected with PRO’s publication 
of the OCGA.  
 




We review the grant of summary judgment de 
novo, applying the same legal standards 
which bound the district court. In doing so, 
we consider “the evidence and all factual 
inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion.” 
Summary judgment is proper only where 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. A 
genuine issue of material fact exists where 
the dispute is “over facts that might affect the 
outcome of the suit under the governing law” 
and where the “evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.” Id. We also review a 
district court’s decision to grant equitable 
relief for abuse of discretion, considering 
questions of law de novo and findings of fact 
for clear error.  
 
In order to establish a prima facie case of 
copyright infringement, “a plaintiff must 
show that (1) it owns a valid copyright in the 
[work] and (2) defendants copied protected 
elements from the [work].” A valid copyright 
registration “constitute[s] prima facie 
evidence of the validity of the copyright.” 17 
U.S.C. § 410 (c). Once the plaintiff has 
produced a valid copyright registration, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to establish that 
the copyright is invalid. There is no dispute 
that the State of Georgia has a registered 
copyright in the OCGA annotations. Nor do 
the parties contest that PRO copied the 
OCGA in its entirety. Thus, at the heart of 
this case is the question whether Georgia’s 
copyright in the OCGA is valid; on this issue 




The Constitution grants Congress the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
Congress has exercised this power by passing 
the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
Under the Copyright Act:  
 
Copyright protection subsists… in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device.  
 
As this provision makes clear, “authorship” 
is central to the statutory scheme. Only 
“original works of authorship” are eligible 
for copyright protection. What’s more, 
authorship generally determines who has a 
possessory interest in a work. “Copyright in 
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a work… vests initially in the author or 
authors of the work.” Indeed, authorship 
allows a person to claim copyright protection 
regardless of whether the work has been 
registered with the United States Copyright 
Office. As we have explained, “[c]opyright 
inheres in authorship and exists whether or 
not it is ever registered.” In consequence, to 
ascertain who holds a copyright in a work, we 
ordinarily must ascertain the identity of the 
author.  
 
The meaning of authorship takes on special 
significance in cases like this where we 
consider the copyrightability of a government 
edict. A long line of authority, stretching 
back more than 180 years, establishes that, 
with respect to certain governmental works, 
the term “author” should be construed to 
mean “the People,” so that the general public 
is treated as the owner of the work. This 
means that a work subject to the rule is 
inherently public domain material and thus 
not eligible for copyright protection. The 
foundations of the case law establishing this 
doctrine are far from clear. Few courts have 
fully explained the basis for this idea and the 
Supreme Court last addressed the question in 
1888. Thus, before explaining why we 
construe the “author” of the OCGA to mean 
“the People,” it’s worth examining the 
principal cases in some detail in order to 
understand the considerations that guided 
them.  
 
The Supreme Court first addressed whether a 
government edict can be copyrighted in 
Wheaton v. Peters. The Court unanimously 
held that “no reporter has or can have any 
copyright in the written opinions delivered by 
this Court; and that the judges thereof cannot 
confer on any reporter any such right.” The 
Court was interpreting the Copyright Act of 
1790, but it did not explain the foundations 
for the rule that “the law” was  
 
The Court revisited the question in Banks v. 
Manchester, and held that the opinions of 
state court judges, just like Supreme Court 
opinions, were not copyrightable. In Banks 
the Court considered an infringement suit 
filed by a publishing firm that had published 
official reports containing the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio against a 
defendant who had published the same 
material in the American Law Journal. An 
Ohio statute provided for the appointment of 
an official reporter for the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, and tasked him with compiling the 
decisions and other materials authored by the 
judges and securing “for the benefit of the 
state” a copyright on the compilations. The 
Ohio statute also required the Secretary of 
State to contract with a publisher, who would 
be given the exclusive right to publish the 
reports compiled by the official court reporter 
“so far as the state can confer [such right].” 
The plaintiff publishing firm in Banks was 
the chosen publisher, and, in suing, was 
attempting to enforce a copyright interest in 
the work of the Ohio judges assigned to it by 
the State of Ohio.  
 
The Court found the copyright invalid. It 
emphasized that under then-extant copyright 
law only “authors” could obtain a copyright 
in their work. The Court determined that the 
reporter who had created the compilations 
did not qualify as the author of the opinions 
or the other materials written by the judges 
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since he had not created the works. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that 
“[i]n no proper sense can the judge who, in 
his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or 
decision, the statement of the case, and the 
syllabus, or head-note, be regarded as their 
author.” Thus, the Court rested its decision on 
a construction of the statutory term “author” 
that excluded both the judges and the reporter 
from qualifying as authors of the material in 
question, which in turn meant that neither the 
judges nor the reporter could have conveyed 
a valid copyright interest to the publishing 
firm bringing suit.  
 
The Court offered a number of reasons for 
holding that the judges could not be 
considered the “authors” of their work. In the 
first place judges “receive from the public 
treasury a stated annual salary, fixed by law,” 
and therefore can “have no pecuniary interest 
or proprietorship, as against the public at 
large, in the fruits of their judicial labors.” 
Furthermore, although the Court said that it 
was only construing the statutory meaning of 
the term “author,” it also acknowledged that, 
fundamentally, “[t]he question is one of 
public policy.” In articulating this public 
policy interest, the Court explained that 
“[t]he whole work done by the judges 
constitutes the authentic exposition and 
interpretation of the law, which, binding 
every citizen, is free for publication to all, 
whether it is a declaration of unwritten law, 
or an interpretation of a constitution or a 
statute.” Banks expressly relied on a ruling of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Nash v. Lathrop, which had similarly 
observed that “it needs no argument to show 
that justice requires that all should have free 
access to the opinions, and that it is against 
sound public policy to prevent this, or to 
suppress and keep from the earliest 
knowledge of the public the statutes, or the 
decisions and opinions of the justices.”  
 
The next, and to date last time the Supreme 
Court considered the rule that government 
edicts cannot be copyrighted came less than a 
month after the Court had decided Banks, in 
Callaghan v. Myers. There, a publisher of a 
set of reports containing the opinions of the 
Supreme Court of Illinois, known as the 
Illinois Reports, brought suit for copyright 
infringement against a rival publisher that 
had copied and published the reports. The 
original publisher had obtained a proprietary 
interest in the reports from a salaried official 
of the State of Illinois whose duties, defined 
by statute, consisted of compiling the Illinois 
Reports; organizing the cases; writing 
annotations such as headnotes and syllabi to 
appear alongside the opinions in the reports; 
and providing a certain number of copies of 
the final product to the Secretary of State of 
Illinois. Having fulfilled his statutory duties, 
the reporter sold whatever proprietary 
interest he had in the Illinois Reports to the 
publishing firm. When the firm sued for 
copyright infringement, the alleged infringer 
attempted to defend, claiming that the reports 
were public property because they had been 
created by a state employed reporter who 
could himself have no proprietary interest in 
the work since he created the reports as part 
of his public duties and therefore was not 
their “author.”  
 
The Court began its analysis by reinforcing 
the basic rule announced in Banks that “there 
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can be no copyright in the opinions of the 
judges, or in the work done by them in their 
official capacity as judges.” Nevertheless it 
rejected the claim that the copyright in the 
Illinois Reports was invalid. It explained that 
the underlying rationale of Banks did not 
apply, observing that “there is no ground of 
public policy on which a reporter who 
prepares a volume of law reports, of the 
character of those in this case, can… be 
debarred from obtaining a copyright for the 
volume which will cover the matter which is 
the result of his intellectual labor.” The Court 
further suggested that, since the court 
reporter was a “sworn public officer, 
appointed by the authority of the 
government… [and] paid a fixed salary for 
his labors,” the state government might have 
taken any proprietary interest in his work for 
itself, but the fact that it had not done so 
suggested that there was “a tacit assent by the 
government to his exercising such privilege” 
on his own. The Court thus reasoned that 
federal copyright law as explicated in Banks 
did not prevent the reporter from holding a 
valid copyright in the work and that the state 
had not reserved the copyright to itself. As a 
result, the copyright the reporter obtained and 
conveyed to the publishing firm was valid. 
The compilation of judicial decisions and 
other explanatory material like headnotes, 
tables, and indices, was different from Banks 
in two ways: first, the reporter, who had been 
appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court, and 
not the judges, had written the material 
accompanying the opinion; and, second, the 
reporter, and not the State of Illinois, claimed 
to hold the copyright. 
 
The Supreme Court has not examined the 
doctrine since it decided Callaghan in 1888. 
However, since Banks and Callaghan the 
lower courts have further explored the nature 
and application of the rule. Thus, for 
example, the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion 
authored by Justice Harlan, applied the rule 
to state statutes. The Fifth Circuit has 
extended the rule to encompass regulatory 
materials. However, other courts have 
declined to extend the rule in other, related 
contexts.  
 
It is also worth observing that Congress has 
partially codified the rule announced in 
Banks. Specifically, the 1909 version of the 
Copyright Act provided that “no copyright 
shall subsist in the original text of any work 
which is in the public domain… or in any 
publication of the United States Government, 
or any reprint, in whole or in part, thereof.” 
This prohibition persists under current 
copyright law, enacted in 1976, which, in 
turn, provides that “[c]opyright protection 
under this title is not available for any work 
of the United States Government.” This 
partial codification of Banks for works 
created by the federal government leaves 
unmodified the rule as it applies to works 
created by the states. As the Copyright 
Office’s 1961 Register’s Report stated, even 
though Congress enacted a prohibition that 
only applies to the federal government, “the 
judicially established rule [] still prevent[s] 
copyright in the text of state laws, municipal 
ordinances, court decisions, and similar 
official documents.”  
 
Although case precedent and congressional 
enactments have long established the rule 
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that government works are not copyrightable, 
the foundations of the rule are generally 
implicit and unstated. Since the Court in 
Banks was not especially clear about the legal 
source of the rule it had announced and since 
the issue has not been raised before in our 
Court, we start with a relatively clean canvas. 
What is clear, however, is that the rule 
enunciated in Banks was grounded on the 
Court’s interpretation of the term “author” in 
the Copyright Act of 1790, that works created 
by courts in the performance of their official 
duties did not belong to the judges, and that 
public policy compelled the conclusion that 
these works were in the public domain and 
uncopyrightable.  
 
Thus, we understand the rule in Banks to 
derive from first principles about the nature 
of law in our democracy. Under democratic 
rule, the People are sovereign, they govern 
themselves through their legislative and 
judicial representatives, and they are 
ultimately the source of our law. Under this 
arrangement, lawmakers and judges are 
draftsmen of the law, exercising delegated 
authority, and acting as servants of the 
People, and whatever they produce the 
People are the true authors. When the 
legislative or judicial chords are plucked it is 
in fact the People’s voice that is heard. Not 
surprisingly, then, for purposes of copyright 
law, this means that the People, as the 
constructive authors are also the owners of 
the law. And in this way, any work of which 
the People are the constructive authors is 
intrinsically public domain material and is 
freely accessible to all so that no valid 
copyright can ever be held in it.  
 
The concept of popular sovereignty is deeply 
rooted in our politics, our law, and our 
history. The seminal statement of America’s 
political creed boldly proclaims that 
“[g]overnments . . . deriv[e] their just powers 
from the consent of the governed.” During 
the ratification debates that followed the 
Revolution, James Madison similarly began 
with the foundational idea that the People 
were sovereign, and that under the proposed 
form of government “the public voice” was 
“pronounced by the representatives of the 
people.” Still again, in the midst of the Civil 
War, President Lincoln etched an indelible 
description of this form of government in the 
national memory, describing ours as a 
“government of the people, by the people, for 
the people.”  
 
In fact, the United States Reports are filled 
with invocations of the sovereignty of the 
People. As Chief Justice Marshall expressed 
the fundamental idea many years ago: “[t]he 
government proceeds directly from the 
people; is ‘ordained and established,’ in the 
name of the people… [and] is emphatically 
and truly, a government of the people. In 
form, and in substance, it emanates from 
them. Its powers are granted by them, and are 
to be exercised directly on them, and for their 
benefit.”  
 
While Banks is not explicit in grounding its 
holding in this conception of sovereignty, 
other federal courts have ruled that 
government works are intrinsically public 
domain material precisely because the People 
are sovereign and are therefore the authors 
and owners of the law. Thus, for example, in 
Banks & Bros. v. W. Pub. Co., the court 
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justified the rule on the grounds that “[e]ach 
citizen is a ruler,— a law-maker,— and as 
such has the right of access to the laws he 
joins in making and to any official 
interpretation thereof. If the right of property 
enters into the question, he is a part owner, 
and as such cannot be deprived of equal 
access by his co-owners.”  
 
In the same vein, and more recently, several 
courts have applied the rule announced in 
Banks and understood the rule to rest on 
foundational principles about the nature of 
law in a democratic society. Thus, in Veeck, 
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted 
the question of whether a model building 
code, once adopted by two municipalities, 
lost its copyright protection In concluding 
that the work was uncopyrightable, the court 
asserted as a basic principle that the law is in 
“the public domain and thus not amenable to 
copyright,” and that cases like Wheaton and 
Banks evince a “broad understanding of what 
constitutes ‘the law’” so as to make judicial 
opinions in addition to statutes ineligible for 
copyright protection. On this basis, the court 
held that, “[a]s governing law,” the municipal 
building codes also could not be copyrighted.  
 
The court went on to explain that its holding 
rested on a deeper principle, a “metaphorical 
concept of citizen authorship.” As the court 
reasoned, “[l]awmaking bodies in this 
country enact rules and regulations only with 
the consent of the governed. The very process 
of lawmaking demands and incorporates 
contributions by ‘the people,’ in an infinite 
variety of individual and organizational 
capacities… In performing their function, the 
lawmakers represent the public will, and the 
public are the final ‘authors’ of the law.”  The 
court discerned that there are strong public 
policy interests in giving the public 
unfettered access to the law. “[P]ublic 
ownership of the law means precisely that 
‘the law’ is in the ‘public domain’ for 
whatever use the citizens choose to make of 
it. Citizens may reproduce copies of the law 
for many purposes, not only to guide their 
actions but to influence future legislation, 
educate their neighborhood association, or 
simply to amuse.” Thus, the “metaphorical 
concept of citizen authorship together with 
the need for citizens to have free access to the 
laws are the ultimate holding of Banks.”  
 
The First Circuit has also emphasized 
popular sovereignty as being foundational to 
its understanding of the rule announced in 
Banks. In Building. Officials & Code 
Administrators v. Code Technology, Inc., the 
court considered, on an interlocutory appeal 
challenging the issue of a preliminary 
injunction, a copyright infringement suit 
brought by the private sector author of a 
model building code against a publisher of 
the Massachusetts building code, which the 
Massachusetts legislature had based in large 
measure on the model code. The court ruled 
that the inclusion of the otherwise 
copyrightable model building code in the 
official Massachusetts building code likely 
rendered those materials, just like the rest of 
the materials in the Massachusetts building 
code, “freely available for copying by 
anyone.”  
 
After reviewing case precedent going as far 
back as Wheaton, a panel of the First Circuit 
asserted that “[t]he law thus seems clear that 
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judicial opinions and statutes are in the public 
domain and are not subject to copyright.” The 
court reasoned that this principle extends to 
regulatory codes as much as it does to statutes 
and judicial opinions. While acknowledging 
that cases like Banks and Wheaton seemed to 
rest in part on the identity of the creators of 
the works in question, namely salaried public 
officials performing official duties, it 
explained that a more fundamental principle 
was at work. In particular, “citizens are the 
authors of the law, and therefore its owners, 
regardless of who actually drafts the 
provisions, because the law derives its 
authority from the consent of the public, 
expressed through the democratic process.” 
The reason why judges and legislators cannot 
copyright works they create, was not because 
they are working for the government rather 
than for themselves, but rather because of a 
“metaphorical concept of citizen authorship,” 
which means that, once it adopts a text as law, 
the body politic becomes the author of the 
work in question, leaving the original drafter 
with no proprietary interest. The court 
reasoned that this was true even where the 





The ultimate inquiry posed by the rule in 
Banks is thus whether a work is attributable 
to the constructive authorship of the People, 
which is to say whether it was created by an 
agent of the People in the direct exercise of 
sovereign authority. Statutes and judicial 
opinions are the most obvious examples of 
what falls within the ambit of the rule.  
 
This does not mean that statutes, judicial 
opinions, and other texts that carry the clear 
force of law are the only works that may be 
subject to the rule. For one thing, relying, as 
the district court did, on a bright line 
distinction between edicts that have the force 
of law and those that do not to apply the 
Banks rule simply does not work in some 
cases. This is one of them. It is clear to us that 
there exists a zone of indeterminacy at the 
frontier between edicts that carry the force of 
law and those that do not. In this small band 
of cases a government work may not be 
characterized as law, and yet still be so 
sufficiently law-like as to implicate the core 
policy interests undergirding Banks.  
 
Statutory texts are the kinds of works most 
obviously subject to the rule announced in 
Banks. Because statutes are the prototypical 
works to which the rule applies, we rely on 
the statutory example as the lodestar for our 
inquiry. Whether or not a work is subject to 
the rule is dependent on whether the work is 
the law, or sufficiently like the law, so as to 
be deemed the product of the direct exercise 
of sovereign authority, and therefore 
attributable to the constructive authorship of 
the People. Basing the inquiry on whether a 
work is similar enough to the law so as to be 
attributable to the People, of course, does 
little to diminish the difficulty of applying the 
Banks rule in the unique circumstances 
presented here. But it does point us toward 
the right way of structuring our analysis.  
 
Put simply, there are certain things that make 
the law what it is. The law is written by 
particular public officials who are entrusted 
with the exercise of legislative power; the law 
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is, by nature, authoritative; and the law is 
created through certain, prescribed processes, 
the deviation from which would deprive it of 
legal effect. Each of these attributes is a 
hallmark of law. These characteristics 
distinguish written works that carry the force 
of law from all other works. Since we are 
concerned here with whether a work is 
attributable to the constructive authorship of 
the People, these factors guide our inquiry 
into whether a work is law or sufficiently 
law-like so as to be subject to the rule in 
Banks.  
An analysis of these factors yields the 
conclusion that the annotations in the OCGA, 
while not having the force of law, are part and 
parcel of the law. They are so enmeshed with 
Georgia’s law as to be inextricable. The 
annotations are themselves law-like insofar 
as we examine who made them, how they 
were made, and the role they play in the 
legislative and jurisprudential spheres of 
Georgia’s public life. In consequence, they 
too represent a work, like the statutes 
themselves, that is constructively authored by 





First, and of critical importance to our 
analysis is that the Georgia General 
Assembly is the driving force behind their 
creation. The Code Revision Commission 
exerts authoritative influence over the 
creation of the annotations and the 
Commission indisputably is an arm of the 
General Assembly. Thus, just as the 
uncopyrightable works in Banks were created 
by the Ohio Supreme Court, the annotations 
are, in a powerful sense, a work created by 
the Georgia state legislature.  
 
While it is true that the annotations were 
initially prepared by a private party, in this 
case Lexis, it is also the case that Lexis drafts 
the annotations pursuant to highly detailed 
instructions contained in the contract it 
entered into with the Code Revision 
Commission. In particular, the publication 
agreement not only lists the types of materials 
that Lexis must include in the OCGA, but 
also provides punctiliously specific 
instructions on how these materials are to be 
prepared. Thus, by way of example, in 
addition to instructing Lexis to include 
annotations summarizing court decisions that 
are relevant to various statutory provisions in 
the OCGA, the publication contract tells 
Lexis which court decisions to include. 
Moreover, the contract specifies the content 
of these summaries, instructing Lexis to 
include discussion of those portions of 
judicial opinions that involve “direct 
constructions” of a statute, including 
“constructions concerning constitutionality, 
purpose, intent, and the meaning of words 
and phrases as well as illustrations as to what 
a particular provision applies and to what a 
particular provision does not apply.” Leaving 
even less to Lexis’s independent judgment, 
the contract also instructs Lexis what not to 
include in the judicial summaries, Lexis’s 
editors to “avoid long factual annotations 
where they do not bear directly upon the 
statute involved.” Further, the agreement tells 
Lexis the order in which the various case 
annotations are to be arranged. 
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The annotations containing summaries of 
judicial opinions are not the only ones for 
which the publication contract provides 
highly specific directions. The agreement 
also requires Lexis to include research 
references in the annotations, and names the 
specific reference sources that must be 
included. Similarly, the contract directs Lexis 
to include annotations dealing with 
legislative history and specifies just how far 
back into a statutory provision’s history the 
annotations may go.  
 
In addition to providing detailed instructions 
that guide the creation of the OCGA 
annotations, the Commission acts in a 
supervisory capacity as well, monitoring 
Lexis’s work throughout the process. The 
contract says that the annotations are 
prepared under the “direct supervision” of the 
Commission. The contract spells out in some 
detail what this supervision means. In 
addition to including the research references 
listed in the publication agreement, Lexis is 
required to “include any new [references]… 
as required by the Commission.” Sections of 
the agreement dealing with other annotations 
similarly allow the Commission to direct the 
inclusion of new material. Indeed, the very 
first section of the agreement states that the 
OCGA shall include, in addition to the 
various, specified annotations, “other 
material related to or included in such Code 
at the direction of the Commission.”  
 
Finally, the publication agreement describes 
in detail how the Commission is to give its 
final assent to the annotations. First, as for 
each type of annotation, the agreement 
affirms the Commission’s role in approving 
Lexis’s work. Thus, with respect to the 
summaries of judicial opinions, the 
agreement provides that “the form of the 
annotations shall be subject to the approval of 
the Commission.” The agreement contains 
similar provisions with respect to the other 
annotations. More generally, the agreement 
provides that the “ultimate right of editorial 
control over all material contained in the 
Code shall be in the Commission, and in the 
event of any disagreement between the 
Commission and the Publisher over the 
material to be included, the decision of the 
Commission shall control.” A separate 
provision of the agreement similarly provides 
that in the event of any disagreement “the 
Commission shall prevail.” Moreover, the 
agreement requires that the Commission have 
an opportunity to conduct pre-publication 
review of all subsequent supplements, 
replacement volumes, and other updates to 
the OCGA.  
 
In short, the Commission exercises direct, 
authoritative control over the creation of the 
OCGA annotations at every stage of their 
preparation. The Commission provides initial 
instructions to Lexis, directly supervises 
Lexis’s work throughout the preparation 
process, and must give its final editorial 
assent to the annotations before they can 
become part of the OCGA. In this way, the 
Commission undeniably controls the creation 
of the OCGA annotations.  
 
The Commission’s intimate involvement in 
the creation of the annotations is of great 
significance. This is because a close 
examination of the nature of the Commission 
confirms that it is for all intents and purposes 
 482 
an arm of the Georgia General Assembly. As 
we’ve noted, the Commission is composed of 
fifteen members, nine of whom are sitting 
members of the Georgia General Assembly, 
along with the Lieutenant Governor of the 
State. Further, funding for the Commission 
comes directly from appropriations 
“provided for the legislative branch of state 
government.” In addition, Georgia law 
provides that “[t]he Office of Legislative 
Counsel shall serve as staff for the 
commission.” This is notable because, under 
Georgia law, the Office of Legislative 
Counsel is tasked with providing various 
advisory and legal services “for the 
legislative branch of government” and is 
therefore properly seen as an adjunct to the 
General Assembly. Thus, not only is the 
Commission funded by legislative branch 
appropriations, but its staff is drawn from an 
office that is itself an agency of the Georgia 
General Assembly.  
 
Further confirming the Commission’s deep 
connection to the Georgia General Assembly, 
the Georgia Supreme Court has held that the 
Commission’s work is properly characterized 
as “legislative” in nature, and that it is 
therefore proper for the Commission to be 
largely composed of officials from the 
legislative branch. Thus, in light of how it is 
funded and staffed, and since its work is 
legislative in nature, it is abundantly clear 
that the Commission is a creation and an 
agent of the Georgia General Assembly.  
 
Indeed, the connection between the 
Commission and the elected legislators who 
make up the General Assembly is so close 
that the Commission may be properly 
regarded as one in the same with the 
legislators for our purposes. As the Supreme 
Court has explained in another context, “it is 
literally impossible, in view of the 
complexities of the modern legislative 
process… for [legislators] to perform their 
legislative tasks without the help of aides and 
assistants…the day-to-day work of such 
aides is so critical to the Members' 
performance that they must be treated as the 
latter's alter egos.” In consequence, the Court 
has held that legislative immunity “applies 
not only to a Member but also to his aides 
insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a 
protected legislative act if performed by the 
Member himself.” “The test for applicability 
of this derivative legislative immunity is 
whether the legislator, counsel or aide was 
engaged within a legitimate sphere of 
legislative activity.”  
 
The basic intuition underlying cases applying 
the Speech and Debate Clause seems to us 
equally instructive in identifying which entity 
in the Georgia state government is the 
creative force behind the OCGA annotations. 
While the Commission’s staff and six of its 
fifteen members are not Georgia legislators, 
the Commission is plainly an adjunct of the 
General Assembly. As we have detailed, its 
staff, funding, and responsibilities all fall 
under the legislative umbrella. The 
Commission is therefore, in a real sense, the 
“alter ego” of the General Assembly, 
meaning that the creative force behind the 
annotations are Georgia’s elected legislators. 
Acting through the Commission, the 
legislators closely supervise and direct the 
production of the annotations.  
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Moreover, and of even greater importance to 
our analysis, the OCGA annotations, once 
completed, are subject to the approval not 
only of the Commission, but also to the 
approval of the Georgia General Assembly. 
The General Assembly actually votes (and 
must vote) to make the OCGA the official 
codification of Georgia’s laws and, in doing 
so, also votes to incorporate the annotations 
as part of the OCGA. In other words, the 
OCGA annotations are not only authored at 
the direction and under the close supervision 
of the Georgia General Assembly, but they 
also obtain their peculiar status as official 
annotations because they are adopted 
annually by the General Assembly. 
 
That Georgia’s legislators are in a very real 
way the creators of the annotations is a 
powerful indication that the annotations are 
subject to the Banks rule. To begin, it is 
apparent that the rule established by Banks 
that government edicts cannot be 
copyrighted, as applied to the works of state 
governments, is more limited than the 
statutory prohibition on copyright protection 
for works of the federal government. As we 
have explained, § 105 states that “[c]opyright 
protection… is not available for any work of 
the United States Government,” and § 101 
defines a “work of the United States 
Government” as “a work prepared by an 
officer or employee of the United States 
Government as part of that person's official 
duties.” Thus, under this prohibition, the 
work of any federal employee, made in his 
capacity as a government employee, is 
uncopyrightable. By contrast, the rule in 
Banks is more circumscribed, applying to a 
limited subclass of government works. Thus, 
some works made by state employees, that 
would be subject to § 105 if made by a federal 
employee, are nevertheless copyrightable 
under Banks.  
 
The reasoning of Banks points to why the rule 
it has announced is applicable to a more 
limited class of public officials than those 
governed by § 105’s prohibition. The Court 
in Banks explained, “[i]n no proper sense can 
the judge who, in his judicial capacity, 
prepares the opinion or decision, the 
statement of the case, and the syllabus, or 
head-note, be regarded as their author or their 
proprietor…Judges, as is well understood, 
receive from the public treasury a stated 
annual salary, fixed by law, and can 
themselves have no pecuniary interest or 
proprietorship, as against the public at large, 
in the fruits of their judicial labors… The 
whole work done by the judges constitutes 
the authentic exposition and interpretation of 
the law, which, binding every citizen, is free 
for publication to all.” Thus, like § 105, the 
Banks decision emphasizes the fact that 
judges are producing works in their capacity 
as employees, but it also goes further than § 
105 and emphasizes that judges are unique 
among government employees. In addition to 
receiving “from the public treasury a stated 
annual salary,” judges are empowered to 
create “authentic exposition[s] and 
interpretation[s] of the law, which[] bind[] 
every citizen.”  
 
As a result, the mere fact that a work was 
created by a state-paid employee in his 
capacity as an employee is not enough to 
trigger the rule in Banks. Something more is 
needed. Specifically, the government official 
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must be entrusted with unique powers 
beyond those possessed by the typical 
government employee, such as the power to 
pronounce official interpretations of the law.  
 
In short, it is clear that the rule in Banks is not 
concerned, as § 105 is, with the works of all 
government employees, but rather only with 
the works of certain government employees, 
which is to say government employees who 
are possessed of particular powers, namely 
the ability to promulgate official, binding 
edicts. This distinction between the rules is 
no doubt attributable to the difference in their 
underlying rationales. Section 105’s 
prohibition is justified on the grounds that the 
public paid for the work and is therefore 
entitled to access it, and because wide 
dissemination of federal government 
materials strengthens democratic discourse.  
 
On the other hand, the rule in Banks derives 
more directly from the concept of popular 
sovereignty. As a result, while § 105 is 
concerned with any work created by a federal 
employee, since all government works are 
paid for by the taxpayer and, as a policy 
matter, are potentially useful to conscientious 
and informed citizens, the rule in Banks is 
concerned with works created by a select 
group of government employees, because 
only certain public officials are empowered 
with the direct exercise of the sovereign 
power.  
 
This explains why the state-paid court 
reporter acting pursuant to his statutory 
duties in Callaghan did not run afoul of the 
rule in Banks and could hold a valid copyright 
in his work even though the work he created 
likely would fall within § 105’s prohibition if 
he had been a federal employee. Though paid 
by the state, and acting pursuant to his official 
duties, the court reporter was tasked with 
essentially administrative and clerical 
responsibilities, to wit compiling and 
summarizing judicial decisions, rather than 
the promulgation of binding legal edicts. 
There was therefore “no ground of public 
policy” standing in the way of his works’ 
copyrightability.  
 
In contrast, the judges in Banks, when 
considered in their relationship to the 
sovereignty of the People, fulfill a different 
function than the court reporter in Callaghan. 
Legislators and judges, unlike other 
government workers, are peculiarly entrusted 
with the exercise of sovereign power to write 
or officially interpret the law. Since the 
power to make law rests ultimately and 
exclusively with the People, the primary, 
official duty of lawmakers and judges is 
therefore to act as agents of the People. While 
government workers like the reporter in 
Callaghan might also be said to be engaged 
in conducting the People’s business, their 
relation to the exercise of sovereign power is 
more attenuated. As a result, if a government 
work is created by a public official who is so 
empowered, it is substantially more likely 
that the work is constructively authored by 
the people.  
 
In light of these considerations, that the 
Georgia General Assembly is the driving 
force behind and ultimately adopts the 
OCGA annotations is significant. Like the 
Ohio Supreme Court in Banks, the Georgia 
General Assembly is not simply composed of 
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ordinary government employees but rather of 
public officials whose official duties 
peculiarly include the direct exercise of 
sovereign power. Of the many government 
workers employed by the state of Georgia, 
the creators of the OCGA annotations are 
unique insofar as they are entrusted by the 
sovereign with legislative power.  
 
This is not to say that every work produced 
by a legislative body is automatically 
uncopyrightable. As we detail below, still 
more is necessary to demonstrate that the 
OCGA annotations are the kind of work that 
is attributable to the constructive authorship 
of the People. However, because the OCGA 
annotations were created by public officials 
entrusted with sovereign, legislative 
authority, just like the opinions in Banks were 
created by justices on the Ohio Supreme 
Court entrusted with sovereign, judicial 
authority, this weighs in favor of a 
determination that the OCGA annotations 




We are also persuaded because, while not 
carrying the force of law in the way that the 
statutory portions of the OCGA do, the 
annotations are “law-like” in the sense that 
they are “authoritative” sources on the 
meaning of Georgia statutes. Having been 
merged by the General Assembly with the 
statutory text into a single, unified edict, 
stamped with the state’s imprimatur, and 
created and embraced by the same body that 
wrote the text that they explicate, the 
annotations have been suffused with 
powerful indicia of legal significance that is 
impossible to ignore. The annotations cast an 
undeniable, official shadow over how 
Georgia laws are interpreted and understood. 
Indeed, Georgia’s courts have cited to the 
annotations as authoritative sources on 
statutory meaning and legislative intent. The 
annotations’ authoritativeness makes them 
closely analogous to the types of works that 
ordinarily represent an exercise of sovereign 
authority. The nature of the work, like the 
identity of its creator, therefore impels us 
further toward the conclusion that these 
annotations are attributable to the 
constructive authorship of the People.  
 
The nature of the OCGA annotations is 
spelled out in some detail by Georgia’s 
General Assembly. While disclaiming any 
legal effect in the annotations, the Georgia 
law providing for the creation of the OCGA 
also states that the “statutory portion of such 
codification shall be merged with 
annotations, captions, catchlines, history 
lines, editorial notes, cross-references, 
indices, title and chapter analyses, and other 
materials.” This language is telling. In 
various dictionaries, the word “merge” is 
defined as meaning to combine or unite, often 
in such a way that the constituent elements of 
the merger lose their distinct identity or 
characteristics and become one. The Random 
House Dictionary of the English Language 
defines “merge” as “to lose or cause to lose 
identity by uniting or blending” and “to 
combine or unite into a single unit.” 
Similarly, Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary defines “merge” as “to become 
combined into one” and to “lose identity by 
absorption or intermingling.” And the Oxford 
English Dictionary variously defines 
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“merge” as “to be absorbed and disappear, to 
lose character or identity by absorption into 
something else; to join or blend,” and “to 
combine to form a single entity.” The use of 
the word “merge” thus carries with it strong 
connotations of unification or combination of 
disparate elements into a single whole in 
which the previously distinct attributes of 
each element become intermingled and 
shared.  
 
The question then becomes, what is the 
nature of the new thing created when the 
Georgia General Assembly explicitly chose 
to merge the annotations with statutory text? 
Here too Georgia law supplies an answer. In 
particular, Georgia law provides that the 
merged text “shall be published by authority 
of the state … and when so published shall be 
known and may be cited as the ‘Official Code 
of Georgia Annotated.’” Thus, the product of 
the merger is an official state publication, 
labelled and cited as the authoritative 
embodiment of the laws of the State of 
Georgia.  
 
It of course remains true that portions of the 
OCGA clearly carry the force of law while 
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 disclaims any legal effect 
in the annotations. Yet the significance of the 
legislature’s decision to “merge” these two 
things into a single edict remains. The 
Georgia legislature was not required to merge 
the annotations with the statutes in order to 
create the OCGA, which it then stamped with 
the imprimatur of the State. But the bicameral 
legislature chose to do so. By combining 
these two components into a unified whole, 
their attributes have been intermingled and 
their distinct character altered. While this 
does not mean that the annotations, by virtue 
of appearing alongside statutory text, are 
suddenly possessed of binding legal effect, it 
does mean that their combination with the 
statutory text imbues them with an official, 
legislative quality.  
 
The statutory text, having been merged with 
these legislatively authored expositions on 
the meaning of Georgia law, must be read in 
pari materia with them. The annotations’ 
combination with the statutes means that any 
understanding of the statutory text arrived at 
without reference to the annotations is 
axiomatically incomplete. Because Georgia 
law tells us that the official codification of 
Georgia statutes contains not only statutory 
text but also annotations that have been 
combined and unified with the statutory text 
into a single edict, a full understanding of the 
laws of Georgia necessarily includes an 
understanding of the contents of the 
annotations. In this way, the annotations are 
clearly laden with legal significance.  
 
Their significance is strengthened further by 
the legislature’s decision to label the unified 
whole “Official.” The OCGA is not simply 
one of a number of competing annotated 
codifications of Georgia laws. It does not 
stand on equal footing with West’s annotated 
Georgia code. Rather, it is the official 
codification of Georgia laws, stamped with 
the imprimatur of the state. This status 
necessarily causes the annotations to cast a 
long shadow over how the statutory portions 
of the OCGA are understood. Because these 
are the official comments to the Code, they 
are to be read as authoritative in a way that 
annotations ordinarily are not.  
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Indeed, demonstrating the importance of the 
state’s decision to stamp the OCGA with its 
imprimatur, the very first annotation in the 
very first section of the OCGA favorably 
cites to a court case that warns that 
“[a]ttorneys who cite unofficial publication 
of 1981 Code do so at their peril.” Similarly, 
the importance the Georgia legislature 
attached to its branding of the Code as 
“Official” is further demonstrated by its 
enactment of a law allowing the publisher of 
the “official Code… to use the state emblem 
on the cover of the publication,” whereas all 
other private parties are prohibited from 
using the state emblem in any context. Thus, 
while stamping the annotations with the 
state’s imprimatur and labelling it official 
does not suddenly elevate the annotations to 
the status of binding law, it too enhances their 
already potent cachet in a way that is 
undeniable and also impossible to ignore.  
 
Moreover, as we have already noted, the 
annotations are not simply adopted by the 
legislature as an official reference work, but 
also, in a very meaningful sense, are written 
by the General Assembly -- a fact that further 
accentuates their legal significance. The 
annotations are not merely expositions on the 
meaning of statutes, but rather are official 
comments authored by the same body that 
also wrote the statutes. Thus, it would be only 
natural for the citizens of Georgia to consider 
the annotations as containing special insight 
into the meaning of the statutory text, and to 
therefore confer upon the annotations a 
special status.  
 
Our view is reinforced by an examination of 
how the annotations have been treated by 
Georgia’s courts. In particular, the state 
courts frequently have characterized OCGA 
comments as conclusive statements about 
statutory meaning and legislative intent.   
 
The nature and authoritativeness of the work, 
like the identity of the author, are material in 
determining whether the work is attributable 
to the constructive authorship of the People. 
After all, the decision in Banks not only 
emphasized the identity of the creator of the 
work but also the nature of the work, 
reasoning that the work was uncopyrightable 
precisely because it was an “authentic 
exposition and interpretation of the law [] 
binding [on] every citizen.”  
 
Many other courts applying the rule in Banks, 
or a rule like it, have emphasized that the law, 
as an authoritative work that governs 
people’s lives, is uncopyrightable.  
 
By way of contrast, a judge might create a 
work in his capacity as an employee of the 
government that bears little relation to his 
role as an official expositor of the law. A 
speech delivered by a judge, depending on 
the circumstances of the address, may or may 
not count as a work created by a government 
employee. But such a work assuredly does 
not count as a work made in the exercise of 
the sovereign power to make or interpret the 
law. A judicial speech is assigned no 
authoritative weight -- it binds no one and has 
no official effect on the law or on how it is 
understood. Only those works that derive 
from the legitimate exercise of sovereign 
power, such as official interpretations of the 
law and the law itself, are assigned 
authoritative weight.  
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Put another way, whether or not a work is 
assigned the authoritative weight associated 
with law is deeply intertwined with the 
question of whether the work was made by 
the agents of the People in the legitimate 
exercise of delegated, sovereign power. As 
Hamilton explained during the ratification 
debates, “[n]o legislative act [] contrary to the 
Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, 
would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater 
than his principal; that the servant is above 
his master; that the representatives of the 
people are superior to the people themselves; 
that men acting by virtue of powers, may do 
not only what their powers do not authorize, 
but what they forbid.” As a result, the 
authoritativeness of a work is probative on 
the question of whether a work is created in 
an exercise of sovereign power, and is also 
probative on the question of whether a work 
falls within the scope of the rule in Banks. 
Thus, in addition to whether the work was 
prepared by a judicial or legislative body, an 
examination of the nature of the work, which 
is another way of asking whether it carries 
authoritative weight, may indicate whether 
the work is uncopyrightable.  
 
These annotations carry authoritative weight 
and therefore make it more likely that the 
work is attributable to the constructive 
authorship of the People. Quite simply, they 
are much closer to resembling the judicially 
authored materials found in Banks than other 
works produced by state employees, such as 
the materials produced by the Court reporter 




The final factor we consider is the process by 
which the annotations were created. While 
the process by which the annotations were 
made into an official edict of the State of 
Georgia is not identical to the process by 
which the statutory provisions were made 
into binding law, they are very closely 
related. As a result, like the identity of the 
work’s creator and the nature of the work, the 
process also weighs in favor of the 
conclusion that the work is uncopyrightable.  
 
Both parties acknowledge that the Georgia 
General Assembly does not individually 
enact each separate annotation as part of the 
ordinary legislative process. In this respect 
the annotations are different than the 
statutory portions of the OCGA. The 
statutory portions of the Code are introduced 
as bills in the Georgia legislature, generally 
pass through the committee process where 
legislators can directly influence the text of 
the bill, are voted on by both Houses, and are 
signed by the Governor.  
 
The enacted laws of a session of the 
legislature are then “published in Georgia 
Laws as a collection of session laws, 
representing all of the acts and resolutions 
passed during that particular legislative 
session.” Later, the laws are incorporated into 
the OCGA. Each year, the Georgia 
legislature then votes to “reenact the statutory 
portion of [the] Code as amended, in 
furtherance of the work of the Code Revision 
Commission,” thereby voting on the statutory 
text in the form in which it has been 
incorporated into the OCGA.  
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Further, under Georgia law, it is the 
responsibility of the Code Revision 
Commission to “prepare and have introduced 
at each regular session of the General 
Assembly one or more bills to reenact and 
make corrections in the Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated.” In this way, the 
statutory portions of the OCGA are voted on 
at least twice, once when they are voted on as 
individual bills after having gone through the 
regular legislative process, and once as part 
of the Georgia legislature’s vote to reenact 
the updated OCGA as prepared by the 
Commission. By contrast, the annotations are 
prepared by the Commission outside of the 
normal channels of the legislative process in 
the manner we have detailed, and are not 
voted on individually in the way that Georgia 
session laws are.  
 
However, it is also the case that the Georgia 
General Assembly voted to adopt the 
annotations as prepared by the Commission 
as an integral part of the official Code. 
Further, it did so through a legislative act that 
necessarily passed both Houses of the 
legislature and was signed into law by the 
Governor. Moreover, and significant for our 
purposes, the General Assembly votes each 
year to amend the OCGA and reaffirm its 
status as the official codification of Georgia’s 
laws.  
 
Under the American system of government, 
the essential hallmarks of legislative process 
are bicameralism and presentment. While 
legislative processes may ordinarily include 
the introduction of an individual bill and its 
passage through the relevant committee 
before it receives a vote of the full House, 
those are not the essential steps that endow 
the bill with its legal status. Rather, the vote 
of both Houses of the legislature, and 
presentment to an executive are the defining 
moments in an exercise of the sovereign 
authority. This is so even when the legislature 
adopts as its own a work authored outside the 
normal channels of the legislative process.  
 
That the process by which the OCGA 
annotations were created is similar to the 
ordinary process by which laws are enacted 
also is relevant to our inquiry. The 
importance of this consideration is apparent 
from well settled procedural mechanisms by 
which the power to make and interpret the 
law is exercised, and from the observation 
that deviating from the process may deprive 
the edict of its legal effect. As we’ve noted, 
bicameral passage of a bill and its 
presentment to the executive are the ordinary 
means by which a legislative body exercises 
the sovereign power entrusted to it. Similarly, 
the judicial power to propound the meaning 
of the law must be exercised according to 
established procedures. In particular, judges 
issue official interpretations of the law as part 
of deciding a case or controversy, after 
considering the arguments made by both 
parties to the case. An exposition on the 
meaning of a law, even if written by a judge, 
would obviously not qualify as an exercise of 
the sovereign power to interpret law if it were 
written outside the ordinary procedural 
channels by which that power is exercised.  
 
In short, as is the case with the identity of the 
creator of the work and the nature of the 
work, fundamental principles that govern 
how sovereign power is exercised under a 
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republican form of government suggest that 
the process by which an edict is promulgated 
is probative as well on the question of 
whether a work was created through the 
exercise of such power. Just as an action is 
not deemed a legitimate exercise of sovereign 
power if it is undertaken by the wrong 
official, so too it may be invalid if undertaken 
outside the proper procedural channels. The 
converse follows naturally: if an action is 
undertaken through the ordinary procedural 
channels by which the sovereign power is 
exercised, it is more likely that the action 
represents an exercise of sovereign power.  
 
The importance of process was suggested 
long ago in Banks when the Supreme Court 
emphasized that only those works created by 
judges in “the discharge of their judicial 
duties” are uncopyrightable. In other words, 
a work made by a judge outside the normal 
channels by which judicial action is taken 
would not be subject to the rule in Banks. It 
is therefore fair to say that, just as the Court 
in Banks emphasized that the justices of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio had authored the 
work in question “in the discharge of their 
judicial duties,” the Georgia legislature’s use 
of bicameralism and presentment to adopt the 
annotations as their own and merge them 
with statutory text indicates that the work was 
created by the legislators in the discharge of 





Our inquiry has focused on whether the 
official annotations represent a direct 
exercise of sovereign power, and are 
therefore attributable to the constructive 
authorship of the People. In making this 
determination, we have compared the work in 
question to works that represent the 
prototypical exercise of sovereign power, 
which is to say statutes and official 
interpretations of the law. We have been 
guided by three factors that may be regarded 
as the defining characteristics of law -- the 
identity of the public official who created the 
work; the nature of the work; and the process 
by which the work was produced. 
 
When the wrong public official exercises a 
power delegated in the law, when the power 
exercised is of a type not contemplated by the 
law, or when the power is exercised outside 
the procedural channels prescribed by the 
law, the act cannot be considered a valid 
exercise of the sovereign power. From these 
principles, the corollary logically follows: 
when the action taken is of the type entrusted 
by the People to their agents, when it is 
wielded by a public official whose assigned 
duties include the exercise of sovereign 
power, and when it is exercised pursuant to 
constitutionally designated processes, it more 
likely represents an exercise of the sovereign 
authority. The reasoning found in Banks also 
suggests the importance of these factors.  
 
All of them point strongly toward the 
conclusion that the OCGA annotations are 
not copyrightable. The OCGA annotations 
are created by Georgia’s legislative body, 
which has been entrusted with exercising 
sovereign power on behalf of the people of 
Georgia. While the annotations do not carry 
the force of law in the way that statutes or 
judicial opinions do, they are expressly given 
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legal significance so that, while not “law,” 
the annotations undeniably are authoritative 
sources on the meaning of Georgia statutes. 
The legislature has stamped them “official” 
and has chosen to make them an integral part 
of the official codification of Georgia’s laws. 
By wrapping the annotations and the 
statutory text into a single unified edict, the 
Georgia General Assembly has made the 
connection between the two inextricable and, 
thereby, ensured that obtaining a full 
understanding of the laws of Georgia requires 
having unfettered access to the annotations. 
Finally, the General Assembly’s annual 
adoption of the annotations as part of the laws 
of Georgia is effected by the legislative 
process -- namely bicameralism and 
presentment -- that is ordinarily reserved for 
the exercise of sovereign power.  
 
Thus, we conclude that the annotations in the 
OCGA are attributable to the constructive 
authorship of the People. To advance the 
interests and effect the will of the People, 
their agents in the General Assembly have 
chosen to create an official exposition on the 
meaning of the laws of Georgia. In creating 
the annotations, the legislators have acted as 
draftsmen giving voice to the sovereign’s 
will. The resulting work is intrinsically public 
domain material, belonging to the People, 
and, as such, must be free for publication by 
all.  
 
As a result, no valid copyright can subsist in 
these works. We, therefore, reverse the 
judgment of the district court, direct that 
judgment be entered for appellant PRO, 
vacate the district court’s order granting the 
State of Georgia injunctive relief, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN 












































June 24, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to hear a case about the extent to which state 
and local governments can claim copyright 
control over legal texts.  
The court agreed to tackle a lawsuit filed by 
the state of Georgia against an activist group 
called Public.Resource, which republished an 
annotated version of the state’s code without 
permission. In November, the Eleventh 
Circuit tossed that case out, saying citizens 
should have “unfettered access to the legal 
edicts that govern their lives.”  
In appealing to the high court, Georgia 
warned the justices that the ruling would 
make it harder for states to produce more 
robust versions of their state laws. 
Surprisingly, Public.Resource also asked for 
high court review, saying it wanted final 
clarity on the state of the law.  
As is customary, the justices did not explain 
why they agreed to hear the case.  
Like many states, Georgia makes a simple 
text of its code available online but also hires 
a private firm to create a more robust 
annotated version, which features citations, 
analysis and opinions from the state attorney 
general. The simple version is free, but users 
must pay for the annotated version.  
States say the arrangement allows for the 
cost-efficient creation of more detailed legal 
materials; critics say it deprives those who 
can’t afford the fees of full access to the law.  
In October, the Eleventh Circuit sided with 
Public.Resource, a transparency group that 
aims to make legal texts available online. The 
court said the annotations were effectively an 
extension of state law, making them "a work 
of the people" and thus "inherently public 
domain material."  
"Answering this question means confronting 
profound and difficult issues about the nature 
of law in our society and the rights of citizens 
to have unfettered access to the legal edicts 
that govern their lives," the court wrote at the 
time.  
“We conclude that the people are the ultimate 
authors of the annotations," the court wrote. 
"As a work of the people the annotations are 
inherently public domain material and 
therefore uncopyrightable."  
On Monday, an attorney for the state of 
Georgia said the court was pleased that the 
Supreme Court had taken the case.  
"The Eleventh Circuit’s decision ... threatens 
to upend Georgia’s longstanding 
arrangement for creating and distributing 
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annotations useful to guide legal research, 
while ensuring that the state’s laws are 
widely distributed and easily accessible—
free of charge," said Joshua Johnson of 
Vinson & Elkins LLP. 
An attorney for Public.Resource declined to 
comment.  
Georgia and its Code Revision Commission 
are represented by John P. Elwood, Joshua 
Johnson and Matthew X. Etchemendy of 
Vinson & Elkins LLP and Anthony B. 
Askew, Lisa C. Pavento and Warren Thomas 
of Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC.  
Public.Resource is represented by Elizabeth 
H. Rader and Sarah P. Lafantano of Alston & 
Bird LLP and Eric F. Citron of Goldstein & 
Russell PC.  
The case is Georgia et al. v. 
Public.Resource.Org Inc., case number 18-

















“The Law©?: No one owns the law, and no one should be able to copyright it” 
 
 
The New York Times 
 
The Editorial Board 
 
June 25, 2019 
 
No one owns the law, because the law 
belongs to everyone. It’s a principle that 
seems so obvious that most people wouldn’t 
give it a second thought. But that’s what is at 
issue in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, a 
case about whether the State of Georgia can 
assert copyright in its annotated state code. 
This week, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case in its next term. 
 
Americans deserve free and easy access to 
public records of all kinds, including court 
documents. But access to the law is the most 
important of all: Democracy depends on it. 
Keeping the law free of copyright is the first 
step.  
 
Yet the law is in disarray on the topic. The 
last time the Supreme Court ruled on the 
issue was in 1888, and it only addressed 
opinions written by judges. In the last 
century, a number of lower courts issued 
lofty proclamations on how the law belongs 
to the people and the people alone. 
Meanwhile, copyright laws passed 
in 1909and 1976 explicitly excluded any 
“work of the United States government.” But 
that exclusion applies only to the federal 
government.  
 
So when the nonprofit organization 
Public.Resource.Org purchased, scanned and 
uploaded all 186 volumes of the annotated 
Georgia state code to its website, the state 
sued to take it down. The code was already 
available free online through the state’s 
partnership with LexisNexis. As part of the 
deal, Georgia gave LexisNexis exclusive 
rights to official “annotations” that elaborate 
on the law but aren’t legally binding. 
LexisNexis allowed users to read the law free 
and it sold the annotated code for $404 
per copy. 
 
Public.Resource.Org is no stranger to 
litigation. For years, it has been embroiled in 
lawsuits over its publication of fire and 
electrical safety standards, air duct leakage 
standards, nonprofit tax returns and 
European Union baby pacifier regulations. 
The founder of Public.Resource.Org was 
once labeled a “rogue archivist.” But if 
publishing building safety standards online is 
an act of roguery, it is time for the courts to 
take a hard look at what copyright is for. 
 
Much of the litigation against 
Public.Resource.Org falls into an ever-
expanding gray zone of the law, created by 
government outsourcing bits and pieces of its 
regulatory function to the private sector. 
Regulations for everything from student loan 
eligibility to food additives can use standards 
written by trade groups.  
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Courts have issued conflicting opinions on 
this premium tier of the law. In the Georgia 
case, an appeals court ruled that the 
annotations were “sufficiently law-like,” 
partly because LexisNexis had created the 
annotations at the direction of the state. As a 
consequence, “the people are the ultimate 
authors of the annotations.”  
 
If the law is confused, it is in part thanks to 
the Supreme Court, which handed down two 
rulings on the subject in 1888. One stated that 
the law is in the public domain, and the other 
said that compiling the law with a table of 
contents, summaries and an index could be 
copyrightable. It’s this latter case that the 
State of Georgia relies on. 
 
The modern-day outsourcing of regulations 
to the private sector makes this issue all the 
more important to take up anew. If the law 
belongs to anyone, it belongs to the people. 
After a hundred or so years of confusion, the 
Supreme Court now has the chance to affirm 
























































“Accused of ‘Terrorism’ for Putting Legal Materials Online” 
 
 




May 13, 2019 
 
Carl Malamud believes in open access to 
government records, and he has spent more 
than a decade putting them online. You might 
think states would welcome the help. 
 
But when Mr. Malamud’s group posted the 
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, the state 
sued for copyright infringement. Providing 
public access to the state’s laws and related 
legal materials, Georgia’s lawyers said, was 
part of a “strategy of terrorism.” 
 
A federal appeals court ruled against the 
state, which has asked the Supreme Court to 
step in. On Friday, in an unusual move, Mr. 
Malamud’s group, Public.Resource.Org, also 
urged the court to hear the dispute, saying 
that the question of who owns the law is an 
urgent one, as about 20 other states have 
claimed that parts of similar annotated codes 
are copyrighted. 
 
The issue, the group said, is whether citizens 
can have access to “the raw materials of our 
democracy.” 
 
The case, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 
No. 18-1150, concerns the 54 volumes of 
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 
which contain state statutes and related 
materials. 
The state, through a legal publisher, makes 
the statutes themselves available online, and 
it has said it does not object to Mr. Malamud 
doing the same thing. But people who want 
to see other materials in the books, the state 
says, must pay the publisher. 
 
This is part of a disturbing trend, according 
to a new law review article, “Who Owns the 
Law? Why We Must Restore Public 
Ownership of Legal Publishing,” by Leslie 
Street, a law professor and librarian at Mercer 
University in Macon, Ga., and David 
Hansen, a librarian at Duke. It will be 
published in The Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law. 
 
States have struck deals with legal publishers, 
the article said, that have effectively 
privatized the law. “Publishers now use 
powerful legal tools to control who has 
access to the text of the law, how much they 
must pay and under what terms,” the article 
said. 
 
Mr. Malamud said those arrangements have 
complicated his efforts. 
“When I started Public Resource,” he said, “I 
thought our mission would be a focus on 
making the laws easier to use and read, but 
because of a buzz saw of opposition we have 
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spent much of our time fighting back 
takedown notices and lawsuits.” 
 
There is no question that judicial opinions 
cannot be copyrighted. The last time the 
Supreme Court addressed the matter, in 
1888, it ruled that “the whole work done by 
the judges constitutes the authentic 
exposition and interpretation of the law, 
which, binding every citizen, is free for 
publication to all.” 
 
Lower courts have said the same thing about 
statutes. But the status of other sorts of legal 
materials has not been definitively resolved. 
In the Georgia case, the question is whether 
annotations commissioned and approved by 
the state may be copyrighted. 
 
The annotations include descriptions of 
judicial decisions interpreting the statutes. 
Only a very bad lawyer would fail to consult 
them in determining the meaning of a statute. 
 
For instance, Georgia has a law on the 
books making sodomy a crime. An 
annotation tells the reader that the law has 
been held unconstitutional “insofar as it 
criminalizes the performance of private, 
unforced, noncommercial acts of sexual 
intimacy between persons legally able to 
consent.” 
 
Professor Street said she tells her law 
students to be sure to consult the annotations 
in Georgia’s official code. 
 
“When you go to a statute, you see the 
language of the statute, but that doesn’t 
necessarily tell you the meaning,” she said. 
“You go to the annotations, which leads you 
to the court decisions, where the judges 
actually tell you what the words mean.” 
 
In ruling for Mr. Malamud, the appeals court 
made a similar point. 
 
“The annotations clearly have authoritative 
weight in explicating and establishing the 
meaning and effect of Georgia’s laws,” Judge 
Stanley Marcus wrote for a unanimous three-
judge panel of the court, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in 
Atlanta. “Georgia’s courts have cited to the 
annotations as authoritative sources on 
statutory meaning and legislative intent.” 
 
Still, the annotations are not themselves law, 
Judge Marcus wrote, making the case a hard 
one. But he concluded that the annotations 
were “sufficiently lawlike” that they could 
not be copyrighted. 
 
The annotations were prepared by lawyers 
working for LexisNexis as part of a financial 
arrangement with the state. Georgia holds the 
copyright to the annotations, but the company 
has the right to sell them while paying the 
state a royalty. 
 
The state says this is a sensible cost-saving 
measure, “minimizing burdens on taxpayers” 
by sparing them from paying for the 
preparation of annotations. 
 
Professor Street said there was no good 
reason for the state to outsource the task. 
“States are privatizing the functions of 
government,” she said. “But the incentives 
are different for a private company when it 
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comes to publishing the law than it is for a 
state government.” 
 
I asked Mr. Malamud why he had urged the 
Supreme Court to hear his case even though 
he had won in the appeals court. 
 
“Repeating the laws of our country should 
not be considered a crime,” he said. “I would 
like the Supreme Court to tell us which laws 























































October 29, 2018 
 
On Friday, October 19th, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a 
decision in Code Revision Commission v. 
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., which reversed-
in-part, vacated-in-part and remanded a 
lower court’s ruling in a copyright 
infringement case involving an annotated 
version of Georgia’s official state code. 
Applying U.S. Supreme Court case law from 
the 19th Century, the last time the nation’s 
highest court decided issues relevant to this 
case, the Eleventh Circuit found that no valid 
copyright interest can be asserted in any part 
of the annotated state code. 
In July 2015, the Code Revision 
Commission, a body established by the 
Georgia General Assembly in 1977 to 
recodify Georgia’s state laws, filed suit in the 
Northern District of Georgia seeking 
injunctive relief to prevent 
Public.Resource.Org (PRO), a non-profit 
working to improve public access to 
government materials, from publishing all 
186 volumes of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated (OCGA) online for free public 
access. PRO responded to the lawsuit by 
arguing that the state of Georgia didn’t hold 
an enforceable copyright to the OCGA. 
Although a LexisNexis Group subsidiary 
publishes the OCGA and is responsible for its 
ongoing maintenance, the publication 
agreement between LexisNexis and Georgia 
retains the copyright to the annotations in 
Georgia’s name. The Northern Georgia court 
entered a permanent injunction against PRO, 
finding that the annotations are not in the 
public domain because they lack the force of 
law. 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that 
the heart of this case rests on the question of 
whether Georgia’s copyright in the OCGA is 
valid. Although the appellate court notes that 
“authorship” is central to the statutory 
scheme regarding copyright protection, the 
meaning of authorship takes on a special 
meaning in cases considering the 
copyrightability of a government edict. The 
Eleventh Circuit cited three Supreme Court 
cases regarding the issue, the last of which 
was decided in 1888. In Wheaton v. 
Peters (1834), the Supreme Court found that 
a reporter cannot hold a copyright in written 
opinions produced by the Court. The 
Supreme Court revisited the issue twice in 
1888, first in Banks v. Manchester, a 
copyright infringement case where the Court 
found that decisions issued by the Supreme 
Court of Ohio are not copyrightable because 
a judge’s interpretation of the law is free for 
publication to all under public policy. Less 
than a month later, the Supreme Court 
decided Callaghan v. Myerswhere the Court 
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found that a copyright claim asserted by a 
publisher of reports containing opinions 
issued by the Supreme Court of Illinois were 
valid because the publisher had obtained 
proprietary interest in the reports from an 
Illinois state official, although the rights did 
not extent to the decisions themselves. 
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that 
Congress partially codified the rule 
from Banks into the 1909 Copyright Act, 
which provided that “no copyright shall 
subsist in the original text of any work which 
is in the public domain… or in any 
publication of the United States 
Government.” A 1961 Register’s Report 
released by the Copyright Office stated that 
Congress’ prohibition of copyright on federal 
government texts also extends to state 
government laws, judicial decisions and 
similar documents. 
“The ultimate inquiry posed by the rule 
in Banks is thus whether a work is 
attributable to the constructive authorship of 
the People, which is to say whether it was 
created by an agent of the People in the direct 
exercise of sovereign authority,” the 
Eleventh Circuit opinion reads. An analysis 
of the OCGA led the appellate court to find 
that the annotations, while not having the 
force of law, are part and parcel of the law. 
First, the Eleventh Circuit found that the 
Georgia General Assembly was the driving 
force behind the annotations in the OCGA. 
Although the annotations were prepared by 
LexisNexis, those annotations were drafted 
based upon highly detailed instructions 
contained within its publishing agreement 
with the Code Revision Commission, making 
Georgia’s legislators the creators of the 
annotations. 
Further, the annotations are authoritative 
sources on the meaning of Georgia statutes, 
heightening their legal significance. This 
makes the annotations closely analogous to a 
work representing an exercise of sovereign 
authority, which under U.S. public policy 
makes them a work of the people. The fact 
that the OCGA contains the word “Official” 
in its title further strengthens the significance 
of the document as not being simply one of 
many annotated versions of Georgia’s 
statutes. 
Finally, the process used to create the 
annotations was closely related to the process 
used to create the statutes themselves, 
bringing the Eleventh Circuit to the 
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge:  
 
 
The matter before us arises from the 
restructuring of Puerto Rico's public debt 
under the 2016 Puerto Rico Oversight, 
Management, and Economic Stability Act 
("PROMESA"). This time, however, we are 
not tasked with delving into the intricacies of 
bankruptcy proceedings. Instead, we are 
required to square off with a single question 
of constitutional magnitude: whether 
members of the Financial Oversight and 
Management Board created by PROMESA 
("Board Members") are "Officers of the 
United States" subject to the U.S. 
Constitution's Appointments Clause. Title III 
of PROMESA authorizes the Board to 
initiate debt adjustment proceedings on 
behalf of the Puerto Rico government, and 
the Board exercised this authority in May 
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2017. Appellants seek to dismiss the Title III 
proceedings, claiming the Board lacked 
authority to initiate them given that the Board 
Members were allegedly appointed in 
contravention of the Appointments Clause.  
 
Before we can determine whether the Board 
Members are subject to the Appointments 
Clause, we must first consider two antecedent 
questions that need be answered in sequence, 
with the answer to each deciding whether we 
proceed to the next item of inquiry. The first 
question is whether, as decided by the district 
court and claimed by appellees, the 
Territorial Clause displaces the 
Appointments Clause in an unincorporated 
territory such as Puerto Rico. If the answer to 
this first question is "no," our second area of 
discussion turns to determining whether the 
Board Members are "Officers of the United 
States," as only officers of the federal 
government fall under the purview of the 
Appointments Clause. If the answer to this 
second question is "yes," we must then 
determine whether the Board Members are 
"principal" or "inferior" United States 
officers, as that classification will dictate how 
they must be appointed pursuant to the 
Appointments Clause. But before we enter 
fully into these matters, it is appropriate that 
we take notice of the developments that led 




The centerpieces of the present appeals are 
two provisions of the Constitution of the 
United States. The first is Article II, Section 
2, Clause 2, commonly referred to as the 
"Appointments Clause," which establishes 
that:  
 
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of 
the United States, whose Appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the Congress 
may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.  
 
The second is Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, 
or the "Territorial Clause," providing 
Congress with the "power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the 
United States." 
A. Puerto Rico's Financial Crisis  
 
The interaction between these two clauses 
comes into focus because of events resulting 
from the serious economic downfall that has 
ailed the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
since the turn of the 21st Century, and its 
Governor's declaration in the summer of 
2015 that the Commonwealth was unable to 
meet its estimated $72 billion public debt 
obligation. This obligation developed, in 
substantial part, from the triple tax-exempt 
bonds issued and sold to a large variety of 
individual and institutional investors, not 
only in Puerto Rico but also throughout the 
United States. Given the unprecedented 
expansiveness of the default in terms of total 
debt, the number of creditors affected, and 
the creditors' geographic diversity, it became 
self-evident that the Commonwealth's 
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insolvency necessitated a national response 
from Congress. Puerto Rico's default was of 
particular detriment to the municipal bond 
market where Commonwealth bonds are 
traded and upon which state and local 
governments across the United States rely to 
finance many of their capital projects.  
 
From 1938 until 1984, Puerto Rico was able, 
like all other U.S. jurisdictions, to seek the 
protection of Chapter 9 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code when its municipal 
instrumentalities ran into financial 
difficulties. But without any known or 
documented explanation, in 1984, Congress 
extirpated from the Bankruptcy Code the 1 
availability of this relief for the Island. In an 
attempt to seek self-help, and amidst the 
Commonwealth's deepening financial crisis, 
the Puerto Rico Legislature passed its own 
municipal bankruptcy legislation in 2014. 
The Commonwealth's self-help journey, 
however, was cut short by the Supreme Court 
in Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016), which invalidated the 
Puerto Rico bankruptcy statute. 
Coincidentally, the Supreme Court decided 
Franklin Cal. on June 13, 2016 -- seven days 
before the following congressional 
intervention into this sequence of luckless 
events.  
B. Congress Enacts PROMESA  
On June 30, 2016, Congress's next incursion 
into Puerto Rico's economic fortunes took 
place in the form of Public Law 114- 187, the 
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and 
Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which 
Congress found necessary to deal with Puerto 
Rico's "fiscal emergency" and to help 
mitigate the Island's "severe economic 
decline." Congress identified the Territorial 
Clause as the source of its authority to enact 
this law.  
 
To implement PROMESA, Congress created 
the Financial Oversight and Management 
Board of Puerto Rico (the "Board"). 
Congress charged the Board with providing 
independent supervision and control over 
Puerto Rico's financial affairs and helping the 
Island "achieve fiscal responsibility and 
access to the capital markets." In so 
proceeding, Congress stipulated that the 
Board was "an entity [created] within the 
territorial government" of Puerto Rico, which 
"shall not be considered to be a department, 
agency, establishment, or instrumentality of 
the Federal Government,"), and that it was to 
be funded entirely from Commonwealth 
resources.  
 
Although PROMESA places the Board 
"within" the Puerto Rico territorial 
government, Section 108 of PROMESA, 
which is labeled "Autonomy of Oversight 
Board,", precludes the Puerto Rico Governor 
and Legislature from exercising any power or 
authority over the so-called "territorial 
entity" that PROMESA 10- creates. Instead, 
it subordinates the Puerto Rico territorial 
government to the Board, as it 
unambiguously pronounces that:  
(a) . . . Neither the Governor nor the 
Legislature may –  
 
(1) exercise any control, supervision, 
oversight, or review over the . . . Board or its 
activities; or  
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(2) enact, implement, or enforce any statute, 
resolution, policy, or rule that would impair 
or defeat the purposes of this chapter, as 
determined by the . . . Board.  
 
PROMESA also provides additional 
authority and powers to the Board with 
similarly unfettered discretion. For example, 
Section 101(d)(1)(A) grants the Board, "in its 
sole discretion at such time as the . . . Board 
determines to be appropriate," the 
designation of "any territorial instrumentality 
as a covered territorial instrumentality that is 
subject to the requirements of [PROMESA]." 
Under Section 101(d)(1)(B), the Board, "in 
its sole discretion," may require the Governor 
of Puerto Rico to submit "such budgets and 
monthly or quarterly reports regarding a 
covered territorial instrumentality as the … 
Board determines to be necessary…” 
Pursuant to Section 101 (d)(1)(C), the Board 
is allowed, “in its sole discretion” to require 
separate budgets and reports for covered 
territorial instrumentalities apart from the 
Commonwealth’s budget , and to require the 
Governor to develop said separate 
documents. Per Section 101(d)(1)(D), the 
"Board may require, in its sole discretion," 
that the Governor "include a covered 
territorial instrumentality in the applicable 
Territory Fiscal Plan." Further, as provided in 
Section 101(d)(1)(E), the Board may, "in its 
sole discretion," designate "a covered 
territorial instrumentality to be the subject of 
[a separate] Instrumentality Fiscal Plan. 
Finally, Section 101(d)(2)(A) bestows upon 
the Board, again "in its sole discretion, at 
such time as the . . . Board determines to be 
appropriate," the authority to "exclude any 
territorial instrumentality from the 
requirements of [PROMESA]."  
 
PROMESA also requires the Board to have 
an office in Puerto Rico and elsewhere as it 
deems necessary, and that at any time the 
United States may provide the Board with use 
of federal facilities and equipment on a 
reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. 
Additionally, Section 103(c) waives the 
application of Puerto Rico procurement laws 
to the Board while Section 104(c) authorizes 
the Board to acquire information directly 
from both the federal and Puerto Rico 
governments without the usual bureaucratic 
hurdles. Moreover, the Board's power to 
issue and enforce compliance with -12- 
subpoenas is to be carried out in accordance 
with Puerto Rico law. Finally, PROMESA 
directs the Board to ensure that any laws 
prohibiting public employees from striking or 
engaging in lockouts be strictly enforced.  
 
We thus come to PROMESA's Title III, the 
central provision of this statute, which creates 
a special bankruptcy regime allowing the 
territories and their instrumentalities to adjust 
their debt. This new bankruptcy safe haven 
applies to territories more broadly than 
Chapter 9 applies to states because it covers 
not just the subordinate instrumentalities of 
the territory, but also the territory itself 
 
An important provision of PROMESA's 
bankruptcy regime is that the Board serves as 
the sole representative of Puerto Rico's 
government in Title III debtor-related 
proceedings and that the Board is empowered 
to "take any action necessary on behalf of the 
debtor" -- whether the Commonwealth 
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government or any of its instrumentalities -- 
"to prosecute the case of the debtor,".  
 
C.  Appointment of Members to 
PROMESA's Board  
 
PROMESA establishes that the "Board shall 
consist of seven members appointed by the 
President," who must comply with federal 
conflict of interest statutes. The Board's 
membership is divided into six categories, 
labelled A through F, with one member for 
Categories A, B, D, E, and F, and two 
members for Category C. The Governor of 
Puerto Rico, or his designee, also serves on 
the Board, but in an ex officio, non-voting 
capacity. The Board's duration is for an 
indefinite period, at a minimum four years 
and likely more, given the certifications that 
Section 209 of PROMESA requires. 
 
Pursuant to Section 101(f) of PROMESA, 
individuals are eligible for appointment to the 
Board only if they: 
 
 (1) ha[ve] knowledge and expertise in 
finance, municipal bond markets, 
management, law, or the organization or 
operation of business or government; and  
 
(2) prior to appointment, [they are] not an 
officer, elected official, or employee of the 
territorial government, a candidate for 
elected office of the territorial government, or 
a former elected official of the territorial 
government.  
 
In addition, there are certain primary 
residency or primary business place 
requirements that must be met by some of the 
Board Members. Of particular importance to 
our task at hand is Section 101(e)(2)(A), 
which outlines the procedure for the 
appointment of the Board Members: 
 
(A) The President shall appoint the individual 
members of the . . . Board of which –  
 
(i) the Category A member should be selected 
from a list of individuals submitted by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives; 
 
(B) the expenditures made by the territorial 
government during each fiscal year did not 
exceed the revenues of the territorial 
government during that year, as determined 
in accordance with modified accrual 
accounting standards. 
 
 (ii) the Category B member should be 
selected from a separate, non-overlapping list 
of individuals submitted by the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives;  
 
(iii) the Category C member should be 
selected from a list submitted by the Majority 
Leader of the Senate;  
 
(iv) the Category D member should be 
selected from a list submitted by the Minority 
Leader of the House of Representatives;  
 
(v) the Category E member should be 
selected from a list submitted by the Minority 
leader of the Senate; and  
 
(vi) the category F member may be selected 
in the President's sole discretion.  
In synthesis, pursuant to this scheme, six of 
the seven Board Members shall be selected 
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by the President from the lists provided by 
House and Senate leadership, with 
PROMESA allowing the President to select 
the seventh member at his or her sole 
discretion. Senatorial advice and consent is 
not required if the President makes the 
appointment from one of the aforementioned 
lists. In theory, the statute allows the 
President to appoint a member to the Board 
who is not on the lists, in which case, "such 
an appointment shall be by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate." Consent 
by the Senate had to be obtained by 
September 1, 2016 so as to allow an off-list 
appointment, else the President was required 
to appoint directly -16- from the lists. And 
because the Senate was in recess for all but 
eight business days between enactment of the 
statute and September 1, one might conclude 
that, in practical effect, the statute forced the 
selection of persons on the list.  
 
As was arguably inevitable, on August 31, 
2016, the President chose all Category A 
through E members from the lists submitted 
by congressional leadership and appointed 
the Category F member at his sole discretion. 
 
 It is undisputed that the President did not 
submit any of the Board member 
appointments to the Senate for its advice and 
consent prior to the Board Members 
assuming the duties of their office, or, for that 
matter, at any other time.  
 
D. Litigation Before the District Court  
 
In May 2017, the Board initiated Title III debt 
adjustment proceedings on behalf of the 
Commonwealth in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Puerto Rico. This was 
followed by the filing of several other Title 
III proceedings on behalf of various 
Commonwealth government 
instrumentalities. Thereafter, some entities -- 
now the appellants before us -- arose in 
opposition to the Board's initiation of debt 
adjustment proceedings on behalf of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Among the challengers are Aurelius 
Investment, LLC, et al. and Assured 
Guaranty Corporation, et al. ("Aurelius"). 
Before the district court, Aurelius argued that 
the Board lacked authority to initiate the Title 
III proceeding because its members were 
appointed in violation of the Appointments 
Clause and the principle of separation of 
powers. The Board rejected this argument, 
positing that its members were not "Officers 
of the United States" within the meaning of 
the Appointments Clause, and that the 
Board's powers were purely local in nature, 
not federal as would be needed to qualify for 
Appointments Clause coverage. The Board 
further argued that, in any event, the 
Appointments Clause did not apply even if 
the individual members were federal officers, 
because they exercised authority in Puerto 
Rico, an unincorporated territory where the 
Territorial Clause endows Congress with 
plenary powers. This, according to the Board, 
exempted Congress from complying with the 
Appointments Clause when legislating in 
relation to Puerto Rico. In the alternative, the 
Board argued that the Board Members' 
appointment did not require Senate advice 
and consent because they were "inferior 
officers." The United States intervened on 
behalf of the Board, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
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2403(a), to defend the constitutionality of 
PROMESA and the validity of the 
appointments and was generally in agreement 
with the Board's contentions.  
 
The other challenger to the Board's 
appointments process, and an appellant here, 
is the Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria 
Eléctrica y Riego ("UTIER"), a Puerto Rican 
labor organization that represents employees 
of the government-owned electric power 
company, the Puerto Rico Electric Power 
Authority ("PREPA"). The Board had also 
filed a Title III petition on behalf of PREPA, 
which led the UTIER to file an adversary 
proceeding as a party of interest before the 
District Court in which it raised substantially 
the same arguments as Aurelius regarding the 
Board Members' defective appointment  
 
E. The District Court's Opinion  
 
The district court, in separate decisions, ruled 
against Aurelius and UTIER and rejected 
their motions to dismiss the Board's Title III 
petitions. In brief, the district court 
determined that the Board is an 
instrumentality of the Commonwealth 
government established pursuant to 
Congress's plenary powers under the 
Territorial Clause, that Board Members are 
not "Officers of the United States," and that 
therefore there was no constitutional defect in 
the method of their appointment. The court 
arrived at this conclusion after considering 
the jurisprudence and practice surrounding 
the relationship between Congress and the 
territories, including Puerto Rico, along with 
Congress's intent with regards to PROMESA.  
 
The district court based its ruling on the 
premise that "the Supreme Court has long 
held that Congress's power under [the 
Territorial Clause] is both 'general and 
plenary.'" Such a plenary authority is what, 
according to the district court, allows 
Congress to "establish governmental 
institutions for territories that are not only 
distinct from federal government entities but 
include features that would not comport with 
the requirements of the Constitution if they 
pertained to the governance of the United 
States." The district court further pronounced 
that Congress "has exercised [its plenary] 
power with respect to Puerto Rico over the 
course of nearly 120 years, including the 
delegation to the people -21- of Puerto Rico 
elements of its . . . Article IV authority by 
authorizing a significant degree of local self-
governance."  
 
The district court also relied on judicial 
precedents holding that Congress may create 
territorial courts that do not "incorporate the 
structural assurances of judicial 
independence" provided for in Article III of 
the Constitution -- namely, life tenure and 
protection against reduction in pay -- as 
decisive authority. From the perdurance of 
these non-Article III courts across the 
territories (excepting, of course, Puerto Rico 
which although still an unincorporated 
territory has had, since 1966, an Article III 
court), the district court reasoned that 
"Congress can thus create territorial entities 
that are distinct in structure, jurisdiction, and 
powers from the federal government."  
 
Turning to the relationship between Congress 
and Puerto Rico, the district court noted that 
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"Congress has long exercised its Article IV 
plenary power to structure and define 
governmental entities for the island," in 
reference to the litany of congressional acts 
that have shaped Puerto Rico's local 
government since 1898, including the Treaty 
of Paris of 1898, the Foraker Act of 1900, the 
Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917, and Public Law 
600 of 1950.  
 
Furthermore, with regards to PROMESA and 
its Board, the district court afforded 
"substantial deference" to "Congress's 
determination that it was acting pursuant to 
its Article IV territorial powers in creating the 
. . . Board as an entity of the government of 
Puerto Rico." The district court then 
proceeded to consider whether Congress can 
create an entity that is not inherently federal. 
It concluded in the affirmative, because 
finding otherwise would "ignore[] both the 
plenary nature of congressional power under 
Article IV and the well-rooted jurisprudence 
. . . establish[ing] that any powers of self-
governance exercised by territorial 
governments are exercised by virtue of 
congressional delegation rather than inherent 
local sovereignty." Accordingly, the district 
court found that the "creation of an entity 
such as the . . . Board through popular 
election would not change the . . . Board's 
ultimate source of authority from a 
constitutional perspective." The court 
deemed this so because "neither the case law 
nor the historical practice . . . compels a 
finding that federal appointment necessarily 
renders an appointee a federal officer." The 
district court therefore concluded that the 
Board is a territorial entity notwithstanding  
 
[t]he fact that the . . . Board's members hold 
office by virtue of a federally enacted 
statutory regime and are appointed by the 
President[,] [because this] does not vitiate 
Congress's express provisions for creation of 
the . . . Board as a territorial government 
entity that "shall not be considered to be a 
department, agency, establishment, or 
instrumentality of the Federal Government."  
 
After ruling that the Board is a "territorial 
entity and its members are territorial 
officers," the district court finally determined 
that "Congress had broad discretion to 
determine the manner of selection for 
members of the . . . Board," which Congress 
"exercised . . . in empowering the President 
with the ability to both appoint and remove 
members from the . . . Board." On this final 
point, the district court observed that 
"[a]lthough historical practice . . . indicates 
that Congress has required Senate 
confirmation for certain territorial offices, 
nothing in the Constitution precludes the use 
of that mechanism for positions created under 
Article IV, and its use does not establish that 
Congress was obligated to invoke it."  
 
The district court was certainly correct that 
Article IV conveys to Congress greater 
power to rule and regulate within a territory 
than it can bring to bear within the fifty states. 
In brief, within a territory, Congress has not 
only its customary power, but also the power 
to make rules and regulations such as a state 
government may make within its state. As we 
will explain, however, we do not view these 
expanded Article IV powers as enabling 
Congress to ignore the structural limitations 
on the manner in which the federal 
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government chooses federal officers, and we 
deem the Board Members -- save its ex 




A. The Territorial Clause Does Not Trump 
the Appointments Clause  
 
However much Article IV may broaden the 
reach of Congress's powers over a territory as 
compared to its power within a state, this case 
presents no claim that the substance of 
PROMESA's numerous rules and regulations 
exceed that reach.  
 
Instead, appellants challenge the way the 
federal government has chosen the 
individuals who will implement those rules 
and regulations. This challenge trains our 
focus on the power of Congress vis-à-vis the 
other branches of the federal government. 
Specifically, the Board claims that Article IV 
effectively allows Congress to assume what 
is otherwise a power of the President, and to 
share within the two bodies of Congress a 
power only assigned to the Senate.  
 
We reject this notion that Article IV enhances 
Congress's capabilities in the intramural 
competitions established by our divided 
system of government. First, the Board seems 
to forget -- and the district court failed to 
recognize and honor -- the ancient canon of 
interpretation that we believe is a helpful 
guide to disentangle the interface between the 
Appointments Clause and the Territorial 
Clause: generalia specialibus non derogant 
(the "specific governs the general").  
 
The Territorial Clause is one of general 
application authorizing Congress to engage 
in rulemaking for the temporary governance 
of territories. But such a general 
empowerment does not extend to areas where 
the Constitution explicitly contemplates a 
particular subject, such as the appointment of 
federal officers. Nowhere does the Territorial 
Clause reference the subject matter of federal 
appointments or the process to effectuate 
them. On the other hand, federal officer 
appointment is, of course, the raison d'etre of 
the Appointments Clause. It cannot be clearer 
or more unequivocal that the Appointments 
Clause mandates that it be applied to "all . . . 
Officers of the United States." Thus, we find 
in answering the first question before us a 
prime candidate for application of the 
specialibus canon and for the strict 
enforcement of the constitutional mandate 
contained in the Appointments Clause.  
 
Consider next the Presentment Clause of 
Article I, Section 7. Under that clause, a bill 
passed by both chambers of Congress cannot 
become law until it is presented to, and 
signed by, the President (or the President's 
veto is overridden). Surely no one argues that 
Article IV should be construed so as to have 
allowed Congress to enact PROMESA 
without presentment, or to have overridden a 
veto without the requisite super-majority vote 
in both houses. Nor does anyone seriously 
argue that Congress could have relied on its 
powers under Article IV to alter the 
constitutional roles of its two respective 
houses in enacting PROMESA.  
 
Like the Presentment Clause, the 
Appointments Clause constitutionally 
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regulates how Congress brings its power to 
bear, whatever the reach of that power might 
be. The Appointments Clause serves as one 
of the Constitution's important structural 
pillars, one that was intended to prevent the 
"manipulation of official appointments" -- an 
"insidious . . . weapon of eighteenth century 
despotism." The Appointments Clause was 
designed "to prevent[] congressional 
encroachment" on the President's 
appointment power, while "curb[ing] 
Executive abuses" by requiring Senate 
confirmation of all principal officers. It is 
thus universally considered "among the 
significant structural safeguards of the 
constitutional scheme."  
 
It is true that another restriction that is 
arguably a structural limitation on Congress's 
exercise of its powers -- the nondelegation 
doctrine -- does bend to the peculiar demands 
of providing for governance within the 
territories. In normal application, the doctrine 
requires that "when Congress confers 
decision-making authority upon agencies," it 
must "lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to [act] is directed to 
conform." Otherwise, Congress has violated 
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which 
vests "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted 
. . . in a Congress of the United States.". In 
connection with the territories, though, 
Congress can delegate to territorial 
governments the power to enact rules and 
regulations governing territorial affairs. The 
Supreme Court has analogized the powers of 
Congress over the District of Columbia and 
the territories to that of states over their 
municipalities. In the state-municipality 
context, "[a] municipal corporation . . . is but 
a department of the State.  
 
The legislature may give it all powers such a 
being is capable of receiving, making it a 
miniature State within its locality." The 
Supreme Court has also made clear that, in 
delegating power to the territories, Congress 
can only act insofar as "other provisions of 
the Constitution are not infringed." 
 
The territorial variations on the traditional 
restrictions of the nondelegation doctrine 
pose no challenge by Congress to the power 
of the other branches. Any delegation must 
take the form of a duly enacted statute subject 
to the President's veto. Furthermore, the 
territorial exception to the nondelegation 
doctrine strikes us as strongly implicit in the 
notion of a territory as envisioned by the 
drafters of the Constitution. The expectation 
was that territories would become states. 
Hence, Congress had a duty -- at least a moral 
duty -- to manage a transition from federal to 
home rule. While the final delegation takes 
place in the act of formally creating a state, it 
makes evident sense that partial delegations 
of home-rule powers would incrementally 
precede full statehood. Accordingly, from the 
very beginning, Congress created territorial 
legislatures to which it delegated rule-making 
authority.  
 
None of these justifications for limiting the 
nondelegation doctrine to accommodate one 
of Congress's most salient purposes in 
exercising its powers under Article IV 
applies to the Appointments Clause. Nor does 
the teaching of founding era history. To the 
contrary, the evidence suggests strongly that 
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Congress in 1789 viewed the process of 
presidential appointment and Senate 
confirmation as applicable to the 
appointment by the federal government of 
federal officers within the territories. That 
first Congress passed several amendments to 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 "so as to 
adopt the same to the present Constitution of 
the United States." One such conforming 
amendment eliminated the pre-constitutional 
procedure for congressional appointment of 
officers within the territory and replaced it 
with presidential nomination and 
appointment "by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.".  
 
More difficult to explain is United States v. 
Heinszen. The actual holding in Heinszen 
sustained tariffs on goods to the Philippines 
where the tariffs were imposed first by the 
President and then thereafter expressly 
ratified by Congress. In sustaining those 
tariffs, the Court stated that Congress could 
have delegated the power to impose the 
tariffs to the President beforehand, citing 
United States v. Dorr, a case that simply held 
that Congress could provide for criminal 
tribunals in the territories without also 
providing for trial by jury. Heinszen cannot 
be explained as an instance of Congress 
enabling home rule in a territory. Rather, it 
seems to allow Congress to delegate 
legislative power to the President, citing the 
territorial context as a justification. Heinszen, 
though, has no progeny that might shed light 
on how reliable it might serve as an apt 
analogy in the case before us. Moreover, 
Heinszen concerned a grant of power by 
Congress, not a grab for power at the expense 
of the executive.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we find in the 
nondelegation doctrine no apt example to 
justify an exception to the application of the 
Appointments Clause within the territories. 
An exception from the Appointments Clause 
would alter the balance of power within the 
federal government itself and would serve no 
necessary purpose in the transitioning of 
territories to states.  
 
Further, the Board points us to Palmore v. 
United States. That case arose out of 
Congress's exercise of its plenary powers 
over the District of Columbia under Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 17, powers which are fairly 
analogous to those under Article IV.  The 
Court held that Congress could create local 
courts -- like state courts -- that did not satisfy 
the requirements of Article III. The Board 
would have us read Palmore as an instance of 
Congress's plenary powers over a territory 
trumping the requirements of another 
structural pillar of the Constitution. We 
disagree. The Court explained at length how 
Article III itself did not require that all courts 
created by Congress satisfy the selection and 
tenure requirements of Article III. ("It is 
apparent that neither this Court nor Congress 
has read the Constitution as requiring every 
federal question arising under the federal law, 
or even every criminal prosecution for 
violating an Act of Congress, to be tried in an 
Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime 
tenure and protection against salary 
reduction."). Rather, the requirements of 
Article III are applicable to courts "devoted 
to matters of national concern,", and that 
local courts "primarily. . . concern[ed] . . . 
with local law and to serve as a local court 
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system" created by Congress pursuant to its 
plenary powers are simply another example 
of those courts that did not fit the Article III 
template (like state courts empowered to hear 
federal cases, military tribunals, the Court of 
Private Land Claims, and consular courts). In 
short, Article III was not trumped by 
Congress's creation of local courts pursuant 
to its Article I power. Rather, Article III itself 
accommodates exceptions, and the local D.C. 
court system fits within the range of those 
exceptions. That there are courts in other 
territories of the same ilk does not alter this 
analysis. Palmore therefore offers no firm 
ground upon which to erect a general Article 
IV exception to separation-of-powers 
stalwarts such as the Appointments Clause.  
 
Finally, nothing about the "Insular Cases" 
casts doubt over our foregoing analysis. This 
discredited lineage of cases, which ushered 
the unincorporated territories doctrine, 
hovers like a dark cloud over this case. To our 
knowledge there is no case even intimating 
that if Congress acts pursuant to its authority 
under the Territorial Clause it is excused 
from conforming with the Appointments 
Clause, whether this be by virtue of the 
"Insular Cases" or otherwise. Nor could there 
be, for it would amount to the emasculation 
from the Constitution of one of its most 
important structural pillars. We thus have no 
trouble in concluding that the Constitution's 
structural provisions are not limited by 
geography and follow the United States into 
its unincorporated territories.  
 
Notwithstanding this doctrine, appellant 
UTIER asks us to go one step further and 
reverse the "Insular Cases." Although there is 
a lack of enthusiasm for the perdurance of 
these cases, which have been regarded as a 
"relic from a different era,", and which 
Justice Frankfurter described as "historically 
and juridically, an episode of the dead past 
about as unrelated to the world of today as the 
one-hoss shay is to the latest jet airplane,", we 
cannot be induced to engage in an ultra vires 
act merely by siren songs. Not only do we 
lack the authority to meet UTIER's request, 
but even if we were writing on a clean slate, 
we would be required to stay our hand when 
dealing with constitutional litigation if other 
avenues of decision were available, and we 
believe there are in this case.  
 
In this respect, we are aided again by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Reid, which 
although refusing to reverse the "Insular 
Cases" outright, provides in its plurality 
opinion instructive language that outlines the 
appropriate course we ought to pursue in the 
instant appeal:  
 
The "Insular Cases" can be distinguished 
from the present cases in that they involved 
the power of Congress to provide rules and 
regulations to govern temporarily territories 
with wholly dissimilar traditions and 
institutions whereas here the basis for 
governmental power is American citizenship. 
. . . [I]t is our judgment that neither the cases 
nor their reasoning should be given any 
further expansion.  
 
The only course, therefore, which we are 
allowed in light of Reid is to not further 
expand the reach of the "Insular Cases." 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Territorial 
Clause and the "Insular Cases" do not impede 
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the application of the Appointments Clause 
in an unincorporated territory, assuming all 
other requirements of that provision are duly 
met.  
 
B. Board Members Are "Officers of the 
United States" Subject to the 
Appointments Clause  
 
We must now determine whether the Board 
Members qualify within the rubric of 
"Officers of the United States," the 
Appointments Clause's job description that 
marks the entry point for its coverage. The 
district court determined that the Board 
Members do not fall under such a rubric. We 
disagree. We begin our analysis by turning to 
a triad of Supreme Court decisions: Lucia v. 
SEC; Freytag; and Buckley v. Valeo. From 
these cases, we gather that the following 
"test" must be met for an appointee to qualify 
as an "Officer of the United States" subject to 
the Appointments Clause: (1) the appointee 
occupies a "continuing" position established 
by federal law; (2) the appointee "exercis[es] 
significant authority"; and (3) the significant 
authority is exercised "pursuant to the laws of 
the United States.". In our view, the Board 
Members readily meet these requirements.  
 
First, Board Members occupy "continuing 
positions" under a federal law since 
PROMESA provides for their appointment to 
an initial term of three years and they can 
thereafter be reappointed and serve until a 
successor takes office The continuity of the 
Board Members' position is fortified by the 
provision that only the President can remove 
them from office and then only for cause. In 
fact, the Board Members' term in office could 
well extend beyond three years, as 
PROMESA stipulates that the Board will 
continue in operation until it certifies that the 
Commonwealth government has met various 
fiscal objectives "for at least 4 consecutive 
fiscal years."  
 
Second, the Board Members plainly exercise 
"significant authority." For example, 
PROMESA empowers the Board Members to 
initiate and prosecute the largest bankruptcy 
in the history of the United States municipal 
bond market with the bankruptcy power 
being a quintessential federal subject matter. 
The Supreme Court recently reminded the 
Commonwealth government of the 
bankruptcy power's exclusive federal nature 
in Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust.  
 
The Board Members' federal authority 
includes the power to veto, rescind, or revise 
Commonwealth laws and regulations that it 
deems inconsistent with the provisions of 
PROMESA or the fiscal plans developed 
pursuant to it. Likewise, the Board showcases 
what can be construed as nothing but its 
significant authority when it rejects the 
budget of the Commonwealth or one of its 
instrumentalities; when it rules on the 
validity of a fiscal plan proposed by the 
Commonwealth; when it issues its own fiscal 
plan if it rejects the Commonwealth's 
proposed plan; and when it exercises its sole 
discretion to file a plan of adjustment for 
Commonwealth debt. The Board can only 
employ these significant powers because a 
federal law so provides.  
 
Moreover, Board Members' investigatory 
and enforcement powers, as carried out 
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collectively by way of the Board, exceed or 
are at least equal to those of the judicial 
officers the Supreme Court found to be 
"Officers of the United States" in Lucia. 
There, the Supreme Court held that 
administrative law judges are "Officers of the 
United States," in part, because they can 
receive evidence at hearings and administer 
oaths. PROMESA grants the Board Members 
the same right and more. In short, the Board 
Members enjoy "significant discretion" as 
they carry out "important functions”, under a 
federal law -- qualities that the Supreme 
Court has considered for decades as the 
birthmark of federal officers who are subject 
to the Appointments Clause.  
 
Third, the Board Members' authority is 
exercised "pursuant to the laws of the United 
States." The Board Members trace their 
authority directly and exclusively to a federal 
law, PROMESA. That federal law provides 
both their authority and their duties. 
Essentially everything they do is pursuant to 
federal law under which the adequacy of their 
performance is judged by their federal 
master. And this federal master serves in the 
seat of federal power, not San Juan. The 
Board Members are, in short, more like 
Roman proconsuls picked in Rome to enforce 
Roman law and oversee territorial leaders 
than they are like the locally selected leaders 
that Rome allowed to continue exercising 
some authority.  
 
The United States makes two arguments in 
support of the district court's opinion and 
PROMESA's current appointments protocol 
that warrant our direct response at this point. 
First, the United States argues that historical 
precedent suggests the inapplicability of the 
Appointments Clause to the territories. 
Second, the United States contends that if we 
find for appellants, such a ruling will 
invalidate the present-day democratically 
elected local governments of Puerto Rico and 
the other unincorporated territories because 
the officers of such governments took office 
without the Senate's advice and consent. We 
reject each argument in turn.  
 
The relevant historical precedents of which 
we are aware lead us to a different conclusion 
than that claimed by the United States. 
Excepting the short period during which 
Puerto Rico was under military 
administration following the Spanish-
American War, the major federal 
appointments to Puerto Rico's civil 
government throughout the first half of the 
20th century all complied with the 
Appointments Clause.  
 
Beginning in 1900 with the Foraker Act, the 
Governor of Puerto Rico was to be nominated 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate 
to a term of four years "unless sooner 
removed by the President." An Act 
temporarily to provide revenues and a civil 
government for Porto Rico, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 
77, 81 (1900). The Foraker Act also 
mandated presidential nomination and Senate 
confirmation of the members of Puerto Rico's 
"Executive Council"  (which assumed the 
dual role of executive cabinet and upper 
chamber of the territorial legislature). The 
Executive Council consisted of a secretary, 
an attorney general, a treasurer, an auditor, a 
commissioner of the interior, a commissioner 
of education, and five other persons "of good 
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repute." In addition, the Foraker Act also 
subjected the justices of the Puerto Rico 
Supreme Court, along with the marshal and 
judge of the territorial U.S. District Court for 
the District of "Porto" Rico, to the strictures 
of the Appointments Clause. Even the three 
members of a commission established to 
compile and revise the laws of "Porto" Rico 
were made subject to the Appointments 
Clause.  
 
The Foraker Act regime lasted until 1917, 
when Congress passed the Jones-Shafroth 
Act. Here again, Congress provided for all 
key appointments by Washington to Puerto 
Rico's territorial government to meet the 
Appointments Clause: the governor, attorney 
general, commissioner of education, supreme 
court justices, district attorney, U.S. marshal, 
and U.S. territorial district judge were to be 
appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. In sum, between 
1900 and 1947 -- the last time the Island had 
a federally-selected Governor -- each of the 
presidentially appointed Governors of Puerto 
Rico acquired their office after receiving the 
Senate's blessing. 
 
As the United States would have it, 
Congress's requirement of Senate 
confirmation for presidential nominees in all 
of the aforementioned contexts was mere 
voluntary legislative surplusage. This 
position, however, directly contravenes the 
published opinions of the United States' own 
Office of Legal Counsel issued as recently as 
2007. The original public meaning of 'officer' 
in Article II includes all federal officials with 
responsibility for an ongoing statutory 
duty."). At a minimum, the United States' 
posture runs head against the sound principle 
of legislative interpretation bordering on 
dogma that "'[l]ong settled and established 
practice is a consideration of great weight in 
proper interpretation of constitutional 
provisions' regulating the relationship 
between Congress and the President." 
Furthermore, the United States fails to 
support its assertion with legislative history 
or other evidence establishing that Congress's 
largely consistent adherence to 
Appointments Clause procedures in 
appointing territorial officials was gratuitous. 
Lacking such an explanation, we believe it is 
more probable that Congress was simply 
complying with what the Constitution 
requires. Furthermore, that largely consistent 
compliance with Appointment Clause 
procedures in hundreds if not thousands of 
instances over two centuries belies any claim 
that adherence to those procedures impedes 
Congress's exercise of its plenary powers 
within the territories.  
 
The United States, as well as the Board, also 
point to the manner in which Congress has for 
centuries allowed territories to elect 
territorial officials, including for example the 
governor of Puerto Rico since 1947. 
Congress created many of these territorial 
positions and they were filled not through 
presidential nomination and Senate 
confirmation, but rather by elections within 
the territory. The Board's basic point (and the 
United States' basic point as well) is this: If 
we find that the Board Members must be 
selected by presidential nomination and 
Senate confirmation, then that would mean 
that, for example, all elected territorial 
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governors and legislators have been selected 
in an unconstitutional manner.  
 
We disagree. The elected officials to which 
the Board and the United States point -- even 
at the highest levels -- are not federal officers. 
They do not "exercise significant authority 
pursuant to the laws of the United States." 
Rather, they exercise authority pursuant to 
the laws of the territory. Thus, in Puerto Rico 
for example, the Governor is elected by the 
citizens of Puerto Rico, his position and 
power are products of the Commonwealth's 
Constitution, see Puerto Rico Const. art. IV, 
and he takes an oath similar to that taken by 
the governor of a state.  
 
It is true that the Commonwealth laws are 
themselves the product of authority Congress 
has delegated by statute. So the elected 
Governor's power ultimately depends on the 
continuation of a federal grant. But that fact 
alone does not make the laws of Puerto Rico 
the laws of the United States, else every claim 
brought under Puerto Rico's laws would pose 
a federal question.  
 
C. The Board Members are Principal 
Officers of the United States  
 
Having concluded that the Board Members 
are indeed United States officers, we now 
turn to the specific means by which they must 
be appointed pursuant to the Appointments 
Clause. If the officer is a "principal" officer, 
the only constitutional method of 
appointment is by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. But 
when an officer is "inferior," Congress may 
choose to vest the appointment in the 
President alone, the courts, or a department 
head. And the Board argues (but we do not 
decide) that the President appointed the 
Board Members notwithstanding the 
restricted choice from congressional lists.  
 
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court 
held that an independent counsel was an 
"inferior" officer because she was subject to 
removal by the attorney general and because 
she had limited duties, jurisdiction, and 
tenure, among other factors. More than a 
decade later, the Court held that an "inferior" 
officer was one "whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were 
appointed by Presidential nomination with 
the advice and consent of the Senate." Our 
circuit later squared the two cases by holding 
that Edmond's supervision test was sufficient, 
but not necessary. Therefore, inferior officers 
are those who are directed and supervised by 
a presidential appointee; otherwise, they 
"might still be considered inferior officers if 
the nature of their work suggests sufficient 
limitations of responsibility and authority."  
 
The Board Members clearly satisfy the 
Edmond test. They are answerable to and 
removable only by the President and are not 
directed or supervised by others who were 
appointed by the President with Senate 
confirmation. Considering the additional 
Morrison factors does not change the 
calculus. Though the Board Members' tenure 
"is 'temporary' in the sense that [they are] 
appointed essentially to accomplish a single 
task, and when that task is over the [Board] is 
terminated,", the Board's vast duties and 
jurisdiction are insufficiently limited. 
Significantly, while the independent counsel 
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in Morrison was unable to "formulate policy 
for the Government or the Executive 
Branch," PROMESA explicitly grants such 
authority. And whereas the jurisdiction of the 
independent counsel was limited, Morrison, 
the Board's authority spans across the 
economy of Puerto Rico -- a territory with a 
population of nearly 3.5 million -- 
overpowering that of the Commonwealth's 
own elected officials. Under Edmond and 
Morrison, the Board Members are "principal" 
United States officers. They therefore should 
have been appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.  
 
THE REMEDY  
 
Having concluded that the process 
PROMESA provides for the appointment of 
Board Members is unconstitutional, we are 
left to determine the relief to which 
appellants are entitled. Both Aurelius and the 
UTIER ask that we order dismissal of the 
Title III petitions that the Board filed to 
commence the restructuring of 
Commonwealth debt. In doing so, appellants 
suggest that we ought to deem invalid all of 
the Board's actions until today and that this 
case does not warrant application of the de 
facto officer doctrine. It would then be on a 
constitutionally reconstituted Board, they 
say, to ratify or not ratify the unconstitutional 
Board's actions. Appellants also request that 
we sever from 48 U.S.C. § 2121(e) the 
language that authorizes the Board Members' 
appointment without Senate confirmation.  
 
There is no question but that in fashioning a 
remedy to correct the constitutional violation 
we have found it is unlikely that a perfect 
solution is available. In choosing among 
potential options, we ought to reduce the 
disruption that our decision may cause. But 
we are readily aided by several factors in this 
respect.  
 
First, PROMESA itself contains an express 
severability clause, stating as follows:  
 
Except as provided in subsection (b) 
[regarding uniformity of similarly situated 
territories], if any provision of this chapter or 
the application thereof to any person or 
circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of 
this chapter, or the application of that 
provision to persons or circumstances other 
than those as to which it is held invalid, is not 
affected thereby, provided that subchapter III 
is not severable from subchapters I and II, 
and subchapters I and II are not severable 
from subchapter III.  
 
Such a clause "creates a presumption that 
Congress did not intend the validity of the 
statute in question to depend on the validity 
of [a] constitutionally offensive provision." 
Severability in this instance is especially 
appropriate because Congress, within 
PROMESA, has already provided an 
alternative appointments mechanism, at least 
as to six of the Board Members. PROMESA 
directs that if the mechanism we found 
unconstitutional is not employed, "[w]ith 
respect to the appointment of a Board 
member . . . such an appointment shall be by 
and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, unless the President appoints an 
individual from a list, . . . in which case no 
Senate confirmation is required." 
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Accordingly, we hold that the present 
provisions allowing the appointment of 
Board Members in a manner other than by 
presidential nomination followed by the 
Senate's confirmation are invalid and 
severable. We do not hold invalid the 
remainder of the Board membership 
provisions, including those providing the 
qualifications for office and for appointment 
by the President with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.  
 
Second, we reject appellants' invitation to 
dismiss the Title III petitions and cast a 
specter of invalidity over all of the Board's 
actions until the present day. To the contrary, 
we find that application of the de facto officer 
doctrine is especially appropriate in this case.  
 
An ancient tool of equity, the de facto officer 
doctrine "confers validity upon acts 
performed by a person acting under the color 
of official title even though it is later 
discovered that the legality of that person's 
appointment . . . to office is deficient." A de 
facto officer is "one whose title is not good in 
law, but who is in fact in the unobstructed 
possession of an office and discharging its 
duties in full view of the public, in such 
manner and under such circumstances as not 
to present the appearance of being an intruder 
or usurper." Our sister court for the D.C. 
Circuit has described the doctrine as 
"protect[ing] citizens' reliance on past 
government actions and the government's 
ability to take effective and final action."  
 
Here, the Board Members were acting with 
the color of authority -- namely, PROMESA 
-- when, as an entity, they decided to file the 
Title III petitions on the Commonwealth's 
behalf, a power squarely within their lawful 
toolkit. And there is no indication but that the 
Board Members acted in good faith in 
moving to initiate such proceedings. 
Moreover, the Board Members' titles to office 
were never in question until our resolution of 
this appeal.  
 
Other considerations further counsel for our 
application of the de facto officer doctrine. 
We fear that awarding to appellants the full 
extent of their requested relief will have 
negative consequences for the many, if not 
thousands, of innocent third parties who have 
relied on the Board's actions until now. In 
addition, a summary invalidation of 
everything the Board has done since 2016 
will likely introduce further delay into a 
historic debt restructuring process that was 
already turned upside down once before by 
the ravage of the hurricanes that affected 
Puerto Rico in September 2017. At a 
minimum, dismissing the Title III petitions 
and nullifying the Board's years of work will 
cancel out any progress made towards 
PROMESA's aim of helping Puerto Rico 
"achieve fiscal responsibility and access to 
the capital markets."  
 
We therefore decline to order dismissal of the 
Board's Title III petitions. Our ruling, as 
such, does not eliminate any otherwise valid 
actions of the Board prior to the issuance of 
our mandate in this case. In so doing, we 
follow the Supreme Court's exact approach in 
Buckley, which involved an Appointments 
Clause challenge to the then recently formed 
Federal Election Commission. Although the 
Court held that the Commission was in fact 
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constituted in violation of the Appointments 
Clause, it nonetheless found that such a 
constitutional infirmity did "not affect the 
validity of the Commission's . . . past acts,". 
We conclude the same here and find that 
severance is the appropriate relief to which 
appellants are entitled after they successfully 
and "timely challenge[d] . . . the 
constitutional validity of" the Board 
Members' appointment.  
 
Finally, our mandate in these appeals shall 
not issue for 90 days, so as to allow the 
President and the Senate to validate the 
currently defective appointments or 
reconstitute the Board in accordance with the 
Appointments Clause. During the 90-day 
stay period, the Board may continue to 





In sum, we hold that the Board Members 
(other than the ex officio Member) must be, 
and were not, appointed in compliance with 
the Appointments Clause. Accordingly, the 
district court's conclusion to the contrary is 
reversed. We direct the district court to enter 
a declaratory judgment to the effect that 
PROMESA's -55- protocol for the 
appointment of Board Members is 
unconstitutional and must be severed. We 
affirm, however, the district court's denial of 
appellants' motions to dismiss the Title III 
proceedings. Each party shall bear its own 
costs.  
 
So ordered.  
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The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a case 
that could upend the work of the oversight 
board tasked with pulling Puerto Rico out of 
its record bankruptcy. 
The justices will review a federal appeals 
court ruling that said the Financial Oversight 
and Management Board’s members were 
appointed in violation of the Constitution. At 
the same time, the appellate panel said the 
board’s past decisions could stay in force, 
and both sides in the dispute asked the 
Supreme Court to intervene. 
Bondholders led by Aurelius Investment 
LLC are challenging the board’s composition 
and aiming to unravel much of its work. A 
win for Aurelius could threaten two tentative 
debt-restructuring deals: an accord with 
creditors of the island’s only electric utility, 
known as Prepa, and a recent agreement with 
a group of commonwealth bondholders. 
Underscoring the urgency of the case, the 
high court indicated it will hear it on a faster-
than-usual basis, with arguments in October. 
Both sides had urged expedited review. 
“The cloud of uncertainty that now hangs 
over the board’s actions is intolerable,” the 
board argued in its appeal. 
Along with certifying fiscal plans of the 
commonwealth and its agencies, the board 
restructured $4 billion of debt of the island’s 
former Government Development Bank in 
November and $17.6 billion of sales-tax debt 
in February. 
On June 16, the board and creditors holding 
$3 billion of commonwealth bonds 
announced a tentative restructuring deal that 
would reduce nearly $18 billion of Puerto 
Rico debt. The board in 2017 filed 
bankruptcy for Puerto Rico, the island’s 
government-owned electric utility and other 
agencies. 
Senate Confirmation 
Congress created the board in 2016 as part of 
federal legislation aimed at solving Puerto 
Rico’s debt crisis. President Barack 
Obama picked three Democrats and four 
Republicans to serve as board members from 
a list provided by congressional leaders of 
both parties. 
The appeals court said the board members 
should have been subject to Senate 
confirmation, as required under the 
Constitution’s appointments clause. The 
three-judge panel rejected contentions that a 
different part of the Constitution governing 
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U.S. territories overrides the appointments 
clause when it comes to Puerto Rico. 
But the appeals court also refused to 
categorically invalidate all the board’s work. 
The panel pointed to a legal principle known 
as the “de facto officer doctrine,” under 
which courts won’t nullify actions taken in 
good faith by someone whose appointment is 
later declared invalid. 
“We fear that awarding to appellants the full 
extent of their requested relief will have 
negative consequences for the many, if not 
thousands, of innocent third parties who have 
relied on the board’s actions until now,” 
Judge Juan Torruella wrote for the court. 
In its appeal, Aurelius and its allies said it 
received “no meaningful remedy.” The 
appeals court “granted Congress free license 
to pass laws that violate the appointments 
clause,” the bondholders argued. 
Aurelius has a history of litigating debt 
restructurings. It was part of a group of 
holdout investors that rejected deals to 
resolve Argentina’s debt crisis in a dispute 
that lasted 15 years. The firm held $360 
million of Puerto Rico general obligation 
bonds and $18.8 million of the island’s 
Highways and Transportation Authority debt, 
as of March 6, according to court documents. 
Retroactive Ratification 
A Supreme Court decision favoring Aurelius 
wouldn’t necessarily invalidate past board 
actions, but it would almost certainly spawn 
a new round of litigation. One possibility is 
that a newly appointed board, once confirmed 
by the Senate, could try to retroactively ratify 
the prior work. 
The Trump administration joined the board in 
urging the Supreme Court to overturn the 
appointments-clause part of the ruling. The 
administration said the lower court’s 
reasoning is so broad it “necessarily implies 
that the government of Puerto Rico has been 
unconstitutional since its inception.” 
The terms of the court’s current members 
expire Aug. 30. Earlier this month, President 
Donald Trump nominated the current 
members to complete their terms, a step 
aimed at minimizing the impact of the 
appeals court decision going forward. 





















June 20, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday agreed 
to decide whether members of Puerto Rico’s 
federally created financial oversight board 
were lawfully appointed in a dispute that 
could disrupt the panel’s restructuring of 
about $120 billion of the bankrupt U.S. 
commonwealth’s debt. 
The justices will hear an appeal by the board 
after a lower court ruled in February that the 
2016 appointments of its seven members 
violated the U.S. Constitution because they 
were not confirmed by the Senate. 
Creditors challenging the appointments filed 
appeals separately, asking the Supreme Court 
to find that the decisions made by the board 
are invalid because its members were 
unlawfully installed. The justices also agreed 
to hear that part of the dispute. 
The court scheduled oral arguments for 
October in a bid to resolve the issue quickly. 
The board is overseeing the restructuring of 
debt and pension obligations through a form 
of bankruptcy. 
The legal challenge to the board’s 
composition was brought in 2017 by Puerto 
Rico creditors including Aurelius 
Investment, LLC, a hedge fund that holds 
Puerto Rico bonds, and Unión de 
Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y 
Riego, Inc, a labor group that represents 
workers at Puerto Rico’s government-owned 
electricity utility. 
Bondholders face losses as a result of debt 
restructuring while the labor group has said 
that the board’s proposed restructuring of the 
utility’s debt would violate the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement and lead to 
its members having worse working 
conditions. 
In an effort to resolve the dispute, the White 
House on June 18 officially sent nominations 
for the board’s current members to the 
Senate. The Trump administration also filed 
its own appeal to the Supreme Court 
defending the original appointments. 
In the meantime, the oversight board has 
asked an appeals court to extend a July 15 
deadline it set for the board’s seven members 






“Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Plan is Almost Done, and It Could Start a Fight” 
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After three years of negotiations, Puerto 
Rico’s federal overseers are at last finishing 
up a plan to complete the restructuring of the 
island’s roughly $124 billion in debt. To 
resolve the biggest government financial 
collapse in United States history, they have 
had to untangle the island’s thorny finances, 
negotiate with creditors and figure out how to 
do it without endangering the livelihoods of 
retirees who rely solely on their pensions. 
That may have been the easy part. 
Some of the island’s creditors — including 
the hedge fund Aurelius Capital 
Management, which held up Argentina’s 
debt settlement for years for a better deal — 
will almost certainly challenge the plan on 
the ground that it violates the territory’s 1952 
Constitution. 
At the center of it all are two intertwined 
issues. The oversight board wants to cut back 
the amount paid to some of those who hold 
the territory’s debt while also giving an 
unexpectedly good deal to more than 300,000 
workers and retirees, some of whom do not 
even have Social Security. The good deal for 
the pension holders means a worse one for the 
holders of Puerto Rico’s debt. 
“You can make social and political 
decisions,” said James E. Spiotto, a longtime 
municipal bankruptcy lawyer who is not 
involved in Puerto Rico’s legal proceedings. 
“But it’s best to have them wrapped up in a 
settlement that everybody agrees to.” 
The plan is expected to be presented to Judge 
Laura Taylor Swain in Federal District Court 
in San Juan, P.R., in the next few weeks. But 
the approach the board has taken could invite 
titanic legal battles and appeals, Mr. Spiotto 
said. 
“You want resolution, not litigation,” he said. 
“I think there’s a significant risk to what’s 
being done. 
In many ways, Puerto Rico’s collapse has 
been uncharted legal territory. It took an act 
of Congress in 2016 to create the bankruptcy-
like law, known as Promesa, that is being 
used to deal with the crisis. 
That has turned Puerto Rico into something 
of a test case. Although cities and 
municipalities — most notably Detroit in 
2013 — have declared bankruptcy, states are 
not eligible to do so. But a number of them 
are dealing with serious financial problems 
because of pension costs. 
A combination of inadequate funding over 
the decades, a wave of retiring baby boomers 
and the lingering effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis has forced states to reduce benefits, 
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increase funding or both. But a few states — 
including Illinois, New Jersey, Kentucky, 
Connecticut and Colorado — are still far 
behind, and more drastic measures may be 
tempting if Puerto Rico can provide a road 
map to recovery. 
“If this works — if Promesa works and the 
restructuring works — it may make 
bankruptcy for states seem like something 
that lawmakers should be considering a little 
more seriously,” said David A. Skeel Jr., a 
University of Pennsylvania law professor 
who is on the oversight board and has written 
on the possibility of states using bankruptcy. 
“But if it doesn’t work, it would have the 
opposite effect.” 
Whether Puerto Rico is able to blaze new 
ground in the world of government debt 
restructuring will not be decided until after 
the courts resolve any challenges to the novel 
steps the oversight board has taken: its 
treatment of retirees and an attempt to 
have $9 billion of its debt declared 
unconstitutional. 
Promesa contains a legal requirement that 
Puerto Rico “provide adequate funding for 
public pension systems” — carefully chosen 
language that has given the island legal cover 
to keep paying retirees their pensions, even as 
it defaulted on bonds that would normally 
have been paid first. 
The board has essentially switched the usual 
order of priority used in bankruptcy: It put 
workers and retirees, with their roughly $55 
billion in pension obligations, near the front 
of the line, and pushed back the general-
obligation bondholders whose investments 
financed the island over the years. 
Under the current proposals, 61 percent of the 
retirees would keep receiving their full 
pensions, said Natalie Jaresko, the oversight 
board’s executive director. Other pensions 
would be cut on a sliding scale, but even 
those owed the most would get 91.5 percent 
of their payments. Current employees would 
be shifted into individual retirement 
accounts. 
That’s a better deal than is being offered to 
the general-obligation bondholders, who 
would get 64 cents on the dollar, at best. And 
retirees are being offered a far more generous 
deal than expected, given that the island’s 
pension system has been stripped bare. 
Normally, the money in a pension fund 
secures the benefits. If an employer goes 
bankrupt, the participants are still guaranteed 
benefits based on what has been set aside: A 
fully funded pension system will pay full 
benefits, and a partly funded pension system 
will pay partial benefits. 
But there is no money set aside in Puerto 
Rico. The participants in such a case would 
normally be considered unsecured creditors 
— the kind who typically get a fraction of 
what they’re owed. One group of unsecured 
creditors, trade vendors to the Puerto Rican 
government, is being offered just 9 cents on 
the dollar, on average. 
The retirees’ terms rival those achieved by 
Detroit’s after their city went bankrupt. 
(Unlike states, cities are eligible for 
bankruptcy unless prohibited by state law.) 
Detroit’s retired police officers and 
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firefighters are still receiving 100 percent of 
their original pensions, with smaller annual 
cost-of-living increases, while other retirees 
are getting 95.5 percent. 
But Detroit’s pension funds were said to be 
about two-thirds funded, and a threat to sell 
off treasures owned by the Detroit Institute of 
Arts raised hundreds of millions of 
dollars more from philanthropic and 
governmental bodies that were horrified at 
the idea of pieces by van Gogh, Matisse and 
others going to private collectors. 
At least one company that stands to lose 
money under the proposed Puerto Rico deal 
says it is preparing a challenge. 
Assured Guaranty, a bond insurer with 
exposure to some of Puerto Rico’s debt, said 
it was ready to go to court because the deal 
threatened to “significantly erode the 
municipal bond market’s confidence” and 
make it harder for governments to take on big 
projects. 
The proposed deal, the insurer said, is based 
on “a number of terms that violate Puerto 
Rico law, its Constitution and Promesa.” 
Under the island’s Constitution, general-
obligation bondholders are said to have “first 
claim” on “all available resources” of the 
government to ensure the repayment of their 
roughly $17 billion of bonds. 
But they’re being offered less than the 
pension holders, who are being offered more 
than 90 percent of what they’re owed. Some 
general-obligation bondholders are being 
offered 64 cents on the dollar, but others are 
being offered less as part of a hardball 
negotiating tactic by the oversight board. 
The board said this year that it would 
challenge the validity of several billion 
dollars’ worth of bonds, including general-
obligation bonds that were brought to market 
in 2012 and 2014. It says that those bonds 
were issued in violation of Puerto Rico’s 
constitutional debt ceiling, and that the 
people of Puerto Rico should not have to 
repay them. 
As a result, only the general-obligation bonds 
issued before 2012 would pay the proposed 
64 cents on the dollar. Investors who hold the 
bonds issued in 2012 are being offered 45 
cents, and those holding the 2014 vintage are 
being offered 35 cents. 
Many holders of the older bonds are expected 
to take their 64 cents and be done with it. But 
holders of the 2012 and 2014 bonds — 
including Aurelius — are likely to sue. 
Aurelius declined to comment on its plans. 
But it has already sued Puerto Rico, 
contending that the island must respect its 
constitutional pledge of using “all available 
resources” to ensure repayment. That suit has 
been stayed while the oversight board works 
on its plan, but any challenge could use the 
same argument. 
Aurelius could also use the legal 
argument that got results in the Argentine 
case: that the restructuring plan illegally 
discriminates against the holders of similar 
bonds. 
Such lawsuits would be an all-or-nothing 
gamble. If the bondholders won, they would 
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get the same 64 percent repayment rate as the 
holders of the older bonds. If the board won, 
the bonds would be voided and the 
bondholders would get nothing. 
That group of bondholders has some 
company in opposing the deal. Puerto Rican 
teachers — who would be moved into 
individual retirement accounts under the deal 
— voted against it in an early ballot, even 
though the American Federation of Teachers 
had urged a yes vote. 
Retired teachers will not cast ballots until 




























May 2, 2017 
 
Puerto Rico is facing a fresh round of creditor 
lawsuits after a temporary reprieve on 
litigation was lifted, exposing the distressed 
Caribbean island to the consequences of the 
defaults on much of its $70 billion of debt. 
Hedge funds holding $1.4 billion of general-
obligation bonds sold in 2014, 
including Aurelius Capital 
Management and Monarch Alternative 
Capital, sued the commonwealth in New 
York state court in Manhattan, seeking 
payment on overdue principal and interest. 
Insurer Ambac Financial Group Inc. and 
funds that own sales-tax backed bonds sued 
in the U.S. District Court of San Juan in an 
effort to block the government from spending 
that money before bondholders are paid. 
“They’re breaking every agreement and 
security feature they set up to borrow the 
money,” said Daniel Solender, head of 
municipals at Lord Abbett & Co., which 
manages $19 billion of state and local debt, 
including commonwealth securities. “The 
creditors have to challenge that because the 
rules have been broken.” 
The cases filed Tuesday are the first of what’s 
expected to be a wave of new legal challenges 
from investors seeking to force the U.S. 
territory to pay what it owes. With the 
government so far unable to reach an 
agreement with bondholders, such lawsuits 
threaten to expose Puerto Rico to adverse 
legal rulings and could lead the island and its 
federal overseers to use bankruptcy-like 
procedures to cut its debts in court. 
That process was created under U.S. 
legislation enacted last year to help Puerto 
Rico arrest its fiscal crisis, given the 
difficulty of restructuring debt sold by more 
than a dozen agencies and backed by varying 
legal pledges. Analysts have speculated that 
Puerto Rico would need to utilize such a 
court-supervised proceeding to force 
creditors to accept losses. 
The lawsuits, similar to others that were filed 
months ago, came after a stay imposed by the 
federal rescue law lapsed on Monday night. 
In one of the new cases, funds holding about 
$1.9 billion of senior sales-tax bonds know as 
Cofinas -- including those run by Whitebox 
Advisors, Merced Partners and Tilden Park 
Capital Management -- sued Governor 
Ricardo Rossello and his administration to 
stop a fiscal plan that diverts the revenue to 
the commonwealth’s general fund, which 
they said violates the U.S. and Puerto Rico 
constitutions. Such shifts raise the risk that 
the island will default on the bonds, and the 
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fiscal plan doesn’t specify which creditors 
have the highest legal claim to the small share 
of money allocated to bondholders. 
Puerto Rico has already defaulted on its 
general-obligation bonds, the securities 
behind the lawsuit filed in New York state 
court. 
Senior Cofinas with a 6.05 percent coupon 
and maturing in 2036, the most-actively 
traded sales-tax bonds in the past three 
months, changed hands Tuesday at an 
average 61.3 cents on the dollar, up from an 
average 60.4 cents the day before, data 
compiled by Bloomberg show. General 
obligations due in 2041, the most active 
Tuesday, traded for an average of 59.5 cents 
on the dollar, up from 59.1 cents Monday. 
Yennifer Alvarez, a spokeswoman for the 
governor, didn’t immediately respond to a 
phone message and email. 
Ambac, which insures about $1.3 billion of 
senior Cofinas, filed a similar suit against 
Rossello and the members of Puerto Rico’s 
federal oversight board, asking the court to 
declare the fiscal plan unconstitutional and 
illegal because it requires using sales-tax 
revenue for general-fund expenses. 
Jose Luis Cedeno, a spokesman for the 
federal oversight board, didn’t have an 
immediate comment. 
While negotiations between Puerto Rico and 
its creditors have so far failed to produce a 
restructuring deal, the commonwealth is still 
engaged in “meaningful conversations” with 
certain bondholders and creditor groups, 
Gerardo Portela Franco, executive director of 
the island’s Fiscal Agency and Financial 
Advisory Authority, said in a statement 
Monday. 
The cases are Aristeia Horizons LP v. 
Rossello, 17-01566; and Ambac Assurance 
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 17-01567, both in 
U.S. District Court, District of Puerto Rico 
(San Juan). Aurelius Investment LLC v. 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
652357/2017, New York State Supreme 
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes 
omitted] 
The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, 
and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) is 
the federal legislation that was enacted to 
provide a special bankruptcy framework for 
Puerto Rico. 48 U.S.C. §§2101 et seq. An 
important component of PROMESA is the 
establishment of a Financial Oversight Board 
(FOMB) with oversight powers over the 
financial affairs of the Puerto Rican 
government and sole authority over the 
Puerto Rico bankruptcy cases. 48 U.S.C. 
§§2121(b), 2121(d), and 2124(j)(1). The 
members of the FOMB are appointed by the 
President. 48 U.S.C. §2101(e)(2). 
In Aurelius Investment v. Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, 2019 WL 642328 (1st Cir. 
2019) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that the appointment of the 
members of the FOMB (the Board Members) 
violated the Appointments Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. The Board Members are 
officers of the United States, and therefore 
they are subject to Senate confirmation. 
However, the court refused to dismiss the 
Puerto Rico bankruptcy case. The First 
Circuit ruled that under the de facto officer 
doctrine the acts of the FOMB were lawful 
because the Board Members of the FOMB 
had acted under color of law and it would be 
counter-productive to negate the actions of 
the FOMB because thousands of people have 
relied upon the acts of the FOMB. The court 
stayed enforcement of its decision for ninety 
days to allow the FOMB to function and to 
permit the Board Members of the FOMB to 
go through the Senate confirmation process. 
Discussion 
The Territorial Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution Does Not Supersede the 
Appointments Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. The first issue that the court 
addressed was whether the Territorial Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution superseded the 
Appointments Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. The Territorial Clause provides 
Congress with the following authority over 
the territories of the United States: 
power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory  … belonging 
to the United States. 
The Appointments Clause states: 
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[The President]  … shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint  … all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, 
and which shall be established by 
Law: but the Congress may by Law 
vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, 
or in the Heads of Departments. 
The court thought that the resolution of this 
issue was a straightforward issue of 
Constitutional interpretation. The Territorial 
Clause was a general clause in the U.S. 
Constitution. The Appointments Clause was 
a specific clause. An important principle of 
Constitutional interpretation is that the 
specific governs over the general. The First 
Circuit stated: 
Nowhere does the Territorial Clause 
reference the subject matter of federal 
appointments or the process to 
effectuate them. On the other hand, 
federal officer appointment is, of 
course, the raison d’etre of the 
Appointments Clause. It cannot be 
clearer or more unequivocal that the 
Appointments Clause mandates that it 
be applied to “all  … Officers of the 
United States.” U.S. Const. art II, §2, 
cl. 2 (emphasis added). Thus, we find 
in answering the first question before 
us a prime candidate for application 
of the specialibus canon and for the 
strict enforcement of the 
constitutional mandate contained in 
the Appointments Clause. 
The court also rejected the argument that the 
Insular Cases negated the operation of the 
Appointments Clause in Puerto Rico: 
Finally, nothing about the “Insular 
Cases” casts doubt over our foregoing 
analysis. This discredited lineage of 
cases, which ushered the 
unincorporated territories doctrine, 
hovers like a dark cloud over this 
case. To our knowledge there is no 
case even intimating that if Congress 
acts pursuant to its authority under the 
Territorial Clause it is excused from 
conforming with the Appointments 
Clause, whether this be by virtue of 
the “Insular Cases” or otherwise. Nor 
could there be, for it would amount to 
the emasculation from the 
Constitution of one of its most 
important structural pillars. We thus 
have no trouble in concluding that the 
Constitution’s structural provisions 
are not limited by geography and 
follow the United States into its 
unincorporated territories. (Footnotes 
omitted). 
The Members of the FOMB Are Principal 
Officers of the United States. The next issue 
that the First Circuit addressed was whether 
the Board Members are officers of the United 
States. The court applied a three-part test to 
determine whether Board Members are 
“Officers of the United States” and therefore 
subject to the Appointments Clause. The 
three-part test was derived from Supreme 
Court case law: 
(1) the appointee occupies a 
“continuing” position established by 
 531 
federal law; (2) the appointee 
“exercis[es] significant authority”; 
and (3) the significant authority is 
exercised “pursuant to the laws of the 
United States.” 
A Board Member has a “continuing position” 
under a federal law because PROMESA 
provides for his or her appointment to an 
initial term of three years and he or she can 
thereafter be reappointed and serve until a 
successor takes office. A Board Member 
exercises significant authority because the 
FOMB has sole authority over the Puerto 
Rico bankruptcy case. The FOMB has the 
authority to countermand Puerto Rico laws or 
regulations that are inconsistent with 
PROMESA. Board Members, moreover, 
exercised significant authority pursuant to 
federal law: 
Third, the Board Members’ authority 
is exercised “pursuant to the laws of 
the United States.” The Board 
Members trace their authority directly 
and exclusively to a federal law, 
PROMESA. That federal law 
provides both their authority and their 
duties. 
The court also held that the Board Members 
are “principal” officers, and thus, must be 
nominated by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate. An “inferior” officer is not subject 
to the Appointments Clause. An “inferior” 
officer was a government official whose 
work is directed and supervised at some level 
by others who were appointed by Presidential 
nomination with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. On the other hand, Board 
Members are only answerable to and only 
removable by the President and are not 
directed or supervised by others who were 
nominated by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate. 
The Remedy and the Application of the De 
Facto Officers Doctrine. The First Circuit 
was averse to dismissing the Puerto Rico 
bankruptcy case. The court stated: 
Second, we reject appellants’ 
invitation to dismiss the Title III 
petitions and cast a specter of 
invalidity over all of the Board’s 
actions until the present day. To the 
contrary, we find that application of 
the de facto officer doctrine is 
especially appropriate in this case. 
The court applied the de facto officer 
doctrine: 
An ancient tool of equity, the de 
facto officer doctrine “confers 
validity upon acts performed by a 
person acting under the color of 
official title even though it is later 
discovered that the legality of that 
person’s appointment … to office is 
deficient.” 
The facts warranted the application of the de 
facto officer doctrine. The Board Members 
were acting under color of authority. The 
Board Members acted in good faith. Until the 
resolution of this appeal there was never any 
question of the Board Members’ authority 
under PROMESA. 
The First Circuit applied the de facto officer 
doctrine because of prudential 
considerations: 
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We fear that awarding to appellants 
the full extent of their requested relief 
will have negative consequences for 
the many, if not thousands, of 
innocent third parties who have relied 
on the Board’s actions until now. In 
addition, a summary invalidation of 
everything the Board has done since 
2016 will likely introduce further 
delay into a historic debt restructuring 
process that was already turned 
upside down once before by the 
ravage of the hurricanes that affected 
Puerto Rico in September 2017. 
The First Circuit did not invalidate any of the 
FOMB’s actions. The court stayed the 
enforcement of its Decision and Order for 90 
days to enable the Board Members to be 
confirmed by the Senate. 
Conclusion 
The First Circuit reached a legally correct 
decision that is equitable and pragmatic. The 
court was cognizant of the potential 
irreparable damage that its decision could do 
to Puerto Rico. In essence, the court applied 
what was the equivalent of the equitable 
mootness doctrine because after almost two 
years it declined to unravel the Puerto Rico 
bankruptcy case. The dismissal of the Puerto 
Rico bankruptcy case would have resulted in 
the dissolution of the automatic stay, and 
unmanageable litigation that could have 
destroyed Puerto Rico. If the Puerto Rico 
bankruptcy case had been dismissed, then 
millions of dollars in professional fees 
incurred by Puerto Rico could have been 
wasted. Therefore, the First Circuit reached 
the correct equitable and legal conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
